Rural Electrification Policy and Off Grid Solar: Sector Engagement Strategies in India and Beyond by Plutshack, Victoria Anne
 1 
Word	T
emplat
e	by	
Friedm
an	&	M
organ	2
014 
 
 
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION POLICY AND 
OFF GRID SOLAR: SECTOR ENGAGEMENT 
STRATEGIES IN INDIA AND BEYOND 
 
 
 
Victoria Anne Plutshack 
Peterhouse 
 
Cambridge Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance 
Department of Land Economy 
University of Cambridge 
 
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
December 2018 
Victoria Anne Plutshack – December 2018  2 
Word	T
emplat
e	by	
Friedm
an	&	M
organ	2
014 
 
 
 Victoria Anne Plutshack – November 2019  i 
Word	T
emplat
e	by	
Friedm
an	&	M
organ	2
014 
 
DECLARATION 
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the 
outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified 
in the text. 
It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently 
submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge 
or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and 
specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already 
been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or 
other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar 
institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text 
In accordance with the Department of Land Economy guidelines, this thesis is does not 
exceed 80,000 words.  
 
 
Signed:______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Date:_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Victoria Anne Plutshack  
University of Cambridge 
 
 
 
 
 Victoria Anne Plutshack – December 2018  ii 
Word	T
emplat
e	by	
Friedm
an	&	M
organ	2
014 
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION POLICY AND OFF GRID SOLAR: 
SECTOR ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN INDIA AND BEYOND 
VICTORIA ANNE PLUTSHACK 
SUMMARY  
1.1 billion people currently live without access to electricity. Sustainable Development 
Goal #7 advocates for clean, affordable energy for all by 2030, but most of the work of 
electrification is spurred by national electrification efforts. How rural electrification 
policies attempt to engage market actors, and the impact that these policies have on 
enterprises, is crucial to understanding what makes policies effective. This thesis begins 
by creating a typology of rural electrification policies in order to improve comparison 
and contextualisation of individual policies. Within this typology, the research explores 
the relationship between programmatic policies and market actors (enterprises). Given 
India’s history of rural electrification programmes and its well-developed off grid solar 
market, the thesis then takes India as a case study and explores on two of its off grid 
solar programmes: the Decentralized Distributed Generation Scheme and the off grid 
component of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission.  
 In depth interviews explore how enterprises’ business models respond to policy 
change, their political strategy and how end users are selected. Findings suggest that 
enterprises respond quickly to changes in their policy environment, and a single change 
can have large knock-on effects within the business model. Political strategies are 
impacted by a number of factors both exogenous and endogenous to the enterprise, 
which can limit engagement with programmes. Finally, the target populations for rural 
electrification programmes are not necessarily the ideal customers for enterprises, even 
for those selling off grid products. While the interviews focus exclusively on India, 
these findings more generally suggest that governments must support the market that 
their policies require. 
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PREFACE 
 
The conceptual framework developed in Chapter 5: Factors influencing the Political 
Strategy of Enterprises was developed from work done in collaboration with Dr 
Subhanjan Sengupta. The data and analysis is completely my own, with Dr Sengupta 
offering feedback. Section 5.3 offers further information. All words are my own. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
 It was a sunny February morning in New Delhi, and I was perched on a plush 
chair in a small conference room. It was my first week in India and the first interview of 
my fieldwork. Next to me, animatedly answering my questions, was the founder of a 
solar social enterprise. The business had started out providing a range of technologies to 
address rural challenges – clean drinking water, pest control, basic lighting. He was 
explaining how the company had landed on their current business model: 
“I realised that the real challenge in India was distribution, and setting up 
the last mile, and as a person also I found I was more excited to work with 
people than with that. So we pivoted the model and we started solar home 
systems, which is more customers” 
 Or it should have been, but despite the reasonable price, no one was buying 
“off the shelf”. That is when the company found financing for their customers through 
the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) and business 
picked up. Political changes put an end to that approach: 
“Then in 2014 the government again changed - the Modi Government, the 
right-wing Government came in. And they decided to remove all the 
subsidies, all the bank financing for home systems, which kind of hit us 
hard again” 
So what did they do?  
“So the model didn't work anymore, so our sales are falling, which is when 
we entered micro grids.”  
 When I spoke to this company last – ENT11, in my coding – they still had a 
few areas where they were supporting their old solar home system customers or 
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providing solar home systems for community and public lighting projects. Now, they do 
not even mention solar home systems on their website. It is microgrids or nothing. As 
the conversation unfolded, the change in technology had shifted their customers. They 
had moved their geographic focus to a different state. Their financial arrangement with 
the consumer had changed, impacting whom they could reach. They added more grid-
connected projects to finance the off grid work. All this because the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Solar Mission (JNNSM) had cancelled its subsidy and financing.  
 This might seem surprising. ENT11 had been taking advantage of the 
JNNSM’s Off Grid Scheme as it was intended. The Government of India had prioritised 
electrifying rural areas and had identified off grid solar systems as one way to do it 
(MNRE, 2012a).  How did the government want these types of enterprises to help them 
reach their goal? How were these policies intended to engage enterprise, and what 
impact were they actually having on the market? It was not simply a matter of losing 
customers: some enterprises were leaving the market; some were shrinking or scaling 
up; some enterprises were metamorphosing into completely different companies 
altogether. All of this was likely to impact the end user. To quote my interlocutor: 
“So [we] realised that we have to take it in our own hands, and otherwise, 
poor people get shafted all the time in this country - actually, everywhere in 
the world.” 
1.2 SDG #7, Off Grid and the Private Sector  
1.2.1 Global policy support for off grid 
 Energy access is a cornerstone of the United Nations’ 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals. SDG #7 aims to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable 
and modern energy for all by meeting five 2030 targets: 
“By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy 
services 
“By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global 
energy mix 
“By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency 
“By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean 
energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote 
investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology 
“By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying 
modern and sustainable energy services for all in developing countries, in 
particular least developed countries, small island developing States, and 
land-locked developing countries, in accordance with their respective 
programmes of support” (United Nations, 2015) 
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This thesis focuses on addressing the first and second targets of SDG 7 by exploring 
rural electrification policies (energy access) that promote solar energy (increasing 
renewables). These are primarily off grid solutions, which include solar home systems 
(sometimes called standalone solar), micogrids and minigrids. Solar home systems 
provide power for a single households, whereas solar microgrids and minigrids power 
multiple households, as well as other buildings. Within this thesis, I define microgrids 
as having between 1-10kW capacity and minigrids as having 10kW of capacity or 
greater, which is the definition according the GoI’s draft minigrid/microgrid policy 
(MNRE, 2016). It should be noted that since “microgrid” is the common vernacular for 
any decentralised grid solution, most enterprises occasionally referred to their products 
as “microgrids”. However, this thesis will continue to use the capacity-based definitions 
outside of direct quotations. 
If we are to meet SDG #7’s goal of energy for all by 2030, nearly three quarters of 
additional connections must come through decentralised systems, 24% through 
standalone off grid and 30% through minigrids (IEA 2017, p 53, 89). This gives some 
idea of the importance of off grid technologies to global energy access in the next 
decade. Indeed:  
“Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has seen significant growth in the role that 
decentralised systems play in providing access in rural areas over the last few years, and 
by 2030, off-grid and mini-grid systems generate the majority of the electricity used to 
bring access to rural areas. In developing Asia, which is home to countries like 
Indonesia and the Philippines with thousands of islands, two-thirds of electricity related 
to expanding access in rural areas comes from decentralised systems in 2030” (IEA 
2017, p 50-51). 
However, even in this new policy scenario, universal access will not be reached, and it 
assumes “strengthened policies, effective infrastructure planning and higher levels of 
strategic investment to keep pace with growing demand from strong population growth, 
particularly in rural areas” (IEA 2017, p 90). 
One aspect of infrastructure planning that has changed over time is the relationship 
between grid and off grid solutions. Grid expansion has long been considered the 
primary approach to electrification, even in scenarios where distributed generation has 
had a large part to play, such as China’s access expansion through microhydro power in 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Victoria Anne Plutshack – November 2019  19 
Word	T
emplat
e	by	
Friedm
an	&	M
organ	2
014 
the 1980s (Niez, 2010; Palit and Bandyopadhyay, 2017). However, as the scale of the 
challenge has come into focus, policies have incorporated off grid solutions, at first to 
reach those that are unable to get grid connected in the short term, and increasingly as a 
longer term complement to grid extension (Haanyika, 2006; Palit and Chaurey, 2011). 
The move from grid-only approaches to off grid is also reflected in a move from 
assumptions of public financing to leveraging the private sector. In great part, this is 
because public resources are scarce in many low- and middle-income countries, and the 
private sector is viewed as a possible solution to tight budgets (Williams et al., 2015). 
These changes have also taken place in the context of power sector reforms across Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa, which have diminished incentives for utilities to connect 
additional customers (Haanyika 2006). Instead, governments have both invited private 
financing for off grid projects and created rural electrification agencies to prioritise new 
connections (Haanyika, 2006; Baldwin et al., 2015). 
1.2.2 Global investment trends in off grid market 
Sure enough, global investment in the off grid market has increased, despite mixed 
views of government intervention in the sector. Increasing investments in pay-as-you-
go solar companies suggest that private players anticipate profits, with the latest figures 
from 2018 showing an additional $511 million investments in solar home system 
companies (Bloomberg NEF, 2017). Solar home system and PAYG business models are 
receiving 81% and 91% of investments, respectively (Wood Mackenzie, 2019). 
Financing also predominantly goes to the SHS players in the field that have already 
achieved scale, such as Zola Electric, MKPOA and d.light (Wood Mackenzie, 2019). 
The majority of investments is flowing into East Africa where mobile money makes 
additional financing attractive (Wood Mackenzie, 2019).  
Financing in the has come from multilaterals, bilaterals, governments and private 
investors, whose focus can influence how money is spent (Gujba et al., 2012). Many of 
these multilaterals are development banks, such as the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank and the African Development Bank, which in the past have 
favoured large, grid-based projects (Subhes C Bhattacharyya, 2013).  
Even smaller off grid projects, like minigrids, can provide a positive return on 
investment, but government policy still needs to help support private investment 
through prioritizing off grid, reforming subsidy regimes that favour fossil fuels, and 
implementing technology standards (Schmidt, Blum and Wakeling, 2013). Solar PV 
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minigrid projects should be slightly less expensive than diesel-based projects, however, 
in high risk environments, PV projects require 95% more financing, becoming much 
more expensive than diesel-based projects (UNDP, 2018). UNDP identifies policy 
programmes and legislation as the primary approach to reducing risk for minigrid 
investment (UNDP, 2018). Meanwhile some have cited India’s public off grid 
programmes as limiting the role of private investment in the sector, suggesting that the 
way in which governments design off grid policies influences the buy in from the 
private sector (Wood Mackenzie, 2019).  
1.2.3 Evidence for the efficacy of policies 
The literature that explores the design and success of off grid solar electrification 
policies falls into three categories: case studies of individual programmes, broader 
explorations of specific themes (ie role of financing), or a few limited comparative 
studies. Case studies of individual programmes attempt to assess the determinants for 
success or failure of rural electrification policies, but are still fairly few and far 
between. Some examples include an analysis of India’s National Solar Mission, 
Bangladesh’s solar home system programme, rural electrification in Zambia, and a rural 
energy service company programme in Fiji (Haanyika, 2008; Dornan, 2011; Harish and 
Raghavan, 2011; Urmee and Harries, 2011). Broader thematic explorations focus 
mainly on the challenges or barriers to off grid energy expansion, which can include 
regulatory or policy barriers, but just as often focus on financing, infrastructure, 
corruption, willingness to pay, technological and human capacity, training and skills 
development (Sovacool, D’Agostino and Jain Bambawale, 2011; Glemarec, 2012; 
Ahlborg and Hammar, 2014; Yaqoot, Diwan and Kandpal, 2016).  
 Finally, studies that attempt to compare rural electrification policies are 
scattered and casuistic in that individual countries are selected and some assumption of 
comparability is inherent in the design of the research. Comparisons commonly take 
place between four main countries: India, China, Brazil and South Africa (Liming, 
2009; Niez, 2010). Liming compares the financing available for rural renewables in 
India and China, finding that India and China share a common emphasis on financing 
for the sector but that India has a more developed system of subsidies, financing and 
institutional support for rural renewables, as well as greater domestic, as opposed to 
international, investment (Liming 2009). Niez is more ambitious is comparing these 
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four large countries and outlining the relevant policies for each, making an assessment 
of general success and drawing broader conclusions about the design of REPs (Niez 
2010).  
 Some comparative studies are more ambitious. Sovacool uses extensive 
interviews (441) and secondary literature to draw conclusions about the success and 
failure of renewable energy access programs in Bangladesh, China, Laos, Mongolia, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea (Sovacool 2013). 
Javadi et al select approximately 40 countries and give cursory descriptions of their 
rural electrification policies, doing little to disentangle the different technologies and 
types of support available for each (Javadi et al. 2013). Examples also come from 
countries in very different bands of electrification rates (ie. Norway and India). 
However, an interesting feature of Javadi’s analysis is the focus on the relationship 
between the public and private sectors: 
“In this case [of rural electrification policy in Peru] the relationship between the private 
sector and the state, involve the private firms to rural electrification, and the role of 
local community in the decision-making process have to be considered. One of the main 
problems of electrification is the total government budget. […] Despite of separation of 
private and public sectors in electrification programs, based on government strategy, 
private sector involves with government policy.” (Javadi et al. 2013) 
To articulate that sentiment another way, despite electrification being considered the 
purview of the government, policies often have expectations for how the private sector 
or other market actors might be involved. Especially given the three requirements 
identified by the IEA – policy, infrastructure and investment – the relationship between 
rural electrification policy and market actors is perhaps particularly important (IEA, 
2017).  
If there is one takeaway from the comparisons above, it is that REPs take varying 
approaches to delivering off grid electrification, and little literature has explored how 
these approaches affect individual market actors. This is important because the 
characteristics of the off grid solar market are likely to impact the diffusion of these 
technologies, and the market is comprised of market actors. Therefore, an exploration of 
the way in which off grid programmes and legislation shape the market actors enable us 
to see the ways in which they shape the market. 
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 LMICs across the world have taken similar steps to reaching unelectrified 
populations, although these policies have taken different approaches to engaging non-
government actors, such as NGOs, social enterprises and the private sector. Does the 
arrangement of these actors within a policy impact its outcomes? In order to take the 
first steps to addressing that question, we must understand what are the arrangements 
being set up? How do the non-government actors function within that arrangement? 
And what are the possible impacts of that arrangement on the rural poor? 
1.3 India as Case Study 
1.3.1 Unelectrified population 
India is an ideal case study for this topic for a number of reasons. First, as recently as 
2016 over 240 million people in the country did not have access to electricity, which is 
nearly a quarter of the global population without access (IEA, 2017). India is made of 
29 states and seven union territories, and infrastructure development varies by state. 
Electricity access is worse in Northern states, which have the lowest electricity access 
rates (IIPS, 2015). Figure 1.1 gives the official survey numbers from 2015, which is 
when this research began. Because of the lower electricity rates in these regions, I have 
focused my research on companies that work in these areas. The majority of my sample 
work across multiple states, but there significant overlap in Rajasthan, Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh. Figure 1.1 illustrates the coverage of the sample. The darkest blue shows states 
represented by over five enterprises in the sample, the medium blue shows states 
represented by between two to five enterprises in the sample, and the lightest blue 
shows states represented by only one enterprise in the sample.  
The country has made great strides in electrifying the population especially given its 
enormous size and geography. Between 1990 and 2016, the electrification rate 
increased from 45% to 85% (World Bank, 2017a). The political will for expanding 
electricity access culminated in the January 2019 announcement that all Indian 
households now had access to electricity (Dsouza, 2019). While in reality, there are still 
many households without electricity, the government’s narrative of total access is in 
tension with the interviews in this thesis, which were collected fewer than two years 
before (Urpelainen, 2019). 
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Figure 1.1: Coverage of enterprise sample and rural electrification rates (Source: 
IIPS 2015)  
1.3.2 Solar Market 
Finally, India has a history of supporting domestic solar energy production and 
distribution, which has led to a burgeoning solar industry. India currently has 345 GW 
of installed capacity, with approximately 20.5% of that capacity derived from 
renewable sources (MoP, 2018). However, as a nation with a growing appetite for 
electricity, there are concerns that demand is outstripping supply, and that this demand 
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could increase significantly from 1130 TWh to 5528 TWh within 30 years (Hairat and 
Ghosh, 2017; CEA, 2018).  
In addressing this demand issue, India has turned to solar energy. Studies suggest that, 
in addition to good general solar radiation conditions, 58% of the India’s geographical 
areas is considered a ‘solar hot spot’ (Ramachandra, Jain and Krishnadas, 2011). Solar 
installations are booming and India has already reached many of its 2022 targets (BT, 
2018). Even in the off grid space, there is a lot of growth. There are approximately 45-
60 formal players in the market, with the smallest providing only a few hundred panels 
and the largest serving millions of customers (Singh, 2016a). Nevertheless, the market 
faces challenges. 
1.3.2.1 Kerosene undermines off grid solar economics 
The low rate of electrification in rural regions goes some way to explaining the political 
and social phenomenon of kerosene usage. India accounts for 15% of kerosene usage 
worldwide (Garg et al., 2017). Kerosene and firewood are the primary fuels used in 
rural lighting and cooking respectively, and they are often used also as a supplement to 
other energy sources like liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or electricity (Gangopadhyay, 
Ramaswami and Wadhwa, 2005; Rao, 2012; Lam et al., 2016b). However, kerosene is 
relatively dangerous, both for causing fires and for damaging air quality, which can lead 
to respiratory infection (Rehman et al., 2005). There is widespread dissatisfaction with 
kerosene, which can also be a challenge to access, but this has not been enough to cause 
a shift in demand for cleaner solar systems for lighting (Urpleinen, 2018). 
Kerosene is subsidised by the government (as seen in Table 1.1), and these subsidies are 
supposed to target the poor and act as a redistributive policy (Rao, 2012). Subsidised 
kerosene is sold through the public delivery system (PDS) but private (and non-
subsidised) actors entered the market in 1993 (Gangopadhyay, Ramaswami and 
Wadhwa, 2005; Rehman et al., 2005). Kerosene is also bought on the black market for 
higher prices (Aklin et al., 2017a). However, since the subsidised rations are based on 
cooking usage, but used for lighting in rural areas, it is not very effective in rural areas 
(Rao, 2012). Due to inefficiencies and health concerns, for years there has been 
discussion about limiting both kerosene subsidies, and the current government seems 
committed to ending the subsidies entirely (Gangopadhyay, Ramaswami and Wadhwa, 
2005; Choudhary, 2017). 
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Year Kerosene Subsidy 
PDS 
Kerosene 
(Rs./Litre) 
2002-03 2.45 8.98 
2003-04 1.65 9.00 
2004-05 0.82 9.01 
2005-06 0.82 9.07 
2006-07 0.82 9.09 
2007-08 0.82 9.13 
2008-09 0.82 9.19 
2009-10 0.82 9.26 
2010-11 0.82 11.90 
2011-12 0.82 13.78 
2012-13 0.82 14.86 
2013-14 0.82 14.96 
2014-15 0.82 14.96 
2015-16 0.82 15.24 
2016-17 0.82 16.69 
Table 1.1:Kerosene Subsidies and Price (PPAC 2018) 
Evidence suggests that solar systems, including lanterns, may be a less expensive, 
healthier and safer alternative, however, uptake of these new technologies remains low, 
perhaps because of low trust (Yaqoot, Diwan and Kandpal, 2015; Urpelainen, 2016). 
Concerns are that high kerosene subsidies undermine the market for solar systems 
(Garg et al., 2017; Mills, 2017). That being said, as electrification spreads, so the use of 
kerosene has been decreasing, and this trend is expected to continue (Rehman et al., 
2005).  
1.3.2.2 Discom disincentives 
It is important to note, that every state in India has its own political and economic 
factors that influence energy access, but there are some general trends that have limited 
historical electricity access (Chatterjee, 2018; Sareen, 2018). The high costs of moving 
into rural areas, mixed with low revenues from poorer customers, disincentivises 
discoms’ expansion into rural spaces. While high costs are certainly a by-product of 
moving into areas with poor infrastructure, it is also the case that the discoms have 
artificially high costs due to inefficiencies within the organisations (Palit and 
Bandyopadhyay, 2017). The fact that they cannot recoup all their costs from rural 
customers is also partially political; relief aid to farmers often comes in the form of 
amnesty from electricity payments and politicians run on offering subsidised electricity. 
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While these losses should be provided in a lump sum to the discom, as in many other 
Indian subsidies, this subsidy is often late or hard to access (Palit and Bandyopadhyay, 
2017). All this makes discoms hesitant to expand electricity access. The discom 
challenge extends to the off grid space, as central grid expansion undercuts minigrid 
and microgrid development, since discoms are required to provide subsidised electricity 
rates to rural customers (Comello et al., 2017). 
1.3.2.3 Access to financing 
Scholars cite financing as one of the greatest barriers to the uptake of off grid 
technologies (Hermes and Lensink, 2011; Agnihotri, 2013; Reeves and Sabharwal, 
2013). Although the World Bank had financed a $10 million loan to the Government of 
India in 1994 for the development of a solar market, there were challenges pushing the 
subsequent credit programme into rural areas (Miller and Hope, 2000). Moving 
forward, greater emphasis was placed on tapping into India’s extensive network of rural 
banks as a means to reach rural customers with financing (Liming, 2009). Nevertheless, 
there are still customers without access to formal banking, and that is where 
microfinance steps in. 
In India microfinance institutions (MFIs) and informal savings collectives such as self 
help groups (SHGs) attempt to improve the penetration of financing deeper into rural 
areas. Microfinance offers small loans to those without access to traditional forms of 
banking, and in India it typically takes the form of MFIs, which can be NGOs or non-
bank financial companies (NBFCs), or SHGs that are linked to banks (Bansal, 2003; 
Singh, 2009; Priyadarshee and Ghalib, 2011). While SHGs and MFIs operate 
separately, they work together as part of the same financial ecosystem. SHGs, which 
were created initially in the 1980s and developed in the 1990s, organise the rural poor 
into groups. Although SHGs may be constituted of men or women, part of their success 
is considered to be the support and financial assistance to women (Kalpana, 2016). 
In 1992, NABARD created a means by which SHGs could be linked to banks in order 
to allow SHGs to access loans, in addition to their current savings and group lending 
activities (Priyadarshee and Ghalib, 2011).  In being linked to SHGs, financial 
institutions (banks or NBFCs) can avoid unnecessary transaction costs from organising 
the poor (Priyadarshee and Ghalib, 2011). SHGs are considered to be informal savings 
groups, and therefore, are predominantly unregulated (Reserve Bank of India, 2013). 
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However, in the past, self-regulation schemes have been trialed in an effort to 
standardise SHGs (Seibel, 2012). 
MFIs can take the form of NGOs, which was initially the most common MFI 
configuration, or more recently as for-profit NBFCs (Priyadarshee and Ghalib, 2011). 
This shift was partially due to a World Bank microfinance programme in India in the 
1990s (Taylor, 2011). While MFIs were initially hailed as a panacea to many 
development challenges, a crisis in the MFI system in Andhra Pradesh in 2010 
undermined the momentum that the system had developed. Since the 1980s, SHGs had 
proliferated across the country unevenly, with nearly 20% of SHGs active in Andhra 
Pradesh (Priyadarshee and Ghalib, 2011). This meant that MFIs quickly moved into the 
state, hoping to capitalise on the success of the SHGs. In turn, oversupply of lending led 
to over borrowing, and defaults on payments drove poor people into the arms of 
usurious moneylenders and famously accounted for a number of suicides in the state 
(Priyadarshee and Ghalib, 2011).  
At this stage, the Government of India stepped in to analyse the practices of MFIs. The 
Malegam Committee, set up by the Reserve Bank of India, proposed caps on 
outstanding loans and an upper limit to interest rates (Reserve Bank of India, 2011). 
More recently, the Reserve Bank of India has categorised MFIs as a form of NBFC and 
outlined further guidelines, most importantly for the conduct of debt collectors (Reserve 
Bank of India, 2017). The aim in both regulations is to protect the rural poor, especially 
as MFIs increasingly move from non-profit to for-profit models, which can become 
exploitative. Although microfinance and SHGs offer opportunity, the reality is that the 
penetration into rural regions is still small and both types of financing leave out the 
poorest constituents (Priyadarshee and Ghalib, 2011). Nevertheless, they are seen by off 
grid solar enterprises as a crucial part of the off grid ecosystem, allowing their products 
to reach a lower social strata. 
1.3.3 Off grid policies 
Indian also has a long history of trying to address this issue. In the early 2000s, off grid 
solar was identified as a potential solution for rural electrification, and so programmes 
that aimed to improve energy access also supported the industry, such as the Rural 
Village Electrification Programme and the Village Energy Security Programme. In 
2003, the Government of India passed the Electricity Act of 2003, which created 
notified rural regions (GoI, 2003). These were areas that were officially ‘rural’ in which 
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private enterprises could provide power at an unregulated price, opening up rural 
electrification to third parties. It was soon followed by the Rural Electricity Policy of 
2006, which announced the aim to provide electricity access to all as well as outlining 
the definition of what constitutes an electrified village (MoP, 2006a).  
Name Region Start 
Date 
Summary Target 
RVEP National 2001 Uses renewables to provide electricity 
to remote villages 
Villages 
without grid 
access 
RGGVY - 
DDG 
National  2005 Uses distributed generation sources to 
provide electricity to remote villages, 
providing free connections to those 
below the poverty line 
Villages 
without grid 
access 
DDUGJY – 
DDG Scheme 
National 2015 Uses distributed generation sources 
(primarily renewables) to provide 
electricity to remote villages, 
providing free connections to those 
below the poverty line 
Villages 
without grid 
access 
JNNSM – Off 
Grid 
Component 
National 2010 Provides financing for solar products 
in the form of end user subsidies 
(SHS) or capital grants 
(microgrids/minigrids) 
Off grid 
technologies 
Draft 
National 
Microgrid/ 
Minigrid 
Policy 
National NA Establishes tariff regulations for 
distributed power plants along with 
potential for capital grants 
Microgrid/ 
Minigrid tech 
Saubhagya National 2017 Aims to provide electricity to all 
households by December 2018, 
providing free connections to those 
below the poverty line 
Households 
without access 
Rajasthan 
Solar Policy 
State 2014 Broadly supports uses of solar energy 
for remote lighting and productive 
end uses 
Solar 
Technologies 
Uttar Pradesh 
Minigrid 
Policy 
State 2016 Establishes tariff regulations for 
distributed power plants along with 
potential for capital grants 
Microgrid/ 
Minigrid tech 
Bihar Draft 
Minigrid 
Policy 
State NA Establishes tariff regulations for 
distributed power plants along with 
potential for capital grants 
Microgrid/ 
Minigrid tech 
Uttar Pradesh 
Solar Policy 
State 2017 In addition to the Minigrid Policy, 
allows for state subsidies to promote 
solar for rural electrification 
Solar 
technologies 
Table 1.2: Primary rural electrification programmes applicable to solar 
technologies, since 2000) 
In 2006 a new tariff policy also required the state energy regulatory commissions 
(SERCs) to set a renewable portfolio obligation for distribution companies, further 
incentivising the adoption of solar (Amrutha, Balachandra and Mathirajan, 2017). 
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Individual states, including Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, have also been at the forefront 
of creating state solar policies (Government of Rajasthan, 2014; Government of Uttar 
Pradesh, 2017).  
For a decade, the main rural electrification scheme was the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen 
Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY), which was initiated in 2005. It was replaced in 2015 
by the Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY). Both schemes focus on 
grid expansion as the primary form of electrification, but include a Decentralised 
Distributed Generation (DDG) Scheme. Both RGGVY and DDUGJY use census 
records to identify villages that would not be reached by the grid within 3-5 years, at 
which point they fall under the DDG Scheme. The DDG Scheme is implemented 
through state governments, which tender off grid projects to supply power to those 
villages, providing a subsidy that is met jointly by the national and state governments 
(MoP, 2009). Table 1.3 compares the number of villages electrified through grid and off 
grid. We can see that off grid electrification accounted for 15% of the villages covered 
under the programme. This number was originally planned to be higher, but 820 
villages were moved from the off grid to the grid extension programme in 2017/2018. 
In 2008, the Government of India launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar 
Mission (JNNSM), which includes a provision for the support of off grid electrification. 
Specifically, the JNNSM includes both targets and subsidies for off grid solar energy, 
which is funneled directly to the system integrator (in the case of micro/minigrids) or 
through the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) for end 
users purchasing solar home systems (MNRE, 2012a). The JNNSM-NABARD subsidy 
has been cancelled twice since its inception – first in 2015 and again in 2017 (MNRE, 
2017b). Its future is uncertain. The JNNSM off grid policy stands alongside the DDG 
Scheme as the two key policies that support off grid electrification via solar energy.  
 In 2017, both the national and state governments were looking to better support 
microgrids and minigrids. In 2016 Uttar Pradesh released a microgrid/minigrid policy, 
and Bihar had a plan in development (Government of Uttar Pradesh, 2016). In 2016, 
MNRE also asked for comments on a draft national microgrid/minigrid policy (MNRE, 
2016).  
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 Villages Electrified under DDUGJY 
State Off Grid Grid Percentage Off Grid 
Arunchal Pradesh 555 1483 37% 
Assam 394 2732 14% 
Bihar  207 2906 7% 
Chhattisgarh 473 1078 44% 
Himachal Pradesh 0 28 0% 
Jammu & Kashmir 54 129 42% 
Jharkhand 248 2583 10% 
Karnataka 27 29 93% 
Madhya Pradesh 33 422 8% 
Maharashtra 43 80 54% 
Manipur 99 366 27% 
Meghalaya 82 1051 8% 
Odisha 399 3281 12% 
Mizoram 0 54 0% 
Nagaland 0 78 0% 
Rajasthan 93 427 22% 
Tripura 0 26 0% 
Uttar Pradesh 31 1498 2% 
Uttarakhand 24 91 26% 
West Bengal 0 22 0% 
TOTAL 2762 18364 15% 
Table 1.3: Villages electrified under DDUGJY, July 2018 (REC, 2018b) 
 It is important to note that the definition of village electrification is that at least 
10% of households have an electricity connection, and therefore 100% village 
electrification is not 100% household electrification. In late 2017, the Government of 
India announced a new programme, Saubhagya, that aims to electrify 100% of 
households by the end of 2018 (ET Bureau, 2017). There are fears that this strong 
centralised push toward total electrification will impact the future of the off grid sector 
in India (Mishra, 2017). This research focuses primarily on the period of 2010-2017, 
and will not include an assessment of the Saubhagya programme. Most enterprises 
entered the market after 2010, although a few enterprises have a much longer history. 
As the interview data was collected in Feb-April 2017 that is the end date for the study. 
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1.4 Literature Review 
1.4.1 Conceptual frameworks: What is the arrangement? 
 Several literatures have offered up conceptual frameworks for articulating the 
arrangement of the private sector, non-government actors and government in delivering 
public services. Each offers a different focus: political economy, innovation studies, 
socio-technical transitions theory, entrepreneurship literature, public administration, and 
modes of governance. In the end, Archibugi et al describe a triangular arrangement, 
which captures all three major elements of service delivery: government, implementing 
actor and citizen/user (2003).  
1.4.1.1 Political Economy 
 Political economy suggests that these actors are part of a larger system in 
which economic theories and political experience merge, and where institutions and 
organizations shape one another. The field is interested in the intersection of politics 
and economics, but it is a wide-ranging discipline, which has evolved since its inception 
(Smith, 1817; Marx, 1859). To complicate things further, political economy can refer to 
either this area of studies or a methodological approach that borrows from economics or 
sociology, usually an institutional approach (Weingast and Wittman, 2008). Therefore 
this section will focus on the most relevant aspects of the current literature, primarily 
institutional approaches focusing on government and public services. This institutional 
approach, which is most relevant to this study, ranges the gamut from looking at the 
efficacy of institutions, to comparing them across countries, to understanding why and 
how they come to take their current forms (Weingast and Wittman, 2008). Political 
economy stresses the co-evolution of politics, society and the economy (Weingast and 
Wittman, 2008). However, the vastness of those interrelations necessarily causes studies 
to focus on particular intersecting phenomena (eg Banerjee et al. 2005).  
 Work on the political economy of India has turned its eye to elections and 
government cycles, government responsiveness, development, policy targets, and 
economic liberalisation (Kohli, 1989; Sen, 1992; Bardhan and Pranab, 1999; Besley and 
Burgess, 2002; Khemani, 2004). Relevant to our interests, a political economy 
perspective has been used to delve into issues of the procurement of public services 
under a centralised democratic government in India (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 
2005, 2007; Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007). Findings suggest that despite calls for 
universal access to basic services, a region’s socio-economic history plays a big role in 
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actual access, but that public mobilization allows some communities to get 
comparatively greater access (Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007). These works explore 
how socio-economic differences play into access to public services, but do little to 
explore the way in which the procurement of those services exacerbates these 
inequalities – focusing on the correlation, not the causation (Banerjee, Iyer and 
Somanathan, 2005). 
 On a high level, much ink has been spilled trying to interpret the extent to 
which government has the ability to impact demand and supply within the market 
(Wren, 2008). It has been pointed out that in a liberalised market, the market itself is 
likely to undersupply public services, suggesting the need for public procurement 
(Romer, 1994; Barro, 1997). From an institutional perspective, institutions and the 
market shape and are shaped by one another. Therefore, the relationship between 
governments and non-state actors in the delivery of public services should fall under the 
purview of the field. Indeed, scholars have examined how governments – particularly in 
less-stable countries – may see service delivery as a mechanism for state legitimacy, 
how politics influences public service delivery, and how NGOs are also employed in 
service delivery (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2010; McLoughlin, 2011; Batley, McCourt 
and Mcloughlin, 2012). However, focus remains on the factors affecting these 
relationships, rather than on the organisation of the relationships themselves 
(McLoughlin, 2011).  
1.4.1.2 Innovation  
 While the previous literatures have suggested that institutions and 
organizations shape one another, both have focused an a higher level institutional 
perspective. Innovaiton studies can also be asked, how does government intervene in 
markets, and what does that say about the role that enterprise is supposed to play? In 
this context, innovation is “understood as the introduction of new solutions in response 
to problems, challenges, or opportunities that arise in the social and/or economic 
environment” (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). Therefore, even the application of a mature 
technology in a new market may qualify as innovation. With this definition, this section 
will look at the literature on innovation systems. 
 Innovation systems literature focuses on how technologies develop and diffuse 
through systems of innovation (Mondal, Kamp and Pachova, 2010; Quitzow, 2015). 
These systems consist of the technology or knowledge of new innovations, the various 
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actors and institutional aspects (Malerba, 2005). Essentially, “the elements and 
relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and 
economically useful, knowledge” (Lundvall, 1992). These systems grow and change in 
response to each other, and to systems in other countries, which enables a truly 
international perspective on innovation (Quitzow, 2015). While much research in the 
field focuses on developed economies, it can apply to developing countries where 
research focuses on ‘catching up’ technologies (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2006; Blum, 
Bening and Schmidt, 2015). Innovation systems are an analytical construct, rather than 
a description of coordinated actions and actors, and as such are used as a way of 
identifying how the world works in practice (Bergek et al., 2008). 
 Generally the innovation literature rejects the traditional concept of market 
failures, in favour of system failures as the crucial impetus for intervention (Foxon et 
al., 2005; Bergek et al., 2008; Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). These ideas are 
operationalized in technological innovation systems (TIS) analysis, which uses the 
concepts to notice weaknesses in the system and offer policy recommendations (Bergek 
et al., 2008). TIS analysis often focuses on the seven system functions: Entrepreneurial 
activities, knowledge development (learning), knowledge diffusion, guidance of the 
search, market formulation, resource mobilization, and the creation of legitimacy. In the 
adjacent literature, innovation economics believes that economic policy exists to 
encourage growth through innovation, and that there is, therefore, a role for government 
intervention in the market. The general tenets of innovation economics could be 
summarised thus: innovation has agglomeration tendencies (physical spaces of 
innovation often further innovation and activities within those spaces) as well as 
spillover (the benefits of innovation are captured by more than just the innovating actor) 
(Rennings, 2000). Because the positive externalities of spillover are not being fully 
captured by the innovator, there is under-investment in innovation, leaving room for 
government intervention to correct this imbalance (Schumpeter, 1939; Freeman, 1982; 
Rennings, 2000). 
 If we step back and look at innovation policy as a whole, there is a social 
dimension to innovation policy: “innovation policy may contribute to solutions for 
urgent societal challenges” (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). In order to do that, 
policymakers must determine how innovation will solve the challenge. This is the basis 
of Edler & Fagerberg’s innovation policy typology in which policies may be mission-
oriented, invention-oriented or system-oriented (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). Taking a 
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more traditional approach, the S-curve of technological development can also be used 
as a guide to which policies are appropriate at each stage of development, starting with 
R&D financing and moving towards a well-regulated market (Foxon et al., 2005). Or 
else addressing function or system failures can be a guide for intervention (Metcalfe, 
2005; Hekkert et al., 2007). In all cases, the government supports innovation as a way 
of supporting either growth, or a particular end goal. In this way, the innovation 
literature is relatively flexible, although it is notable that, with a few exceptions, there is 
less emphasis on diffusion than on the earlier stages of innovation (Freeman and Soete, 
1997). 
1.4.1.3 Socio-technical Innovation Systems 
In more recent years, innovation systems has been rolled into the burgeoning field of 
socio-technical transitions. Where innovation systems approaches focus on an 
ecosystem perspective of technological change, socio-technical transitions expand the 
range of actors that impact those changes (Ockwell and Byrne, 2017). The combination, 
the socio-technical innovation systems approach, therefore allows a more holistic vision 
of how these changes take place, and how governments can support or guide them 
(Ockwell and Byrne, 2017). Socio-technical transitions encapsulate the shift in 
technology use within a society, and are embedded within the socio-technical landscape 
of deep, structural trends within that society (Geels, 2002). In the commonly cited 
multi-level perspective, that landscape is composed of overlapping technical regimes, 
who change over time as innovation from niches are incorporated into them (Smith, 
Voß and Grin, 2010; Geels et al., 2017). Innovation alone does not lead naturally to 
technological change, but social structures, behaviours and attitudes must coevolve with 
technology (Geels et al., 2017). 
 These niches, also described in the Strategy Niche Management framework, 
serve to protect innovations as they are developed through experimentation (Schot and 
Geels, 2008; Raven et al., 2016). New socio-technical innovations will not initially be 
robust enough to compete with incumbent technologies, and therefore need spaces in 
which financial, and other, pressures are lowered in order to develop that robustness 
(Nill and Kemp, 2009). It is worth noting that innovation in this context does not have 
to be an entirely new piece of technology, but can be a new application of existing 
technology. In that regard, even though solar energy, in many contexts, has become a 
part of the dominant technical regime, its off grid application is still struggling to move 
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out of its niche. The socio-technical innovation systems approach to technology 
transitions emphasizes the system-wide support that novel technologies require to move 
from their niche into the dominant technical regime (Ockwell and Byrne, 2017). 
India’s solar industry has made great strides through that type of eco-system approach, 
offering R&D support, having public sector companies move technologies from labs 
into markets, and continuing to support training efforts in the sector (Kapoor et al., 
2014). In 1981, the government initiated the Commission for Additional Sources of 
Energy (CASE), and the 1980s broadly saw an increase in R&D support for the 
industry.  R&D funding for solar increased significantly in the Eleventh Five Year Plan 
(2007-2012), which proposed an additional Rs 53 billion (around 758 million USD) to 
be specifically focused on silicon production and light emitted diodes (Sahoo, 2016). 
The Department of Science and Technology, Department of Industrial Research and 
MNRE fund R&D activities. MNRE in particular has funded Rs 3016.4 million 
(approximately 42 million USD) worth of on-going solar R&D projects (Kar, Sharma 
and Roy, 2016). Currently, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission is the 
programme that supports this aggressive R&D (Sahoo, 2016).  
 Innovation was often spurred by large, state-owned energy enterprises, such as 
when Central Electronics Limited (CEL) started the National Solar Photovoltaic Energy 
Demonstration Program to lower the cost per Wp by improving efficiency (Kapoor et 
al., 2014). In fact, companies like CEL have a remit specifically to bring to 
“commercially exploit” technologies developed by national labs and R&D institutions 
(CEL, 2019). The Government of India has also recognised the need for more solar 
skills development, and in 2015 it launched the Sector Skill Council for Green Jobs 
(SSCGI), which is a not-for-profit, autonomous, industry-led society, which aims to 
promote training for renewable energy technologies, among others (GoI, 2015). On the 
NGO side, Barefoot College is one of the few institutions that tries to train rural 
workers – especially women – as solar engineers, with the expectation that they will 
take their skills with them back to their home villages (Roy and Hartigan, 2008).  
 However, this systems approach does not appear to extend to off grid solar, 
with which India has taken a more top-down approach. Instead, India follows the 
approaches that Ockwell and Byrne describe as “hardware financing” and “private 
sector entrepreneurship” (2017). Hardware financing refers to the approach wherein the 
barrier to greater dissemination is the inability for the benefits of the technology for 
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society to be reflected in the price, and so additional support is employed to make up 
the difference. Private sector entrepreneurship approaches assume that innovation will 
solve society’s problems in an extreme form of techno-optimism, and so support should 
go to capital for private sector innovation (Ockwell and Byrne, 2017, pg 142). 
Arguably, the direct contracting approach of the DDG scheme takes this hardware 
financing approach, and the JNNSM’s capital subsidy for microgrid/minigrid 
enterprises could be seen as taking either approach, depending on whether you view a 
microgrid development as a completed project or an innovation experiment.  
It is possible that the government’s view of off grid solar as something temporary or 
marginal that limits its interest in building up the off-grid sector in the same holistic 
manner. Another possibility is that India’s contracting approach to rural development 
became the guiding posts for off grid solar. Going from a niche to a regime (this is the 
niche ontology) involves the coevolution of government regulations with technology, 
which fit and integrate with existing practices (Ockwell and Byrne, 2017). Direct 
contracting for rural development may have been that ‘existing practice’ (Monga, 
Mehta and Ranjan, 2012). As it stands, solar home systems may be ready to be 
integrated into the dominant regime, but minigrid businesses are still looking for the 
innovation that will allow them to break even. India provides an interesting case study 
where this particular form of innovation (off grid solar) had a great opportunity to grow 
in its niches (projects, companies) but in the scaling up support has neglected the whole 
system in favour of financing to get systems in the hands of the poorest. 
1.4.1.4 Public Administration 
 The literature on public administration suggests that as our conception of 
public administration has changed, so has the relationship between government and 
non-state actors. Sindane describes public administration as “the organisation, 
mobilization and management of human and material resources to achieve the purposes 
of government” and the art and science of that management (Sindane, 2004). The 
literature on public administration covers many of the topics that also fall under 
political science, such as the process of policy design and public participation, but there 
is a heavier emphasis on implementation. Common topics include bureaucracy (Farmer, 
1995; Goodsell, 2003), public participation (Hart, 1984; Vigoda, 2000, 2002), and 
engagement with the private and non-profit sectors (Hood, 1995; Hughes, 2012). 
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 In traditional conceptions of public administration, governments organised 
themselves in bureaucracies, which focus on the administration of policy determined by 
politicians, which made the bureaucrat a true public servant. This also entailed 
bureaucratic delivery, namely “[o]nce a government had involved itself in a policy area, 
it also became the direct provider of goods and services through the bureaucracy” 
(Hughes 2012, p 5). This firm delineation between public and private sector is a partial 
over simplification, but stands in stark contrast to the newer forms of administration 
discussed below (Hood, 1991). In the traditional public administration template, the role 
of the private sector is kept outside of the delivery of public services, which become the 
province of the state. 
 Since the 1980s, there had been a belief that we are moving from public 
administration to new public management (Hood, 1991, 1995; Hoggett, 1996). While 
this definition, too, is vague, scholars see a changing conception of the roles of 
government and non-state actors. In the initial conception of public administration the 
government did the work of implementation, whereas in public management, the 
government controls or manages that implementation (Hughes, 2012). New public 
management (NPM) is characterised by a more private sector ethos: 
“The basis of NPM lay in reversing the two cardinal doctrines of PPA; that 
is, lessening or removing differences between the public and the private 
sector and shifting the emphasis from process accountability towards a 
greater element of accountability in terms of results.” (Hood, 1995) 
 Since then, there are continued changes in the relationship between 
government and the private and non-profit sectors. Characteristics of these changes 
include: a focus on efficiency, decentralisation and public service in the mode of the 
private sector, including a move to contractualism (Lane, 2002; Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2016). By this, Lane is referring to an increase in contracting out public 
services to the private sector, although this could also include contracting out to any 
non-governmental organisation (Lane, 2002; Lecy and Van Slyke, 2013). It should be 
noted that contracting out has been in use for centuries, but its rise in popularity under 
NPM is notable. As with the general mixing of public and private sector in public 
management, contracting out is intended to improve efficiency, although there is still an 
administrative need to ensure compliance with the contract (Hughes 2012, p 153). 
Although NPM is has moved out of academic favour, replaced partially by the concept 
of ‘governance’, its applicability and success in developing economies is unclear 
(Manning, 2001).  
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 Perceptions of the role of NPM in LMICs is mixed, with some scholars 
believing that NPM has had little impact outside of the OECD whereas others see 
output-based (results-based) contracting in the developing world as an extension of this 
phenomenon (Manning, 2001; Kilby, 2004; Common, 2017).  The difference seems to 
come from a disagreement about what the key characteristic of NPM is: reduced public 
sector size or contractualism. While the two logically go hand in hand, LMICs may 
display an increase in contractualism as private sector (or at least non-government 
actors) supposedly improve efficiency, while maintaining their bureaucracies to manage 
these new contracts (Kilby, 2004; Alonso, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2015).  
1.4.1.5 The Triangular Arrangement 
 The triangular relationship of service delivery developed by Archibugi et al 
takes these actors and concepts and develops a simple framework that is easily used to 
conceptualise the organisation of the state, non-state service delivery actors and the end 
user (see Fig 1.2) (Archibugi et al., 2003). The inclusion of the state in service 
provider–consumer interactions acknowledges the government’s role in public services, 
and the division of the end user and citizen acknowledges the overlapping but differing 
populations of users and taxpayers.  
 The triangular relationship is simple, but effective for the focus of this 
research, which is interested in how the state organises these actors in the provision of 
public services. This framework allows us to conceptualise how the state attempts to 
create efficiency and service quality, often through competition, and to balance the 
needs of the citizens and users. Within this framework “different combinations of tariff 
coverage and general taxation may present themselves, with weights depending above 
all on distributive concerns” (Archibugi et al., 2003). This conceptual framework offers 
a way of viewing the process of service delivery, which will later be employed to 
describe the programmatic modes developed in the typology in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 1.2: Triangular Arrangement developed by Archibugi et al 2003 
 So what is the arrangement between government, non-government 
implementing actors and end users in rural electrification policies? These strands of the 
literature, taken together, suggest that such an arrangement should account for 
prominence of government institutions in shaping the market, while also acknowledging 
the role of the end user/citizen. It should also be acknowledged that these arrangements 
will not be the same from policy to policy, and the popularity of specific arrangements 
will likely change over time. While Archibugi’s framework offers a good articulation of 
these features, an examination of real world rural electrification policies will be needed 
to determine the common arrangements of these actors. 
1.4.2 Enterprises: What are the impacts on non-government actors within 
the arrangement? 
1.4.2.1 Private and non-governmental sectors in rural electrification 
 After identifying the common arrangements of rural electrification policies, 
this thesis asks how implementing actors are influenced by policy at the enterprise-
level. Over the last 30 years, the private sector has been invited to participate in rural 
electrification in developing countries (Cabraal, Cosgrove-Davies and Schaeffer, 1996; 
Haanyika, 2006; Yadoo and Cruickshank, 2010). Because rural electricity – whether 
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grid-based or standalone systems – partially shares aspects of private goods, there is the 
assumption that the private sector could be engaged to provide these services. More 
specifically, depending on the technology, electricity can be measurable, consumers can 
be charged relative to the amount consumed, and can be excluded if payment is not 
made (Ostrom and Ostrom, 2014).  
 However, the motivations of the private sector and the public sector are often 
at odds, and there is a concern that privatisation will mean the sidelining of rural 
electrification (Haanyika, 2006). In some cases, private investment has been poor in the 
rural space, due to a perceived lack of profits to be made, heavy subsides for 
government grid power, and lack of access to credit (Ahlborg and Hammar, 2014; 
Yaqoot, Diwan and Kandpal, 2016). Additionally, there is evidence that relying on the 
private sector has slowed electrification efforts (Cook, 2011). Nevertheless, there is still 
a great deal of support for the concept of non-state enterprises, particularly SMEs, 
social enterprises, and NGOs, getting involved in the off grid space (Yadoo and 
Cruickshank, 2010; Lemaire, 2011; Jolly, Raven and Romijn, 2012; Yaqoot, Diwan and 
Kandpal, 2016).  
 There are some further criticisms of this approach. The aim of engaging the 
private sector in delivering public services is to save the public money on those services 
through competition (Entwistle and Martin, 2005). Contracting out public services has 
been seen as a way of capturing private sector benefits and reducing taxpayer costs 
without selling state assets (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). Contracting private 
enterprises assumes that this competition is present, but that is not always the case 
(Amir Hefetz and Warner, 2012; Girth et al., 2012). Additionally, engaging private 
enterprise is considered to be at its weakest in situations where there is not a customer 
“with the resources to provide a profit to the organisation that performs it,” as is often 
the case in rural contexts (Cohen, 2001).  
 The World Bank, among others, has suggested public-private partnerships as a 
way to mitigate risk for private sector coming in to a new market with low margins 
(Reiche, Covarrubias and Martinot, 2000). These partnerships are usually supported 
because they purport to reduce government inefficiency and lessen the burden on the 
taxpayer (Linder, 1999). However, the degree of decentralisation and extant 
redistributive policies impact the true equity of these partnerships and the benefit they 
provide to the poor (Miraftab, 2004).  
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 Other non-private sector options exist also. NGOs can have very different 
relationships to government, but increasingly low-income countries find themselves 
with NGOs that focus on providing basic services (Coston, 1998; Rahman, 2006). This 
is at least partially because NGOs are being encouraged as market actors who can 
provide services at lower cost and higher quality than the government (Hearn, 1998). 
Local cooperatives have also emerged in some regions in response to the failure of the 
public sector to deliver these services (Yadoo and Cruickshank, 2012). 
 Crucially, the private and nonprofit sectors are also bolstered by government in 
an attempt to both create and to take advantage of competition and capacity within these 
sectors. Recent literature has suggested, for instance, that where the US government 
supports nonprofits, they are more prevalent, which lends credence to the theory that 
nonprofits are engaged by governments to assist with public services, rather than that 
they step in where government has failed (Lecy and Van Slyke, 2013). Even in the 
private sector, governments use strategies to support private markets when competition 
is low, essentially using their own resources to build competition in order to then 
improve public service delivery (Girth et al., 2012). Understanding this symbiosis 
paints a richer, more accurate picture of how policy interventions impact electrification 
efforts. 
1.4.2.2 Enterprise-level perspective 
 That understanding can be best improved by focusing on the enterprise-level 
perspective. Empirically, taking the enterprise as the subject through which to view the 
impact of policies enables the researcher to identify the causal mechanisms at play, and 
so it is a good level at which to articulate and examine whether a policy’s theory of 
change functions in context. Conceptually, it offers greater granularity to a system that 
is routinely overlooked. Many fields treat the firm as a black box, most notably policy 
evaluation, whose impact evaluation studies the outputs and outcomes of an 
intervention and neglects the implementing agent to a great extent (Chaurey and 
Kandpal, 2010; Millinger, Mårlind and Ahlgren, 2012). Even in the literature cited 
above, especially political economy, public administration, and modes of governance, 
the enterprise is conceptualised primarily as part of a market, and not as a system in its 
own right (Howlett, 2011; McLoughlin, 2011; Quitzow, 2015). By focusing on the 
enterprise-level perspective here, we have an opportunity to improve the granularity of 
the system that moves from policy intervention through implementation to outputs. In 
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terms of implementation science, this approach aims to explain what influences 
implementation outcomes (Nilsen, 2015). 
 Despite the conceptual and empirical value that can come from a firm-level 
analysis, few studies on off grid enterprises focus on the policy dimensions of their 
experience. Exploring off grid energy through energy service companies usually 
focuses on case studies, but there are some prime examples of research on the state of 
the market (Zerriffi, 2007b; Harish et al., 2013; Gabriel and Kirkwood, 2016; Singh, 
2016a). All of these works aim to inform policy, but they take very different approaches 
to incorporating past interventions into their research. Zerriffi focuses on small scale off 
grid technology in the context of Brazil, not limited to solar power, and explores how 
business models and institutions play a role in success and failure of enterprises.  Policy 
is an integral part of that project, and the author breaks down the policy priorities and 
focus to show the link between policy interventions and the repercussions for rural 
electrification, using the fiscal consequences of policy as the pressure point for impact 
(Zerriffi, 2007b).  While Gabriel & Kirkwood focus more broadly on renewable energy 
entrepreneurs in 28 developing countries, they also take policy as a key independent 
variable. In their paper, the number of renewable energy policies and the strength of 
government interest in those policies are two key axes for anticipating the types of 
businesses present in a country (Gabriel and Kirkwood, 2016).  
 Similar literature in the Indian context exclusively focuses on the off grid solar 
market. A great recent example is Kartikeya Singh’s work on the state of the market 
and relationship between technology options and scalability. Singh does ask whether 
enterprises take a government subsidy but primarily uses feedback about government 
programmes as a context for providing policy recommendations (Singh, 2016a). Harish 
et al. (2013) examine Karnataka’s off grid solar market in order to disentangle the 
dynamics of technology adoption. While they cite the solar loan programme as a 
catalysing factor and note that sales dropped after the announcement of JNNSM, the 
focus is very much on the dynamics between enterprises, their offerings and end users. 
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Singh 2016 Harish et al 2013 Zerriffi 2007 Osterwalder 2004 
(Gabriel & 
Kirkwood 2016)  
Types of products sold Type Independent 
Variables: 
Product: 
Number of products 
sold/distributed 
Year of 
Establishment 
Organisational 
Form 
Value Propositions 
Geography of distribution Primary Product Technology Choice Infrastructure 
Management: 
Primary reasons customers 
purchase the products 
Volume of Sales Target Customers Key Partners 
Information regarding 
warranty 
Geographical 
Presence 
Financial Structure Key Activities 
Availability of financing to 
purchase products 
 Dependent 
Variables: 
Customer 
Interface: 
Participation in 
government subsidy 
market 
 Electricity Access Customer 
Segments 
 Research & development 
budget  
 Sufficiency Channels 
Marketing  Quality Customer 
Relationships 
After sales maintenance 
and servicing  
 Sustainability Financial Aspects: 
Perceived barriers to 
market entry and scaling 
 Replicability Cost Structures 
      Revenue Streams 
Table 1.4: Business Model Components 
 There are two key shortcomings to the approaches described above. Firstly, 
there is a lack of comparability across authors, since each use a different set of 
components to break down and compare business models, as seen in Table 1.4. Singh 
uses a survey according to a set of pre-determined metrics such as types of products, 
marketing, and participation in government subsidy market. Likewise, Harish et al use a 
similar approach with a narrower band of metrics. Zerriffi goes in a different direction 
by breaking down characteristics into independent and dependent variables. Finally, 
Gabriel & Kirkwood rely on the business model canvas first developed by Osterwalder 
(Osterwalder, 2004; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). Although ‘types of products sold’, 
‘primary product’, ‘technology choice’, and ‘value proposition’ could all be describing 
the same component, their differences make comparison challenging. Only Gabriel & 
Kirkwood choose to use a set of components that have been developed by previous 
enterprise literature. 
 Taking a step back, the second shortcoming is that most of these papers 
represent a snapshot of the enterprise landscape at one moment in time. Singh and 
Harish are particularly notable for using survey data, which are particularly good for 
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making statistical generalisation, but weak when considering changes in the landscape. 
Zerriffi’s focus on the relationship between policy impact places a greater emphasis on 
the transformative power of policy, but only Gabriel & Kirkwood talk about enterprises 
as they change over time (see discussion of a life-cycle progression). As policy 
interventions are time-bound phenomena, snapshots of business models are inadequate 
to fully grasp their impact.  
 Exploring changes to an enterprise’s business model over time addresses the 
shortcomings of these studies, while also making a novel empirical and conceptual 
contribution. By comparing multiple narratives of change over time, this research 
enables us to make broader statements about the factors that influence these changes, 
and begin to answer questions about how the shape of the market is impacted by 
specific interventions.   
1.4.2.3 Political Strategy 
 In Osterwalder’s conceptual framework, one level up from the business model 
level is the ‘strategic level’ (2004). Although changes to business models may give an 
indication of how the market has been changed by an intervention, understanding how 
enterprises try to negotiate their relationship with government offers additional insights 
into how enterprises function within these policy arrangements. Enterprises take 
different strategies in engaging with government and policy based on their 
competencies, knowledge, and resources (Dahan, 2005; Vining, Shapiro and Borges, 
2005). Research into strategies of political engagement fall under political strategy or 
corporate political action and focus solely on non-market strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 
1999; Lawton, Mcguire and Rajwani, 2013; Mellahi et al., 2016).  
 Baron describes nonmarket strategy as a “concerted pattern of actions taken in 
the nonmarket environment to create value by improving its overall performance” as 
opposed to market strategies that “create value by improving economic performance” 
(Baron, 1995; Lux, Crook and Woehr, 2011). Nonmarket strategies aim to shape the 
environment in which enterprises function, and therefore Baron proposes that they are 
more important in contexts with few market opportunities (Baron, 1995; Aggarwal, 
2001). Within the literature on nonmarket strategies, we find research on corporate 
political action and corporate social responsibility, the former focusing on political 
relationships and the latter focusing on appearing to align corporate and political 
interests (Mellahi et al., 2016). 
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 The literature on corporate political action (CPA) covers the factors that 
influence it (e.g. Dahan 2005; Vining et al. 2005), typologies of strategies and 
approaches (e.g. Hillman et al. 2004; Getz 2002; Lawton, Mcguire, et al. 2013; Oliver 
1991), as well as burgeoning evidence on the efficacy of CPA (e.g. Hillman & Hitt 
1999; Shaffer et al. 2000; Oliver & Holzinger 2008; Lawton, Mcguire, et al. 2013). The 
broad topics covered are outlined in Table 5.1, borrowed from Hillman et al 2004. 
 
Antecedents Types of CPA Outcomes Organising to Implement 
Firm Proactive/Reactive Public Policy Integration with market strategies 
Industry Approach Firm Performance Integration of multiple political 
actors 
Issue Participation Level   
Institutional Strategy Types   
Table 1.5: Summary of Political Strategy Literature (Source: Hillman et al 2004) 
 This thesis is interested in the secondary strand of approach: the types of 
strategies that enterprises employ. In this way, it aligns itself primarily with the 
taxonomic approach that has characterised the literature. Examples include Hillman & 
Hitt’s taxonomy of political strategies: information strategy, financial incentive 
strategy, and constituency building strategy (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Mathur and Singh 
attempted to integrate CPA and corporate management literature, creating a two-
stranded taxonomy based on political contributions and corporate lobbying (Mathur and 
Singh, 2011). Previous to that, Weidenbaum outlined business responses to policy: 
passive reactive, positive anticipation and public policy shaping (Weidenbaum, 1980). 
Meznar & Nigh identified broader strategies of buffering or bridging (Meznar and Nigh, 
1995). Using a smaller microscope, Cook and others explored the political actions of 
smaller firms, from letter writing and association participation to personal contact, 
coalition building, publicity and hiring consultants, and personal involvement in 
campaigns (Cook and Barry, 1993, 1995; Cook and Fox, 2000).  
 There are a number of blind spots within the literature described. Firstly, the 
types of firms that are explored are almost exclusively large corporations and often 
multinational firms (Wry, Cobb and Aldrich, 2013; Hadani, Munshi and Clark, 2017). It 
is specifically in considering the political strategy of multinationals that emerging 
markets are considered, rather than exploring the expression of CPA within a single 
emerging market (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 1999; Aggarwal, 2001; Peng, Wang and 
Jiang, 2008). This is a significant gap, in that emerging markets may have weaker 
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institutions, or institutional voids, or else have greater government control over 
relevant, regulated markets (Khanna, Palepu and Bullock, 2008; Tian, Hafsi and Wu, 
2009). There are a few notable exceptions to each trend, namely Cook’s work on 
political action within small firms, and a few examples of political strategy within a 
single emerging market (Cook and Barry, 1993, 1995; Cook, 1996; Cook and Fox, 
2000; Tian, Hafsi and Wu, 2009). More recent works on corporate social responsibility 
highlight the various national and international institutions that shape its expression in 
developing countries (Ali, Frynas and Mahmood, 2017; Jamali and Karam, 2018; 
Frynas and Yamahaki, 2019). This thesis hopes to address both shortcomings by 
exploring the political strategy of the off grid solar sector in India, which is comprised 
predominantly of small- to medium-sized enterprises (Singh 2016).  
 An enterprise’s choice of political strategy can also be informed by a number 
of theoretical explanations. Political strategy literature often straddles a variety of social 
science theories, which inform the assumptions that the study makes and the aspects of 
the study that are explored. Potential theoretical approaches include agency theory, 
transaction cost theory, stakeholder theory, game theory, interest group theory and 
collective action theory, resource dependence theory and institutional theory among 
others (Getz, 2002; Mellahi et al., 2016).  
 Resource dependence theory (RDT) and institutional theory (IT) are two of the 
most prominent within the literature (Birnbaum, 1985; Meznar and Nigh, 1995; 
Blumentritt, 2003). Resource dependence theory has particular relevance in nascent 
industries that have grown – like solar – with the support of government.  Pfeffer and 
Salancik developed resource dependence theory in their seminal work The External 
Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective, in which they proposed 
that organisations are dependent upon the resources of one another, and that firms will 
seek to reduce the risks associated with that dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
This proposition has often been interpreted as suggesting that firms seek greater 
autonomy and to lessen dependence, but is an equally useful perspective to consider 
how uncertainty is mitigated in the context of resource dependence (Hillman, Withers 
and Collins, 2009; Drees and Heugens, 2013). The latter perspective is the primary 
focus of research on RDT in the context of political action, although government is 
ignored by most RDT literature (Nienhüser, 2008; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009; 
Drees and Heugens, 2013). RDT addresses political strategy directly in Pfeffer and 
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Salancik’s Ch 8: The Created Environment: Controlling Interdependence Through Law 
and Social Sanction (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). As Getz puts it: 
“Political activity does not enable a firm to reduce its dependence on 
government. Rather, it allows the firm to reduce uncertainties related to the 
dependence, and thereby to reduce the likelihood that dependence will have 
negative effects on the firm.” (Getz 2002, p 313) 
 The core assumption is that firms rely on the resources of external parties, and 
so the desire to reduce uncertainty in the policy environment is related to political risk 
(Mellahi et al., 2016). Enterprises may attempt to reduce that uncertainty by either 
aligning their incentives with government or by creating a favourable political 
environment (Mellahi et al., 2016). There is empirical evidence that the greater the 
dependence of a firm on its political environment, the greater its commitment to 
political action, and that firms in similar environmental positions will take similar 
political strategies (Mullery, Brenner and Perrin, 1995; Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002). It 
should be noted that, outside of policy, a universe of diverse actors with different 
interests and objects affect the firm’s environment (Wry, Cobb and Aldrich, 2013). 
These organizations may coalesce around specific issues, and RDT then becomes a 
useful perspective through which to disentangle the complexity of such an environment 
(Wry, Cobb and Aldrich, 2013, pg 467-468). 
 Of course, the institutional context within which a firm is conducting business 
will impact the political strategy it pursues. Within the literature on CPA, an 
institutional perspective is prominent, whether it is defining the political strategies of 
multinational corporations, Chinese firms in the domestic market, or more broadly 
focusing on the context-specific nature of political strategy (Aggarwal, 2001; Wilts, 
2006; Kolk and Pinkse, 2007; Tian, Hafsi and Wu, 2009). Institutional theory becomes 
even more relevant within the literature in cases on emerging or developing markets, 
where the strength and competencies of institutions vary significantly from the Western 
contexts of most literature (Aggarwal, 2001; Tian, Hafsi and Wu, 2009).  
 Institutional theory sees institutions in an economic framework or a 
sociological one: respectively either focusing on economic regulation or legitimacy 
(Hotho and Pedersen, 2012). The latter approach suggests that firms require legitimacy 
to access institutional resources, and that internal political resources are required in 
order to gain political access and legitimacy. This is done primarily by adapting to 
institutional contexts, norms and laws, but enterprises have a range of potential 
responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991a; Mellahi et al., 2016). Institutions, 
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which include government actors but are not limited to them, provide the environment 
of rules and requirements within which a firm must function (Bluedorn et al., 1994). In 
the context of political strategy, Getz explains: 
“Political activity is a way by which a firm obtains formal and informal 
institutional resources, among which are laws, favorable public opinion and 
legitimacy.” (Getz 2002, p 314) 
However, the process by which policy is made can also confer legitimacy on the 
governing institution, suggesting that legitimacy is not owned by one actor alone, but is 
instead creating and endowed through an iterative process (Malesky and Taussig, 2017). 
 This section began by asking, ‘what are the impacts of policy on non-
governmental implementing agents in the arrangement?’ As we have explored the firm-
level studies already existing on off grid enterprises and the literature on political 
strategy, it is clear that both the changes that occur within the business model and the 
attitude to government that underpin a business’ strategy will be relevant to that 
question. 
1.4.3 End Users: What is the impact of the arrangement? 
 In the end, the firm-level changes that take place in response to policy 
interventions are most important to the customer. Who is targeted and by which types of 
organizations matter. At a higher level, policymakers must decide who or what should 
be the target of policy interventions. In REPs, targets can be those without grid access, 
those without the means to purchase energy systems, or even the technology itself. It 
should be noted that Indian fuel subsidies are, at their core, a rural energy policy. In the 
case of fuel subsidies, it is the poor who are the target. Targeting the poor is a feature of 
both government programmes, aid agencies and microfinance organisations (Skoufias, 
Davis and de la Vega, 2001; Rai, 2002). Even in the case of government services, where 
fees are required, government targets low-income populations or high-risk populations 
for exemptions and additional support (Gilson, Russell and Buse, 1995). 
 Selection can take place at a range of levels. Oftentimes household level 
selection takes place, focusing on household consumption or other wealth indicators 
(Skoufias, Davis and de la Vega, 2001). In some cases, household level selection is 
approximately as effective as geographical based selection, suggesting a strong 
correlation between geography and wealth demographics (Skoufias, Davis and de la 
Vega, 2001). Indeed, targeting the poor often requires a proxy for wealth, as this data 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Victoria Anne Plutshack – November 2019  49 
Word	T
emplat
e	by	
Friedm
an	&	M
organ	2
014 
may be hard to come by (Alatas et al., 2012). Many studies focus on measuring the 
success of these proxies, but the truth is that proxies are often context-dependent 
(Wodon, 1997; van de Walle, 1998; Rai, 2002; Ravallion, 2009). In rural areas, for 
instance, land ownership is a better indicator of wealth than education, whereas the 
trend it reversed in urban areas (Wodon, 1997).  
 In truth, targeting the poor – as with any population – is a multifaceted 
problem with unintended consequences. Being aware of programmes changes people’s 
actions to either try to be included or to avoid inclusion, depending on the social 
dimensions of the programme (Sen, 1992). While it is important to successfully target 
those populations in need, the reality is that the costs required in targeting provide a 
trade off for more granular targeting (van de Walle, 1998; Ravallion, 2009). An 
additional challenge is making sure that the programme is identifying the right subset of 
people as in India’s Targeted Public Distribution System for targeting food subsidies, 
which conflated poverty with food insecurity (Mane, 2006; Suryanarayana and Silva, 
2007). 
 Targeting the poor in low- to middle-income countries may be less effective 
because a high rate of poverty increases the costs of targeting (Ravallion, 1999). In the 
context of rural electrification, it may be argued that offering subsidised off grid 
systems bypasses this difficulty. Those who would purchase off grid systems are by 
definition those in need of greater electricity access, and therefore the target population 
for REPs.  
 Market actors - be they commercial companies, non-governmental 
organisations or social enterprises –also target their activities towards certain customers. 
In the case of off grid solar solutions, the target customer is predominantly rural, 
without grid access, and with little cash or credit history, although there are exceptions 
in each case. Despite these challenges companies have seen opportunities for making 
profits even at the bottom of the pyramid, often with the help of microfinance 
institutions (Prahalad and Hart, 1999; Reeves and Sabharwal, 2013). Studies on the 
success of microfinance only address a challenge to targeting the poor, but do little to 
circumscribe the types of customers that different organizations target. In great part this 
is because studies on electrification have avoided the firm-level perspective, as 
discussed above. Better describing the target populations for policymakers and 
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enterprises can give insights into whether policies are likely to attract the interest of 
enterprises and help better understand the off grid market. 
 So, given that rural electrification policies assume some enterprise 
involvement, how do these policies impact the off grid solar sector? Taking a step back, 
we are left with a number of questions. A tour through the most relevant fields of 
literature suggests that to unpack the arrangement of actors within these policies, we 
need a conceptual framework that includes government, the market and the user/citizen, 
with the understanding that institutions shape the market and visa versa, and that the 
arrangement of actors may change. Archibugi’s triangular relationship gets us as close 
as possible, but we are left to ask, what are the most common arrangements of these 
actors within REPs? 
 Shifting to the enterprises that make up the market, we asked what the impacts 
were on the actors within the arrangement? Past studies have suggested that a firm-level 
perspective is the correct one to use to answer the question, and have also demonstrated 
the challenge of using different conceptual frameworks when discussing business 
models. For that reason, Osterwalder’s business model canvas will be used. The 
literature on political strategy also offered up a way of asking ‘why’ enterprises act. By 
combining both ‘how’ and ‘why’ enterprises respond to policy interventions, we can 
present a more robust picture of these interactions in order to improve policy design. 
 Finally, what is the impact on the end user? Although the firm-level 
perspective is not the most intuitive one from which to answer this question, it offers 
some insights into the interplay between policy and the market. Specifically, it can help 
to answer whether REPs and enterprises are targeting the same customers, and it can 
give an indication of what types of companies are truly targeting the bottom of the 
pyramid. 
1.5 Research Questions 
 This thesis takes up the challenge of exploring national rural electrification 
policies (REPs) through the lens of off grid solar enterprises. Policymakers, researchers, 
donors and international aid organisations all have a vested interest in understanding 
what works when it comes to policy interventions (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; 
World Bank, 2008; Bennett et al., 2011; Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). Policy evaluation 
currently focuses on impact evaluation and ex-post interviews with stakeholders, 
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enabling high level statements about the overall success or failure of the programms 
(Aklin et al., 2017a; Akoijam and Krishna, 2017; GOGLA, 2018). The outputs of these 
policies are determined by the success of market actors within the framework set out by 
government, and yet studies of businesses focus on innovative business models, local 
governance and economic viability (Jolly, Raven and Romijn, 2012; Krithika and Palit, 
2013; Bhattacharyya, 2014; Ramchandran, Pai and Parihar, 2016; Singh, 2016b). The 
lack of scholarly connection between off grid enterprises and policy is surprising, since 
rural electrification efforts have almost universally been instigated (and financed) by 
government (Haanyika, 2006; Liming, 2009; Niez, 2010). In reality, policy 
interventions and enterprises work within an interlocking system of incentives and 
disincentives, and this thesis is an attempt to treat it that way by exploring policy 
change from the perspective of off grid solar enterprises. The value of this approach is a 
better view of India’s main off rural electrification programmes, JNNSM and 
DDUGJY, which can go beyond evaluating success or failure and address aspects of 
policy design as well as broader concerns of embedding energy justice into rural 
electrification policy (Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015; Fuller and McCauley, 2016). 
 In doing so, we see how policy does more than encourage outputs, it changes 
the very shape of the market. It is impossible to engage the market without changing it. 
Commercial companies, NGOs, state-funded organisations and social enterprises all 
seek to provide electricity access to the world’s rural poor. They do so with their own 
goals, aims and means. REPs require a certain amount of engagement from these 
enterprises because they form key actors in reaching electrification targets. The extent 
to which REPs support, engage and require enterprise action is variable, and so this 
thesis aims to answer a big question – how do REPs impact off grid enterprises – by 
breaking down the topic into a series of smaller, more manageable questions:  
• Ch 2: How can we categorise rural electrification policies in order to better 
contextualise and compare them? 
• Ch 3: How do India’s rural electrification policies fit into this typology? 
• Ch 4: How have off grid solar enterprises in India changed their business models 
over time in response to policy change? 
• Ch 5: What political strategies do these enterprises employ, and what enterprise 
factors influence political strategy? 
• Ch 6: Who are the target populations of rural electrification policies and off grid 
solar enterprises, and what factors influence which populations are targeted? 
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 Chapter Two opens up the thesis by asking, how can we categorise REPs so as 
to better contextualise and compare them? This question arose in response to the lack of 
comparability across and within studies of rural electrification policies. Without a 
strong breakdown of the nature of policies, which regularly consist of multiple 
instruments, it is impossible to determine the external generalizability of findings (Niez, 
2010; Javadi et al., 2013; Sovacool, 2013). Attempting to apply a modes of governance 
framework onto these policies does more to obscure their comparability, because 
applying a term like ‘corporatist’ or ‘network-based’ belies the fact that most 
governments cut across approaches in addressing energy access (Howlett, 2011; 
Mukherjee and Howlett, 2016). Instead, the chapter takes a sample of 56 policies from 
countries with a less than 80% rural electrification rate and breaks down these REPs by 
type and components, offering up a new typology of rural electrification policies that 
focuses on the mechanism by which enterprises implement the policy.  
 In order to further explore that intersection, India is selected as a case study for 
the thesis due to its ample solar potential, history of off grid policies, and relatively 
large off grid solar market. While there are a few evaluations of the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Solar Mission and the earlier Village Energy Security Programme, there is a 
dearth of evaluations of the on-going DDUGJY and its DDG component (Harish and 
Raghavan, 2011; Palit et al., 2013; Akoijam and Krishna, 2017). Chapter Three is an 
application of the rural electrification policy typology against India’s extant REPs, 
which helps to define which types of interventions the thesis tackles and ways in which 
my findings are applicable to other contexts.  
 From this point on, the research moves to an embedded case study approach, 
focusing on off grid solar enterprises in India and relying on interview data from 15 
enterprises, three government organisations and a handful of experts in the field. As 
described above, policy evaluations of rural electrification programmes ignore the 
business perspective, despite the fact that the each policies makes assumptions about the 
market’s characteristics and its behaviour (Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Andrews and 
Entwistle, 2010). Is that theory of change of the policy intervention correct? And are 
there other changes that occur that aren’t accounted for in that theory of change? If it is 
not, then policies will be less effective. If there are unexpected consequences of change, 
then those may have unintended impacts on the target population. 
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 While some literature on business model change explores how the stage of the 
market and strength of government interventions shapes the characteristics of 
enterprises, none conducts policy analysis through exploring change over time (Gabriel 
and Kirkwood, 2016). Change over time is crucial to making claims about causality, 
and hence linking policy to its impacts on the market. Chapter Four interrogates the 
interviews to determine how off grid solar enterprises have changed their business 
models over time in response to changes in the JNNSM and DDG scheme.  
 In Chapter Five, I ask what political strategies enterprises employ and what 
enterprise factors may influence political strategy. Although there is a large field of 
literature that explores political strategy, these literatures were developed in the context 
of large corporations in the late 20th century, in the USA and Europe (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Schuler, 1996; Getz, 2002; Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004). Some 
efforts have been made to re-approach these concepts from a small company’s 
perspectives, but as they stand, they are ill-suited for the context of small companies in 
a highly politicised sector that focuses on optional incentives instead of regulation 
(Cook and Barry, 1993, 1995; Cook and Fox, 2000). By asking what strategies 
enterprises employ, we can re-focus the concept of political strategy so that it is more 
relevant for these enterprises. By considering then what factors influence an enterprise’s 
political strategy, policymakers can proactively consider the likelihood of their policies 
being appropriate for enterprises of different characteristics (size, type, philosophical 
orientation, etc). 
 Finally, Chapter Six brings the research back to what really matters: people. In 
the off grid space, many actors focus on the ‘bottom of the pyramid,’ the poorest 
members of the community (Prahalad and Hart, 1999, 2001; Prahalad and Hammond, 
2002). The original concept suggested that capitalism could extract profits from even 
the poorest people on the planet, but evidence a decade later suggests that none have 
successfully tapped this market (Pitta, Guesalaga and Marshall, 2008; Agnihotri, 2013; 
Kolk, Rivera-Santos and Rufín, 2014). Given that electricity access is often considered 
a proxy for poverty, it seems unlikely that enterprises that require a degree of cost 
recovery and rural electrification targets would overlap. So who are the target 
populations for REPs and enterprises, and what factors influence these target 
populations? Answering this question will also determine the degree of overlap between 
these populations, which is likely to impact the size of the enterprise population 
interested in engaging with the National Solar Mission of the DDG Scheme. 
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 In total, the thesis seeks to understand the means by which policies for the 
improvement of energy access through off grid technologies engage enterprises, and 
what the impact is on end users. In order to do that, it creates a typology for comparing 
policies before looking at the case of India in order to explore how business models 
change in response to policy change, how they seek to mitigate the risk and seek 
benefits associated with change, and what impacts these changes have on target 
populations. Figure 1.3 diagrams the focus of each chapter. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Conceptual Framework for Chapters (Source: Author, 2018) 
1.6 Methodology 
 In order to answer questions about the interplay between policy design and 
enterprise, this thesis follows a number of qualitative methods. This section will outline 
the literature on each approach, namely, typologies, embedded case study analysis, and 
grounded theory. First, this section will cover the epistemological and ontological 
assumptions of the thesis before moving on to expand on the qualitative research 
methodologies. The research question for each chapter will be linked to the data and 
methods employed to answer it, making this the primary reference section for each 
chapter’s methodology. 
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 As an interdisciplinary research project, the relevant literature at times takes 
competing epistemological and ontological positions. Ontology refers to what degree 
there is a concept of reality, and epistemology refers to what degree that position of 
reality can be known and the ways in which that knowing is constructed or discovered.  
It is important to understand the assumptions inherent in the literature cited before 
outlining the position that this thesis takes. Research on international business and 
organisational studies has been trapped between positivist and anti-positivist 
approaches, depending on the topic of their study (Wicks and Freeman, 1998). 
Specifically, studies of management and international business often take a positivist 
approach that assumes research is able to make objective statements about the world 
around us (Martin, 1990; Astley and Zammuto, 1992). Whereas studies that explore the 
more intangible aspects of organisations, such as strategy, ethics or culture take an anti-
positivist approach wherein the researcher is unable to make claims to objectivity, but 
instead describes one vision of reality that is inherently limited in its generalisability 
(Astley, 1985). This same ‘generalisability’ challenge appears in the struggle between 
context-laden and context-free international business research (Welch et al., 2011). The 
concern is that:  
“while all qualitative research is commonly assumed to be context sensitive, 
a strong trend towards decontextualisation has in fact prevailed in much 
case research. The rich context that is the essence of a case study is 
ultimately regarded as a hindrance to theorising. Since to theorise is to 
generalise away from context, “explaining” and “contextualising” are 
regarded as being fundamentally opposed.” (Welch et al. 2011, 743) 
However, each epistemological approach takes some balance of the two. Summarising 
the common approaches of qualitative methodologies, inductive theory building takes a 
positivist approach that searches for generalities (ie Eisenhardt), natural experiments 
also take a positivist approach but focus on searching for causes (Yin), and interpretive 
sensemaking uses an interpretivist or constructivist approach to search for meaning, as 
is commonly used in grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Welch et al., 2011). 
 This study finds itself between a number of philosophical stances, likely in 
what Welch et al would describe as ‘contextualized explanation’ (Welch et al. 2011, 
745). Epistemologically it shares the social constructionist belief that artifacts are 
socially constructed through language, narrative and interaction, and that an 
organisation can represent such a society (Berger and Luckmann, 1991; Burr, 1995; 
Charmaz, 2006). However, it follows the interpretivist approach that the models we 
create are interpretations of reality and that the researcher is not an unbiased observer 
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(Lin, 1998; Williams, 2000). Ontologically, the research follows more in the vein of 
critical realism, taking an ontological realism stance, married with epistemological 
constructionism (Maxwell and Mittapallo, 2010). In that regard, the research imagines 
that the interviews are social constructions that reveal a single perception of an 
objective reality, and the models of interaction that the research proposes are 
interpretations of what that reality might be. In that regard, truth is provisional, and 
multiple interpretations may exist which are better or worse representations of reality. 
 Qualitative research has become increasingly popular in both solar policy 
evaluation and business studies, although with different focuses. Policy evaluation that 
uses qualitative methodology predominantly looks into how solar home systems impact 
users’ lives through interviews and is most commonly paired with some kind of 
quantitative method (Azimoh et al., 2015; Holtorf et al., 2016; Barman et al., 2017; 
Den Heeten et al., 2017). Business research has more whole-heartedly embraced 
qualitative methods in the past decade (Hair et al., 2007; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 
2008; Welch and Piekkari, 2017). A qualitative research approach was ideal for 
exploring enterprises decision making since decisions about business models, political 
strategy and target customers or beneficiaries take place within the ‘black box’ of the 
organisation. Interviews with government officials and enterprises allows the researcher 
to see factors involved in such decisions. Qualitative research is also well-suited for 
hypothesis and theory building because of a focus on mechanisms and causal 
relationships (Yin, 1981; Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Ridder, Hoon and 
McCandless Baluch, 2014). Because of these benefits there is a growing trend towards 
qualitative research in business and strategy research (Carson and Coviello, 1996; Hair 
et al., 2007; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). 
 Criticisms of qualitative methodologies focus on the nature of interpretation 
and the generalisability of such findings. While it is true that qualitative methodologies 
rely on authorial selection and interpretation, such claims can also be levelled at 
quantitative research (Eisenhardt, 1989). All research requires the researcher to make 
determinations about what questions, sources and interpretations are relevant and valid 
(Lin, 1998; Williams, 2000). The measure of good qualitative research is the 
transparency with which these decisions are made (Eisenhardt, 1989). Likewise, issues 
of generalisability emerge also in quantitative studies (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). In 
qualitative research, it is not the material findings that are generalisable but the 
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mechanisms and relationships through which they come about. This is analytical 
generalisation (Yin, 2014). Following this logic, the thesis offers up a way of viewing 
the relationships between rural electrification policies, the actors that they work 
through, and the end user that may be applicable to other low- and middle-income 
countries. 
 As its core the thesis explores the experiences of 15 enterprises in order to 
glean knowledge that may apply in other circumstances, the methodologies employed 
try to offer a pathway to generalizability while also appreciating the context of that 
experience. The first two main chapters create and apply a typology of rural 
electrification policies in order to determine the universe of policies to which India’s 
case study may apply. In that way, the thesis moves from asking ‘what are the possible 
approaches that government take to engaging enterprise to provide off grid energy?’ to 
asking ‘what are the approaches used in this case study?’. 
 The latter three chapters then employ a mix of grounded theory and case study 
analysis, wherein grounded theory allows the researcher to define the studied 
phenomenon (ie. political strategy or target population) according to the conception of 
the enterprise, and the case study analysis uses that contextual construct to compare the 
experiences of enterprises to tease out factors that influence their behaviour. So the 
latter half of the thesis asks ‘how do enterprises respond to these approaches?’, ‘why do 
they respond that way?’ and ‘what is the impact on the end user?’.  
1.6.1 Typology 
 Chapter two asks, how can we categorise rural electrification policies in order 
to better contextualise and compare them? In order to answer this question, the chapter 
develops a typology of relevant policies. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest where 
governments take similar approaches to engaging enterprises, and thus improve the 
comparability of this study to others. An alternative approach may have been to expand 
this thesis to another country case study or two, and to compare India’s approach and 
experience to another country. However, this would have been extremely onerous, 
given the time constraints. Perhaps more importantly, by creating a typology of policies, 
I create a framework that is applicable outside of one or two case studies, and also 
enables other comparative policy studies to be better contextualised. 
 The Rural Electrification Policy Typology would be best described as a 
qualitatively derived theory, in that it was created inductively through comparing a set 
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of qualitative data and that it offers up not just concepts but the relationship between 
them (Morse, 2004). There are two common arguments about the validity of typologies, 
which offer a parsimonious summary of the research subject: either typologies achieve 
parsimony through “glossing over” complexity or else they do not reach the level of 
theory, and are merely a classification system (Doty & Glick 1994, 230). In order to 
address each of these criticisms it is crucial to understand how typologies are derived in 
qualitative research and what is meant by theory. 
 First, qualitative derived typologies are created through an inductive process 
that can be described in three steps. The researcher builds categories (concepts) from 
comparing the data, names them, then creates definitions, boundaries and attributes of 
the concept (Morse, 2004). I would argue that at this stage, the researcher also outlines 
relationships between the concepts. While the skill and transparency of the researcher 
will determine the extent to which these concepts describe the world’s complexity, 
Morse also offers three tests of the concept. Each concept should be 1) saturated, as in, 
fully described, 2) linked to data, and 3) abstract enough to be “used independently 
from the context” in which it was created (Morse 2004, 1390). 
 Second, theory is described not just as rich description of the concept itself, but 
theory also sets out the falsifiable relationships between concepts (Bacharach, 1989; 
Whetten, 1989). Concepts, as described above, are not just categories but the “building 
blocks of theory” (Morse, 2004). They need not be unconnected to other concepts, but 
indeed, should be connected. Finding common attributes between concepts and 
connecting them is the next step to describing relationships between concepts (Morse 
and Penrod, 1999). Indeed, Chapter Four borrows a typology in the form of 
Osterwalder’s business model framework, which explicitly describes the relationships 
between the concepts therein (Osterwalder, 2004). Finally, Doty & Glick explain how 
falsifiability is needed and how can be done between ideal type and real world 
organisations, which is a possible way of determining the fit of the REP typology 
against real world rural electrification policies (Doty and Glick, 1994). That 
falsifiability is evident in Morse’s criteria for evaluation: clarity, structure, coherence, 
scope, generalisability, and pragmatic utility (Morse et al., 2002). It should be noted 
that falsifiability applies to the creation of typologies, as in chapter 2, but not to the 
creation of constructs in grounded theory (Doty & Glick, 1994). Typologies must be 
coherent in order to meet the criteria for theory. This criterion, along with the five 
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others, represents a good rubric by which to determine the validity of the typologies 
within the thesis. 
1.6.1.1 Typology Data 
 My approach was first to identify those 62 countries that have a rural 
electrification rate of under 80% (World Bank, 2017a). Rural electrification policies 
that were included must meet the following criteria: 
1. The aim of the policy must be to improve rural energy access 
2. At least one policy instrument must be relevant to the provision of off grid solar 
technologies 
3. The primary source must be available in full (or else a proxy, i.e. the World 
Bank project report) 
4. Salient portions of the primary source must be available in English 
 The definition of policy incorporates legislation, as well as any projects, 
programmes or notices about the strategy or implementation of rural electrification. The 
survey includes World Bank projects. These projects were included if they were the 
only record of a government policy that was financed by the World Bank as a way to 
access policies whose primary sources are not in English. World Bank projects are also 
included if they include policy instruments beyond pilot projects, i.e. they represent a 
programme for expanding access. The survey also includes Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), which are national strategies for reducing the carbon 
emissions in developing countries and are created by the national government pursuant 
to the Bali Action Plan from COP 18 in Doha (UNFCCC, 2018).  Relevant REPs were 
identified through:  
1. Policy databases such as IRENA 
2. Rural Electrification Agency websites 
3. The World Bank database 
4. Additional online searches to identify documents 
 The final result is a survey of 56 REPs across 30 countries with rural access 
rates below 80% (see Appendix 1). The vast majority of these policies (54) were 
initiated after the year 2000 and almost all (49) are still in effect. No specific time 
period was used in surveying these policies, focusing instead on those that were most 
commonly identified in primary literature (ie. background information available in rural 
electrification strategies). The loose restriction on time period was due to the focus on 
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collecting a large sample. It is possible to attribute the large skew in the sample towards 
post-2000 policies as reflecting the impact of the Millennium Development Goals on 
socially oriented policies, but it is also likely due to the ease of accessing more recently 
developed, written and uploaded documents. 
 Therefore, what this survey includes is recent rural electrification policies that 
support off grid solar energy in countries with low rural electrification rates. Due to the 
need for English language documentation, there is bias towards countries that have 
previously been colonies of the British Empire. Therefore, there are fewer examples 
from South America and more examples from Africa and South East Asia. As the focus 
is on categorising the types of policies, it is unlikely that this bias has any strong impact 
on the categories present, but incorporating Spanish and French language policies could 
address the gap. As it stands, additional foreign language research was outside the scope 
of this research. This research often includes multiple policies from a single country, 
but is not a complete record of all relevant policies, and is not a country case study. 
Instead, it is a collection of relevant policies from which to draw broader categories and 
approaches. 
1.6.1.2 Typology Method 
 Once collected, each policy was broken down into a summary of its constituent 
parts, with particular emphasis on how the private or non-state sector was involved in 
dissemination and on aspects of the policy relevant to off grid solar products. At that 
stage, policies were further broken down by policy instrument. Almost all policies 
contained multiple policy instruments. Based on the summaries and policy instruments, 
policies first were grouped into categories. These categories were then named, based on 
the nature of their constituent policy instruments and the arrangement of actors, and 
then these categories were defined (as outlined in section 2.5). The relationships 
between these categories were also defined as a part of that exercise. The final typology 
can be seen in Figure 2.1. 
 As the following chapters shift to focus on India, chapter three asks, how do 
India’s rural electrification policies fit into this typology? By answering this question 
the chapter suggests the universe to which experiences based on a particular policy may 
be generalised. For instance, experiences describing the bidding process of the DDG 
Scheme will be more comparable to another country’s experience with direct 
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contracting, as opposed to another country’s policy that takes a government as 
distributer approach. 
 In order to do this, chapter three uses primary source material (legislation, 
policy guidelines, etc.), augmented by expert interviews with nine government officials, 
to break down the two main rural electrification policies – DDUGJY and JNNSM – by 
programmatic mode. Within these policies, I focus solely on the off grid components; 
namely, the DDG Scheme of DDUGJY and the Off Grid Component for the JNNSM. 
Although the grid expansion (DDUGJY) and the grid-connected solar (JNNSM) 
components also shape the industry, this research has focused on the off grid space 
because it is understudied, and these are the policies most commonly referenced by the 
respondents (Brass et al., 2012). By that same logic, I have also applied the typology 
from chapter two to other important policies for the rural electrification sector, as the 
respondents commonly discussed them. Their inclusion also illuminates the approach of 
the Government of India to the sector as a whole, as policies have layered over time 
(Howlett and Rayner, 2007).  
1.6.2 Case Study Analysis 
 Chapters four through six rely on case studies of off grid solar organizations in 
India. This thesis utilises an embedded case study approach where the experiences of 15 
enterprises are considered to be separate case studies within the single case study of 
India (Yin, 2014). Case studies are ideal for asking questions about why or how 
phenomena take place in a context that does not require control over behavioural events 
and where the phenomena studied take place in the present (Yin 2014, 8). Chapter four 
is interested in how off grid solar enterprises have changed their business models in 
response to policy change. In addition to the changes in the enterprises (how), the rich 
interview data also allows an analysis of the factors influencing these changes (why), 
making case study research ideal for this project. Chapters five and six are specifically 
interested is the factors that influence political strategy and target populations. It should 
be noted that chapters five and six are also interested in what political strategies and 
target populations exist, and these questions are addressed by grounded theory (see 
1.5.3). 
 While some of this information could be collected through surveys, which may 
have offered greater comparability if subjects were to be given multiple choice 
questions, narratives from chapter 4 would have been difficult to collect in such a 
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manner. Likewise, factors that influence political strategy or target populations would 
be difficult to untangle from survey-based research, as it requires the context available 
in these rich interviews. 
 Case studies are commonly used in the field of political science, and their use 
as a qualitative research method has been codified, with particular attention to 
generalising their findings (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2005; Yin, 2014). 
Within-case and cross-case methods develop and test hypotheses that are both case 
specific and generalised (Brady, 2002; Mahoney, 2007). Generalisation takes two forms 
– theoretical (analytical) and empirical. Theoretical generalisation occurs when a 
process or mechanism is extracted from a case study that may also apply in other cases. 
Empirical generalisation occurs when characteristics of a sample can be extrapolated to 
the whole population (Tsang, 2014). Case studies are particularly appropriate for 
theoretical generalisation, since they are able to determine causal mechanisms in a way 
that quantitative correlation alone cannot (Flyvbjerg, 2006). However, empirical 
generalisation is possible for portions of a case study when comparing similar analytical 
structures (Tsang, 2014). 
 There are four ways to assess the strength of a case study: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 1981). Construct validity assesses 
the quality of data collection, which can be done by using multiple sources of evidence, 
having an established chain of evidence and having informants review draft reports. 
Establishing a chain of evidence links the case study questions to the case study 
protocol to citations in the report to evidence in the database (Yin, 2014). The intention 
here is that later researchers can dig into how certain claims were made, so that they are 
falsifiable. All these steps have been taken in this thesis. Internal validity is described as 
“seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to 
lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin, 2014). This 
is done through explanation building, pattern matching and addressing rival 
explanations. Within the thesis, I look for patterns across cases, use direct quotes to 
build the logical mechanisms behind these patterns and use literature to uncover and 
counter rival explanations. 
 External validity, on the other hand, is a matter of “designing the domain to 
which a study’s findings can be generalized” (Yin, 2014). In single case studies, as in 
the overarching case study of REPs in India, theory should be used to expand on the 
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generalisability of this study. In the work on embedded cases (ie individual enterprises), 
replication logic is used to prove that the same logic is applicable to other cases. 
Finally, reliability is concerned with “demonstrating that the operations of a study – 
such as the data collection procedures – can be repeated, with the same results” (Yin, 
2014). In order to achieve this, I prepared a case study protocol (Appendices 1-2) and a 
case study database, which can be seen upon request. These files include the details on 
case how case studies were done, questions asked, all raw interview data, and the full 
word tables for each chapter. 
1.6.2.1 Case Study Data  
 This primary data for these chapters are 29 in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews, across a range of enterprises, government agencies and research institutes. 
17 interviews were with high-level executives or managers of 15 enterprises that 
provided off grid solar technologies, broken down in Table 1.6. Two were primarily 
commercial enterprises, seven social enterprises, four non-governmental organisations, 
one public sector enterprise and one governmental organisation. Several enterprises had 
additional products, but this research focused solely on off grid solar products for 
domestic lighting. 
 
Interview Type Organisation Type Total 
Organisations 
Total Interviews 
Enterprises  15 17 
Government 
Officials 
Government of India 2 6 
 State Governments 2 3 
Experts  3 3 
Totals  22 29 
Table 1.6: Interviews Summary 
 Interviews lasted between 25-75 minutes, with the majority of interviews 
taking approximately one hour. The respondents were primarily the CEOs of small to 
medium scale enterprises, or else the senior manager of the off grid division of larger 
enterprises. Questions focused on initial descriptions of the business model in use, 
reasons behind the use of this business model, how the business model had changed 
over time, interaction with government and the impact of policy changes on the 
enterprise. 
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Code 
Off Grid Product Primary 
Enterprise 
Type 
Est. States Scale of Off Grid Component  Type (Past & 
Present) 
ENT11 Microgrid, SHS Social 2010 Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh 
Medium - 5000-
50,000 HHs 
ENT12 SHS Commercial 2013 Rajasthan Small - 500-5000 HHs 
ENT13 Microgrid, Minigrid, SHS Commercial 2013 
Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh, 
Others 
N/A - Panel 
Manufacturer 
ENT14 Microgrid, Minigrid, SHS Social 2014 
Bihar, 
Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh 
Medium - 5000-
50,000 HHs 
ENT21 Minigrid NGO 2015 Bihar, Uttar Pradesh 
Medium - 5000-
50,000 HHs 
ENT22 SHS NGO 2009 
Bihar, 
Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh, 
Others 
Very Large - 100,000-
250,000 HHs 
ENT23 Minigrid, SHS Public Sector 1974 Bihar, Others 
Large - 50,000-
100,000 HHs 
ENT24 Minigrid Social 2007 Bihar, Uttar Pradesh 
Medium - 5000-
50,000 HHs 
ENT25 SHS Social 2013 Bihar, Others Pilot - 0-500 HHs 
ENT26 SHS Social 1995 
Bihar, 
Rajasthan, 
Others 
Very Large - 100,000-
250,000 HHs 
ENT27 SHS NGO 2013 Bihar Small - 500-5000 HHs 
ENT28 Microgrid, SHS NGO 2008 Bihar Very Large - 100,000-250,000 HHs 
ENT29 Minigrid, SHS Government  2012 Bihar Small - 500-5000 HHs 
ENT31  Minigrid Social 2014 Haryana Small - 500-5000 HHs 
ENT32  Microgrid, Minigrid Social 2011 West Bengal, Jharkhand 
Small - 500-5000 
HHs 
Table 1.7: Enterprises Interviewed  
 The enterprises selected give a fairly good overview of the market across India. 
Estimates vary, but recent research suggests that there are 45-60 key formal players 
within the off grid solar sector in the country (Singh, 2016a). An informal market of 
local dealers and distributers also exists within the country, representing a few hundred 
companies, but collecting data on these enterprises is challenging given their disparate 
locations and limited footprint outside of their local area (Singh, 2016a). The true extent 
of the market is not clear, but the CEEW suggests there are approximately 250 formal 
and informal businesses nationwide (CEEW, 2013). 
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 Within the sector, there are a number of large private actors (e.g. TATA BP) 
and large public sector organisations (eg. REIL), as well as a growing number of small 
and medium-scale organisations that represent NGOs, social enterprises and smaller 
commercial enterprises. It should be noted that the line between each category can be 
blurry, as there are a number of organisations that fall within a range of public to private 
ownership, NGOs may have branches of their organisation that are run as a commercial 
enterprise, and India has no legal definition of social enterprise (Perry et al., 1988; 
Sengupta and Sahay, 2017).  
 The commonality between all these actors is that they are a part of the supply 
chain (manufacturing, developing, distributing) off grid solar technologies. There the 
commonalities end. Some are financed by international development banks (i.e. World 
Bank), foundations (i.e. Shell Foundation), and aid agencies (i.e. DFID). Others are 
funded directly or indirectly by state governments (i.e. Government of Bihar). Still 
others have partnerships across business, government and international organisations, 
which are summarised in Figure 1.4. Lines represent partnerships, which need not be 
for funding, but may also be supply chain related, for local capacity, for training, among 
other purposes. 
 For stylistic purposes – and brevity – these actors are described in the 
collective as ‘enterprises,’ alluding to a combination of the term’s meanings of 
‘business’ and ‘undertaking.’ The term is not used to denote an organisation’s 
philosophy regarding profit-making (Sengupta, Sahay and Croce, 2018). Where 
relevant, analysis will specify the type of actor, but Table 1.7 can also be used as a 
reference throughout. 
 Within these organisations, there is a wide range of engagement with the off 
grid sector. That is, some organisations work solely with off grid products, even in grid 
connected areas, whereas others spend most of their energies on grid connected 
products. Only three of the enterprises regularly engage in grid connected projects 
(ENT11, ENT13, ENT23). All grid connected products are outside the scope of this 
study. However, off grid products used in grid connected areas are within my scope. 
Description of the enterprises and their work will focus entirely on their off grid 
products, except where explicitly discussed.  
 Finally, the study focused on enterprises that were active in Bihar, Uttar 
Pradesh and Rajasthan. Those states were chosen because their high solar potential and 
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lower rates of rural electrification have led to a rise in enterprises working in these 
areas. However, most enterprises worked in multiple states (as seen in Figure 1.1), 
including those from outside the study area, without changing their business model 
across states. Because the focus on these areas was primarily to increase the number of 
enterprises that might be interviewed, this study also includes enterprises that were 
available for interviews from outside these states. As the policies studied are national 
level interventions, they apply equally to enterprises working in different states. 
 
Figure 1.4: Interconnections between organisations 
 Interviews were conducted using a mixture of snowballing sampling from 
multiple entry points and theoretical (or stratified) sampling. Three enterprises served as 
discrete entry points, reaching out to them independently, and thereafter reaching most 
of the interviews by introductions from other enterprises. Many small to medium 
enterprises are members of networks such as the Clean Energy Access Network 
(CLEAN). To avoid this bias, I also purposefully sought out larger enterprises, public 
sector enterprises, and governmental organisations that may not have been in these 
networks. The theoretical saturation point was reached when all key enterprise types 
(NGO, public sector, commecial, and social) were represented within that sample 
(O’Reilly and Parker, 2013). Arguably, a thematic saturation point was also reached 
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within the interviews, in that narratives of change, while different, followed similar 
logic and represented common experiences (Eisenhardt, 1989; Guest, Bunce and 
Johnson, 2006; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). However, there is still scope for further 
research, particularly into those categories for which there are few respondents, notably 
public sector organisations.  
 The sample represents approximately 650,000 households who have received 
an off grid solar product through one of these 15 enterprises. Most of this population 
received their products through one of the three very large enterprises represented. 
However, it is important to note that the interview selection is biased towards smaller 
enterprises, because they are more responsive to interview requests, are often members 
of industry organisations and were more likely to connect me with additional 
interviews. 
 Since larger organisations are more likely to be eligible to engage with current 
rural electrification programmes, there is a potential bias against working with the 
government in this sample. In order to mitigate this, I purposefully sought out larger 
organisations, state-owned enterprises, and governmental organisations in order to get a 
fuller picture of possible government interactions. There is also a selection bias for 
successful enterprises. Unsuccessful enterprises are difficult to identify and reach out to, 
and so I only contacted enterprises that were currently in business. This does not 
significantly negatively impact my results, as they are representative of enterprises 
currently functioning in the space, but it must be acknowledged that one potential 
impact of policy change is the loss of particular businesses. 
 Interviews with government officials covered two fundamental national-level 
organisations: the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) and the Rural 
Electrification Corporation (REC). Additionally, interviews included members of the 
REC in Rajasthan, as well as the Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Ltd 
(RRECL), which is the state nodal agency for the current rural electrification 
programme Deendayal Upadhyaya Grameen Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY). Efforts were 
made to contact other relevant state nodal agencies, but were unsuccessful. 
 Finally, three experts were interviewed to provide richer context on the policy 
and enterprise landscapes. Experts were primarily academics or practitioners. Some 
contact was made with a researcher from the World Bank and members of self help 
groups (a form of MFI), however, in the analysis the importance of financing became 
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clear. Future research would do well to expand this research to the role of selection in 
donor organisations, development banks and microfinance institutions. 
1.6.2.2 Case Study Method 
 Each chapter begins by articulating the phenomenon that is being studied. In 
chapter four, that is the components of the business model. In chapter five that is the 
components of political strategy, and in chapter six that is the aspects of target 
populations. Chapters fix and six articulate these phenomena through grounded theory 
(1.5.3), but chapter four borrows its ontology from Osterwalder’s business model 
canvas (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). The reason for borrowing the ontology, rather 
than recreating one, is that the interviews did not focus on full descriptions of the each 
aspect of a enterprise, but only record business model components that arise within the 
course of questioning. Therefore, the data was not robust enough to create my own 
ontology, and so I have borrowed one. 
 Once the phenomenon has been articulated, each chapter applies a case study 
approach, comparing the response of each organization and identifying overall trends 
and possible factors that influence diverging responses. In chapter four, general trends 
in change over time are noted, as well as building logical relationships that contribute to 
causal mechanisms within the system that is the enterprise. In chapter five, each tactic 
of political strategy is explored one by one, noting the characteristics of the enterprises 
that employ such a tactic in order to pull out the key factors that influence political 
strategy. Finally, chapter six uses the construct of the target population to breakdown 
how the main programmes articulate their target population, as opposed to trends within 
descriptions of the target population by technology, enabling us to see where 
programmes and enterprises are targeting the same populations, where they are not, and 
hypothesising about the potential impact of these overlaps (or lack thereof) on end 
users. Further articulation of each chapter’s methods is incorporated in the individual 
chapter. 
1.6.3 Grounded Theory 
 Chapters five and six also rely on a methodology influenced by grounded 
theory to derive the frameworks used to analyse political strategy and end user selection 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). By blending grounded theory 
with case study analysis, the thesis attempts to overcome the limitations of previous 
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business research, whose frameworks have been developed in a very different context, 
while still attempting to move towards generalizability. Grounded theory enables 
chapters five and six to describe the phenomena as it is experienced in context, rather 
than transplanting a multinational corporation-based, western-centric ontology onto it. 
In that way, grounded theory is being used to expand upon and challenge the current 
literature in these fields, as well as answering the questions about ‘what’ is being 
studied. At the same time, it offers a starting point for comparative analysis across 
enterprises with the aim of identifying influencing factors that have the potential to be 
applied across contexts. 
 Grounded Theory was originally developed by Glaser and Strauss to develop 
theory through the coding and analysis of qualitative data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In 
its original conception, grounded theory takes an objectivist approach, assuming that the 
researcher is able to take a detached stance and view reality through this analysis 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). However, later iterations of the 
method take a constructivist view that the researcher cannot be separate, and instead the 
‘reality’ that is viewed through analysis is social constructed (Charmaz, 2006). Given 
the constructionist stance of this thesis, I take this form of grounded theory as my guide 
through chapters five and six.  
 Grounded theory in these chapters helps to conceptualise how enterprises and 
governments conceive of and describe political strategies and their target populations. 
In that way, these concepts are not universal truths but an approximation of the reality 
that the researcher and the subject share (Charmaz, 2006). These concepts are then 
applied to the embedded case studies to determine the factors that influence them and 
the implications for the real world actions of enterprises. As will be explored in the next 
section, keeping the analysis close to the interview data, rather than imposing theory 
from above, is integral to addressing the role of the researcher in our postcolonial 
development narratives.  
 As I have alluded, I do not follow a strict grounded theory methodology, but 
instead borrow heavily from its approach. In addition to sharing the assumptions of 
Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory, I develop my conceptual frameworks 
through three-step coding. Primary coding is done freely by associating sections of 
interview data with the guiding question of the chapter. Secondary coding consolidates 
and builds on the primary codes. Finally, tertiary codes compare secondary codes to 
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derive higher-level categories (Charmaz, 2006). Further details on coding are available 
in chapters five and six. Where I deviate from the approach is in my strict allegiance to 
the research question (not necessary, or even desired in Glaser’s conception), and I 
allowed myself to be familiar with related literature (as opposed to coming in blind). 
These changes make the research a little more focused, but necessarily block off 
particular paths of inquiry that I might have taken. Nevertheless, given the limited scope 
of time available for a doctoral thesis, I believe this compromise allows for the best of 
both worlds, allowing the research subjects centre stage while also being specific in 
what I asked of the data, which were the same interviews as Table 1.7. 
1.7 Reflexivity and Positionality 
 Given the many dimensions of identity, authority and representation within this 
subject, it is crucial to reflect on the positionality of both the author and the research 
within this thesis. What role does the researcher play in the research, and how do the 
characteristics of the researcher impact that role? What role does the researcher have in 
representing the realities of the research subjects? Are these designations of 
“researcher” and “research subject” overly simplistic and problematic? How can 
reflecting upon these questions improve our fieldwork research? These are the questions 
that predominantly play out in geography and education research that take a closer look 
at gender, race and postcolonialism (Katz, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994; Mullings, 1999; 
Nagar and Ali, 2003). 
 Reflexivity refers to the concept of reflecting upon these questions with the 
aim of improving our understanding of how knowledge is constructed, or at least 
acknowledging the limitation of that construct. Sultana describes it as “being attentive 
to the politics of knowledge production” (Sultana, 2007). The belief in the value of such 
reflection relies heavily on postmodernist concepts of the plurality of truth, and it 
questions our ability as a single point of observation to see and know alternative 
realities, which are situated, incomplete and ever shifting (Pillow, 2003). In such an 
environment, what is it that we mean by positionality? A researcher’s position is the 
combination of a range of visible and invisible factors that contribute to the negotiated 
identity of the researcher in the research context. In other words, “a researcher situates 
both herself and her research subjects in the same landscape of power, which is the 
context of the research project in question” (Rose, 1997). This can simply take the form 
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of an exploration of the way that race, gender, education, class or other markers of 
identity influenced the interactions between researcher and research subject (Sultana, 
2007). However, some scholars, Rose most prominently, disagree that “transparent 
positionality” – that is, explaining how your position and how it affects the research – is 
even possible. In Rose’s conception, the postmodernist position is ever changing and 
multi-faceted, experienced differently by each party, and therefore is unknowable 
(Rose, 1997). This is a position increasingly shared by feminist geographers (Nagar and 
Ali, 2003; Pillow, 2003). 
 Given the unknowability of our positionality, what is the purpose of 
reflexivity? Scholars have questioned the ability of self-reflection to move beyond 
narcissistic naval-gazing (Patai, 1994; Nagar and Ali, 2003; Pillow, 2003). Perhaps 
more insidiously, there is the concern that the simple act of reflection will be deemed 
sufficient to consider the work of justice and equality done, and relations between 
researcher and subject will return to a previous dynamic with the mistaken belief that 
inequalities of representation have been solved (Sultana, 2007; Spivak, 2010). One 
approach that seeks to prevent such surface-level reflexivity is to write “with” and not 
“about” one’s subjects (Nagar and Ali, 2003). This prevents the silent assertion that the 
academic distance a researcher maintains imbues them with a god-like objectivity. 
However, this can begin to blur the lines between academic research and journalism, as 
the subject is given greater sway over the narrative. Either way, the most strident 
criticism of reflexivity is that this is academic discourse that ignores the very real-world 
needs of people and that we are not asking the most pressing questions in our fog of 
semantics (Patai, 1994; Nagar and Ali, 2003). These criticisms are even more pointed in 
the context of work with the rural poor. 
 Within this thesis reflexivity holds three purposes, which aim to acknowledge 
the postmodernist conception of unknowable positionality while forging ahead in the 
knowledge that inevitable simplifications in representation must take place to address 
the real, pressing needs of those without electricity access. Therefore, reflection is key 
for 1) considering the limitations of this research, 2) ensuring the representation of 
counter-narratives within the research (especially crucial in Chapters Four through Six, 
which rely on interview data), and 3) acknowledging the position of this research in 
broader, systemic inequalities of postcolonial research in the hope that we might, as a 
field, find ways to address these (Nagar and Ali, 2003; Jack and Westwood, 2006; 
Milner, 2007; Spivak, 2010).  
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 Despite the initial differences between myself and the majority of my research 
subjects, I actually occupied a dual insider-outsider status (Mullings, 1999; Merriam et 
al., 2001; Sultana, 2007). As a young, white woman with an American accent, coming 
from a top British university, I was often diametrically opposed on all these visible 
counts of identity from my interview subjects, most of whom were middle-aged, Indian 
men in government or business in India. From this perspective, I was a clear outsider, 
and when I attempted to show insider status (wearing a shalwar kameez, for instance) it 
was commented upon. These comments were always friendly, but served to further 
draw attention to differences between myself and my subjects. However, despite initial 
impressions, there were important similarities between most of the interview subjects 
from off grid businesses and myself. Many of the CEOs, COOs, managers and 
cofounders that I spoke to had been to business school, some in India, some in 
European institutions. As I undertook my masters at the Judge Business School of the 
University of Cambridge, these interviews often illuminated how a shared educational 
background can be as powerful as visible markers of similarity (Mullings, 1999). 
 Whether these similarities or differences helped or hindered in the course of 
my research is difficult to address. It is certainly possible that the difficulties I faced in 
getting some government interviews, or the dismissiveness of some government 
interview subjects, related to my gender, but equally, it is likely that my gender and age 
contributed to some of my more cordial, longer and more helpful interviews (Sultana, 
2007). It also likely assisted in the few interviews that were with women, who often 
were working specifically in a women’s empowerment context. It is certainly the case 
that a shared business school background helped in many of the business interviews, in 
great part because the participants spoke the same “language,” making their narratives – 
and my questions - more instantly understandable to each party.  
 Despite these similarities, my research still falls under the category of 
international business research (IBR) and comes with the larger-scale, systemic post-
colonial baggage that that entails. Although many of my interview subjects came from 
the same, Euro-American educational background, the subject of my research was truly 
the businesses that these subjects represented. The fact of the matter is that IBR is 
predominantly developed, undertaken, and published by either Western scholars or 
within the framework of Western, Anglophone scholarship. This can drown out 
competing voices from elsewhere in the world (Jack and Westwood, 2006). Likewise, 
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the very questions and assumptions that scholarship makes is determined not by the 
individuals whose lives are studied, but by scholars from a different continent, speaking 
a different language (Nagar and Ali, 2003). Even where interviewing elites (as I was), 
the power of interpretation and choice of frameworks still remains with the author 
(Mullings, 1999). To attempt to redress this issue, Jack and Westwood suggest that “at a 
minimum, local self-representations should be taken account of and ideally become the 
prime resource driving conceptualizations and practice” (Jack and Westwood, 2006). 
Borrowing from grounded theory in first constructing and then applying new 
frameworks, I have attempted to put the interview narratives front and center in my 
interpretation. However, there are still some frameworks (ie Osterwalder’s business 
canvas) that are applied retroactively onto the data.  
 Exploring the role that this researcher and research has in broader trends cross-
boundary research aims to qualify the authorial objectivity that academic research takes 
(Nagar and Ali, 2003). More concretely, it is the basis by which counter-narratives are 
included within the interview data. Doing so is more than naval-gazing, but 
acknowledging that real world data can be messy and contradictory, and improving 
representations of the research subject despite that. 
1.8  Conclusions 
 This introduction has gone some way to exploring the context in which the 
research is situated. India is a large, complex country with its own history of power 
sector development. When electricity was introduced in the late 1800s, it was primarily 
owned by private developers and very limited in geographical scope. Since then, 
publicly owned companies took over as the grid was expanded throughout urban and 
periurban spaces. However, large swathes of the rural population were still without 
power, and policies and companies that are the subject of this research emerged in the 
1990s-2000s with the privatisation and unbundling of the power sector (Palit and 
Bandyopadhyay, 2017). Given the political interest in electricity access, as rural 
populations make up large portions of many constituencies, Indian policies vacillate 
between strong state interest in customer protection and an emphasis on allowing 
market forces to bear on rural development.  
 Given that, this thesis asks how rural electrification policies impact the 
enterprises that are enlisted (or expected) to provide off grid solar systems in areas with 
little to no electricity access. Using an embedded case study method, the bulk of the 
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research uses interviews and secondary literature to piece together the complicated 
answer to such a question. In doing so, I break this question further into smaller 
questions about enterprise change over time, political strategy and target customers. The 
findings suggest that enterprises of all sizes are agile, quickly respond to policy, and try 
to balance minimising political risk with taking advantage of potential benefits. The 
tension between market-based approaches and social equity create difficulties in scaling 
up enterprises that focus on those with the least, and microfinance organisations can 
actually reinforce inequality. 
 While the case studies focus entirely on India, the rich interviews that underlie 
this study offer up logical relationships between social, economic and political factors 
that allow for theoretical generalisation. That is to say, while the particulars of each 
enterprise are idiosyncratic, the mechanisms by which they make decisions are 
potentially universal. This is the greatest offering that this research can make to our 
energy access problem. India is unique among low- to middle-income countries in its 
decades of grid and off grid expansion programmes that have been supplied by 
impressive central investments. Prime Minister Modi believes that all households will 
be electrified by the time that this thesis is completed (ET Bureau, 2017). While it 
seems likely that energy intensification programmes and efforts to improve quality will 
be ongoing, the future of off grid expansion is primarily in Africa (IEA, 2017). While 
India might be unique in the history and breadth of its off grid programmes, it is hardly 
the only country to recognise its potential. Increasingly, low- and middle-income 
countries are supporting non-state enterprises in expanding the use of solar home 
systems, microgrids and minigrids (Sovacool, 2013; IEA, 2017). To determine where 
the comparison of India’s REPs is most apt, we begin by exploring these new policies 
around the globe.  
 India-specific findings suggest that solar enterprises respond to changes in 
ways that are potentially predictable, given the logical relationships between aspects of 
the business model, but which may be counterproductive for the development of a 
healthy off grid solar sector and for filling tenders. The extent to which enterprises are 
reliant on, and therefore responsive to, enterprise change is determined by their political 
strategy, which relies on enterprise characteristics such as size, past experience, and 
technology. Finally, the end users targeted by policy and enterprises are only partially 
aligned, suggesting that changes in market-based policy may negatively impact the 
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direct contracting policies in place. Taking a step back, the study suggests that policy 
changes do not just increase or decrease sales, but change the very shape of the market 
that they hope to tap into. Increased emphasis on leveraging the private sector by 
governments around the world suggests that these findings may have relevance for 
other policies that try to use market actors for public service delivery, particularly in a 
development context. 
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2 RURAL ELECTRIFICATION 
TYPOLOGIES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Sustainable Development Goal 7 supports access for affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern energy for all by 2030 (United Nations, 2015).  In the pursuit of 
that goal, governments all over the world have sought to bring power to the 1.1 billion 
people without electricity (IEA, 2017). The expectation is that increased energy access 
will improve other development indicators, such as air quality, health, education and 
gender equality (Azimoh et al., 2015; Barman et al., 2017). While the relationship 
between these factors is still up for debate, international organisations broadly agree 
that energy is a cornerstone of development, without which many other quality of life 
improvements cannot exist (Muir, Areikat and VandenBroek, 2014; Acheampong et al., 
2017; Mccollum et al., 2017). This is the primary reason that governments all over the 
world are trying to improve and expand energy access. In countries with large 
underdeveloped areas, these attempts at improvement take the form of rural 
electrification policies (REPs). REPs typically focus on expanding the national grid and 
planning increases in supply in order to support new demand. However, with SDG #7 
increasing the pressure to provide access, even where grid expansion is uneconomical, 
many countries are acknowledging the importance of providing energy through off grid 
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solutions. Off grid solutions include minigrids, microgrids and standalone systems of all 
capacities and energy sources. The IEA estimates that 50% amount of new connections 
will be achieved through off grid (IEA, 2017). Although both fossil fuels and 
renewables are likely to play a part in the expansion of off grid systems, renewables are 
anticipated to account for 60% amount of new connections (IEA, 2017). Among 
renewables, solar has been the heavy hitter, accounting for a large proportion of 
connections as manufacturing costs for PV decrease globally (IEA 2017, p 13). 
Nevertheless, as energy access is broadly considered the responsibility of central 
governments, newer REPs have gone out of their way to support solar off grid. 
 These REPs require a degree of engagement with market actors. It is 
anticipated that $786 billion of investment will be required to secure energy access for 
each person on the planet by that deadline, with the majority of that money needed for 
the expansion of electricity access (IEA 2017, p 104). That represents approximately 
3.4% of the global energy sector investment. Given that the majority of the population 
without access lives in low- to medium-income countries, governments have looked to 
the private sector and other non-state actors to secure the funding and expertise 
necessary. Rural electrification policies utilise a range of approaches to encouraging off 
grid technology and engaging non-state actors in their delivery. This thesis focuses 
specifically on those REPs that engage market actors in the service of expanding access 
through off grid solar technologies.  
 As it stands, the literature on such policies is casuistic and sparse. Occasionally 
scholars have sought a comparative approach to REPs (Liming, 2009; Niez, 2010; 
Javadi et al., 2013; Sovacool, 2013), but the majority of studies take a single case study 
approach (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti, 2002; Haanyika, 2008; Lemaire, 2011; 
Mawhood and Gross, 2014; Quitzow, 2015; Mollik et al., 2016). One reason for this is 
the complexity of the field, which intersects previous power sector policies, 
electrification programmes, market development and renewable energy support. This 
can also lead to policy layering (Rogge, Kern and Howlett, 2017). This makes 
comparing them a challenge and prevents attempts at more generally assessing their 
operation, as there is not necessarily a shared vocabulary between the studies. In order 
to improve comparison and contextualise single case studies and expand the 
conclusions of this thesis, this chapter surveys a selection of off grid solar REPs to 
develop a rural electrification policy typology. Building a typology from the data, rather 
than fitting the data to a previous framework, is important in part because of the 
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uniqueness of the sector, which features the provision of new technology in low- and 
middle-income countries to deliver public services typically through private and non-
state actors. 
 In order to do that, this chapter first explores the relevant literature on rural 
electrification policies and public service delivery, and then surveys the rural 
electrification policies that utilise off grid solar energy that are available in English. 
Solar energy is expected to be the largest source of off grid electricity, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa (IEA 2017, p 13). The policies surveyed focus on those countries 
that currently have lower than an 80% rural electrification rate. This is not a claim that 
these are all the relevant policies in existence, but merely a large sample of such 
policies, given the constraints outlined the in methodology section. Breaking down 
these policies into their constituent relevant instruments, this chapter proposes a new 
typology of REPs focusing on three policy types: institutional, regulatory, and 
programmatic. Within the programmatic policies, there are five modes of engagement 
with market actors in public service delivery: market-based, energy service companies, 
public-private partnerships, direct contracting, and government as distributer.  
 The rural electrification policy typology that is developed here offers a toolbox 
for comparing off grid solar policies across countries and contexts. Given its focus on 
off grid energy products, it is likely applicable to other forms of off grid electricity 
technology, such as micro hydro or biomass plants, or else to other off grid energy 
products, such as clean cook stoves. Most importantly, defining and delineating these 
categories offers a way to improve our comparative analysis of REPs, to ensure that 
comparisons are able to accurately determine the key similarities and differences 
between policies. 
 This chapter will first expand on the current literature on off grid solar policy 
in section two. Section three will review how three strands of the relevant literature 
approach the engagement of private and non-state actors in the provision of public 
services, namely, the literature on political economy, innovation studies and public 
administration. Section four will then outline the method by which this chapter 
collected rural electrification policies, their definition, and their analysis.  Section five 
sets out a new typology of REPs and section six goes into detail on programmatic 
modes, which specifically describe the engagement of private and non-state actors, 
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pulling back in our conceptual framework. Finally, section seven will discuss the 
implication and use of this typology in its concluding remarks. 
2.2 Methodology 
  Using the typology methodology described in 1.5.1, I collected 56 rural 
electrification policies to develop the REP typology below. The majority of the rest of 
chapter defines the categories and their relationships, as well as offering a survey of 
policies that fit within these categories.  
2.3 Rural Electrification Policy Typology 
2.3.1 Development of an REP typology 
 Two studies are notable for taking steps towards a typology of global rural 
electrification policies. The first is a study of policies from all over the world that aim to 
expand electricity access, which broadly break down into grid expansion and off grid. 
From there, off grid policies can be broken down by technology. However, the 
‘typology’ of each policy is a very short summary (Javadi et al., 2013). Sovacool takes 
a more methodical approach to collecting and categorising rural electrification 
programmes, but the focus is on lessons learned in achieving its outputs (Sovacool, 
2013). Notably, Sovacool only looks at programmes, not all policies, and so policies 
that do not explicitly set up a service delivery arrangement are not included. In 
considering the programmes together, the article outlines three paradigms of renewable 
energy development: donor gift paradigm (1970s-1990s), the market creation paradigm 
(1990s and 2000s), and the new “sustainable program paradigm (mid 2000s-present) 
(Sovacool, 2013). While this typology is helpful in conceptualising how these policies 
have changed over time, they act more as a historical summary rather than a tool for 
deconstruction, which is necessary for comparison. 
 The REP typology presented here categorises the policies that have been 
included in this survey. Findings suggest that policies are primarily institutional, 
regulatory or programmatic. However, it is possible for policies to be in more than one 
category. Thus, the relationships between the categories could be described as this: rural 
electrification policies can be institutional and/or regulatory and/or programmatic in 
nature; programmatic policies deliver rural energy through a programmatic mode using 
incentives to align the actors within the mode. 
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 Categories can be defined by the challenge that they aim to address. That is, 
institutional policies address limitations to the current institutional capacity. Regulatory 
policies address needs to manage a market that is not naturally supporting energy 
access. Finally, programmatic policies specifically focus on how to reach end users with 
the specified technology. The latter is usually what is referred to as rural electrification 
policy, but other policies, such as those that create funds for improving energy access, 
are also important parts of the rural electrification puzzle. By incorporating all of these 
types of policies and delineating their aims and methods, this typology improves our 
discussion around these policies by making it more precise, systematic and comparable.  
 Up until this point, the chapter has referred to a range of non-state actors: 
private companies, NGOs, semi-public organisations and social enterprises. From this 
point forward, all non-state actors will be referred to as ‘enterprises’ regardless of their 
business model. This is partially due to the fact that in the off grid sector the line 
between private, social and non-governmental organisations can blur due to the heavy 
emphasis on poorer customers. Given this, REPs often invite any non-state organisation 
to apply. Last but not least, for stylistic purposes, it is easier to give this diverse group a 
single moniker. Clarifications will be made when discussing specific REPs, but general 
discussion of engagement with non-state actors will refer to them as enterprises. 
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Figure 2.1: Rural Electrification Policy Typology 
2.3.2 Institutional Policies 
 In 1977, the Government of Bangladesh ratified Ordinance No. LI of 1977. 
This ordinance set up a rural electrification fund to be managed by a rural electrification 
agency. At that time, the rural electrification rate in the country was under 5%. Today it 
is 68.85% (World Bank, 2017a). Ordinance No. LI of 1977 is the oldest REP in this 
dataset, although it should be noted that the policy was updated in 2013. It represents a 
subset of the REPs that are institutional policies; that is, they are policies that aim to 
create an institutional framework within the government that enables the expansion of 
energy access. For the most part, these policies focus exclusively on the creation of a 
rural electrification agency or a rural electrification fund. A rural electrification agency 
may be a separate entity or a subdivision of the ministry or department of energy or 
renewable energy. Rural electrification funds are usually under the sole control of the 
rural electrification agency, where one exists. 
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 Within the sample, nine policies create a rural electrification fund and eight 
policies create a rural electrification agency or rural electrification board. In the creation 
of a rural electrification fund, these policies outline the role of the fund, how money 
shall be allocated to the fund, who is in control of the fund, and the manner in which the 
money in the fund should be dispersed. The aim of these funds is to expand and 
improve rural electricity access, but the creation of a fund also aims to do so by ring-
fencing funding for this particular purpose. Legislation setting up rural electrification 
agencies follow a similar approach in concentrating institutional capacity and attention 
through a devoted board of members. Policies that set up these agencies outline the 
agency or board’s purpose, membership, functions, responsibilities and reporting and 
auditing rules. 
 As in all these categories, some policies may fall under more than one 
category. Although typically these policies stand on their own or else include provisions 
for both a rural electrification agency and fund, in some policies, the creation of an 
agency or fund is one instrument among many. There is no obvious trend in which 
policies may overlap with this category; that is, some policies include regulatory and 
institutional components and some include programmatic and institutional components. 
2.3.3 Regulatory Policies 
 Regulatory policies do not offer financial benefits, although they may be 
favourable to a sector, but instead set out the rules of the playing field. They are broadly 
considered to be a restrictive policy – limiting the actions of market participants. The 
aim of regulatory policy can be to protect the interests of the end user or the interests of 
certain sectors – this being the difference between social regulation and economic 
regulation (Hughes p 26). Both are salient in the energy access discussion and within 
these policies. Perhaps the clearest example of this distinction is the role of tariff 
regulation. 
 18 policies include rules for off grid tariff regulation, which can either be in the 
form of the deregulation of tariffs in off grid spaces, an outline of how tariffs are 
regulated, or the acceptable regulated tariff prices. The difference between the former 
(deregulation) and the latter two policies (regulation) is the difference between 
economic and social regulation. One example of a policy of deregulation is the Notified 
Rural Regions of the Indian Electricity Act 2003. This section of the policy allows for 
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private operators in rural areas to provide power at an unregulated price. Other policies, 
such as the Nigerian Regulation for Mini-grids 2016, offer the option of a tariff that is 
agreed upon between the private operator and the community (V.20). However, even in 
this case, that tariff is agreed upon with potential oversight by the Nigerian Electricity 
Regulatory Commission. The aim of deregulating tariffs is to allow private companies 
to recoup sufficient costs in an area that would otherwise be challenging. Minigrids 
require high capital costs and often work in areas with low demand, which means that 
they may not be able to function at the nationally regulated electricity price. The aim, 
therefore, is to ensure that non-state businesses can work in the space, and therefore 
these are economic regulations. 
 On the other hand are social regulations, which aim to protect the interests of 
the end user. A great example would be the Section 13 of the Renewable Energy Act 
2013 from the Gambia. This section states: 
“(1) Electricity generation from renewable energy resources or hybrid 
systems in off-grid areas which build the required facilities to connect end 
consumers (“Private Wire Network”) are allowed to charge electricity tariffs 
to end consumers up to the current national retail tariff rates (“Approved 
Electricity Tariffs”), as determined by the Authority, provided the capacity 
of generating facility on such private wire networks system is no greater 
than two hundred kilowatts.   
“(2) Private Wire Networks with a capacity of generation from renewable 
energy resources or hybrid systems greater than two hundred kilowatts or 
wishing to charge tariffs greater than the approved electricity tariff may also 
be permitted, but shall justify any tariff to the Authority following the 
normal procedures under the Electricity Act.” (Ministry of Energy, 2013) 
In this case, minigrid operators are expected to sell power at up to the same price that 
the national grid charges. This may not be to the benefit of the private company, which 
may wish to charge more, but to the benefit of the end user that is able to better afford 
the power. This is not the only possible configuration of regulation, however. Vanuatu, 
for example, in their nationally appropriate mitigation action plan of 2015, determined 
that tariffs should be agreed between the private company and the Government of 
Vanuatu (UNDP 2015, p 53). The aim of this oversight is to protect the end user, so that 
they are not being charged exorbitant rates. 
 With tariff regulations often come rules around licensing. 12 policies in the 
sample include licensing regulations, which identify which parts of the market require a 
vendor to have a license and how licensing should occur. The aim of these policies is to 
allow the government to determine who is allowed to participate in certain markets. In 
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the context of rural electrification, this is often to ensure the companies providing off 
grid solar are able to provide adequate products and services, and that they are not a 
‘fly-by-night’ operator who might provide poor products and then disappear. These 
licensing requirements often incorporate rules around technical standards. 
 23 policies include a description of, or plan for, technical standards. Technical 
standards can be for the import of solar modules, solar panels, their installation or their 
maintenance. The most common is the requirement that imported solar products meet 
the ISO standards for solar energy products (ISO, 2018). Notes on technical standards 
are also prevalent in programmatic policies requiring enterprise engagement with 
government, as governments make specific requirements of the standards that 
enterprises must maintain. For instance, in the case of Zambia’s 2008 Rural 
Electrification Master Plan, solar development moving forward includes the unification 
and improvement of their technical standards: 
“9.4.5. Standardization of Implementation Plans, Applied Technologies and 
Equipment Specifications, and Development of Technical Manuals 
“Unification of technical standards, standardization of solar power 
generation technologies which align with local characteristics regarding 
design and installation items, etc., and technical manuals are needed for 
installation, implementation and operation maintenance. Currently the 
procurement of solar power generation facilities mainly relies on imports, 
but in order to promote the future utilisation of parts manufactured in the 
country, costs and quality of these products should achieve an international 
level, requiring the establishment of technical standards, quality 
improvement, and technological advancement for cost reduction, of solar 
power generation facilities.” (Ministry of Energy and Water Development, 
2009) 
This is something that had previously been identified as a hindrance to rural solar 
deployment (Ministry of Energy and Water Development 2009, s 9.1.1). 
Standardisation can benefit both the end user, by improving quality, and the sector as a 
whole, by improving trust in the product. Regulatory policies therefore have both an 
economic and social dimension, depending on the aim of the instrument. 
2.3.4 Programmatic Policies 
 Research around REPs typically focuses on programmatic policies; that is, 
policies that outline a programme of distribution of off grid energy supply. Within 
programmatic policies, this research identifies a mode of distribution and incentives for 
distribution, which refer to enterprise engagement. Essentially, programmatic policies 
Chapter 2: Rural Electrification Typologies 
Victoria Anne Plutshack – November 2019  85 
Word	T
emplat
e	by	
Friedm
an	&	M
organ	2
014 
outline the relationship between the government, enterprises and end users, and the 
incentives in place to align them. A programmatic policy may involve more than one 
mode, particularly if it describes the distribution of more than one type of technology 
(ie minigrids and SHSs). Likewise, a programmatic policy regularly involves multiple 
incentives. Finally, as with institutional and regulatory policies, a programmatic policy 
may overlap with other categories. This section will briefly describe the nature of the 
programmatic policies surveyed before section 6 goes into greater depth on 
programmatic modes. 
 Modes express the relationship between government, enterprise, and end user 
in the provision of off grid solar power. There are five programmatic modes: market-
based (included in 20 policies), private-public partnerships (14), private ESCOs (9), 
direct contracting (16) and government as distributer (2). All programmatic policies 
take at least one mode, but a policy may have more than one mode as REPs often 
include more than one technology and modes may overlap. Policies that provide 
incentives without an explicit structure (ie a subsidy with no plan for public 
distribution) assume a market development mode. Further details and examples of 
modes will be explored below. 
 In order to ensure that enterprises participate in the way that modes intend, 
incentives are built into the programmes to encourage involvement. In some cases, this 
is in order to encourage enterprises to get involved (a kind of economic incentive, a la 
regulatory policy), and in other cases the incentives encourage rural end users to 
purchase the systems or power (a kind of social incentive). They primarily take the form 
of subsidies (included in 24 of the policies), tax incentives (8), credit or financing (20), 
and capital grants (12). 
 Subsidies can target technologies or end users either through subsidising the 
technology or by providing subsidies only to a particular target population (ie 
households below the poverty line). This is the most popular incentive within the 
sample, likely due to its flexibility. A subsidy may be of any amount (some countries 
offer free connections to rural households) and may target any population (in some 
cases subsidies are primarily for community buildings). Subsidies are present in all 
modes: market development (10), private-public partnerships (7), private ESCOs (3), 
direct contracting (10) and government as distributer (2). It is perhaps worth noting that 
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subsidies are used in half or fewer of the three former modes, and are slightly more 
prevalent in direct contracting and government as distributer. 
 The classic example of direct contracting is exemplified by Mozambique’s 
2016 programme managed by FUNAE, Off-grid renewable energy for rural 
electrification in Mozambique. In it, the government identifies the areas that require off 
grid technology, tenders out the project for private and non-state contractors, then 
provides a 100% end user subsidy for initial connection and a further end user subsidy 
for monthly payments to the contractor (UNFCCC, 2016). However, subsidies can also 
be integrated into a market development mode. For instance, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Solar Mission (JNNSM) initially provided an end user subsidy for customers 
of certain solar home systems. Customers worked with companies to prepare the 
paperwork that would allow them access to a loan and a subsidy through the National 
Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). Any end user would have 
access to this subsidy if they were purchasing a system. This expanded the reach of 
these systems into rural areas without the identification of such populations by the 
government, unlike India’s other rural electrification programmes. 
 Tax exemptions are another form of financial incentive that is present in a 
number of these policies. These may be exemptions from VAT or other duties that 
target downstream parts of the market. For example, the Renewable Energy Policy of 
Bangladesh, 2008 has a VAT exemption for renewable technologies: 
“5.2. To prompt renewable energy in power sector, all renewable energy 
equipments and related raw materials in producing renewable energy 
equipments will be exempted from charging 15% VAT. SEDA or power 
division of the MPEMR or its assignee until SEDA is formed, will fix up 
the acceptable mechanism to reach the benefits of tax exemption to end 
users in consultation with NBR.” (MoP, 2008) 
Other tax exemptions target upstream parts of the market by reducing or eliminating 
import taxes, for instance. The aim of these policies is to improve both the profitability 
of the technologies and to lower their costs for consumers. 
 Next is financing. Financing comes in two main forms: credit for businesses or 
microcredit for end users. A great example of the range of targets for financing is 
Rwanda’s Renewable Energy Fund Project 2017, supported by the World Bank. The 
objective is to “increase electricity access in Rwanda through off-grid technologies and 
facilitate private sector participation in renewable off-grid electrification” (World Bank 
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2017b, s28, p 22). In order to do that, the Government of Rwanda will offer financing 
through four different ‘windows’: onlending through SACCOs [Savings and Credit 
Cooperatives] to households and micro-enterprises, onlending through banks 
(commercial and microfinance) to households and small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), direct financing of mini-grid developers, direct financing of locally registered 
OSCs (World Bank 2017b, s 34, p 24). In summary, windows one and two offer 
financing to small businesses and end users through local cooperatives and banks. 
Windows three and found offer financing directly to companies for minigrid 
development and for registered off-grid solar companies. Policies with financing 
instruments do not necessarily include both financing for end users and for enterprises. 
Rwanda’s four-window approach is unusual in its breadth of financing targets. 
However, both financing for companies and microfinancing for end users are 
commonly incorporated into the policies, making it the second most common form of 
incentive. 
 Finally, twelve of the policies include capital grants. It is possible to consider a 
technology-based subsidy as a capital grant, but in this typology, capital grants refer to 
government funding that is provided to the enterprise to cover high initial investments, 
not ongoing product costs. For that reason, capital grants are primarily an incentive for 
minigrid and microgrid developers. An interesting example is the World Bank funded 
Nigeria Electrification Project initiated in 2018. In the first component, the project aims 
to involve private investors in Nigeria’s minigrid space by offering grants (here called 
subsidies) to the lowest bidder: 
“35. Component 1.1: Minimum Subsidy Tender for Mini Grids (IDA 
US$70 million equivalent). To initiate implementation, REA will select 
250 sites in areas where there is already significant private sector interest. 
REA will invite private developers to bid for minimum capital cost 
subsidies according to their business plans to provide electricity to these 
sites.” (World Bank 2018, p 16) 
 In that way, the government procures a system that requires the least government 
support for initial investment. Other policies take different approaches. They may offer 
a fixed grant percentage, such as South Africa’s Non-Grid Electrification Policy 
Guidelines, or Lao PDR’s Decree on Solar Energy Development. Or else the amount of 
funding may be agreed between the government and the company, as in the case of 
Tanzania’s National Electrification Programme 2013-2022. 
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2.3.5 Other Policy Instruments 
 It should be noted that there are other policy instruments that are occasionally 
incorporated into these policies, but which have not been included in this typology due 
to their scarcity. Other forms of support for off grid power come in the form of 
awareness campaigns, training and other forms of capacity building. Amongst projects 
funded by international organisations, there can also be found implementation support 
and research and knowledge sharing. However, these policy instruments are much less 
common (cited between 1-3 times across all policies) and therefore are only mentioned 
here. Additionally, due to their vague character, little concrete information about the 
form of, say, capacity building is available. 
2.4 Programmatic Modes 
 It is worth taking a moment to further explore the programmatic modes. 
Programmatic policies focus on setting up and incentivising the relationships between 
government, end user and enterprises. The programmatic mode sets up that relationship. 
It describes how these actors relate to one another with the aim of expanding energy 
access. There are five potential modes present in the data: market-based, energy service 
companies, private-public partnerships, direct contracting or government as the 
distributer.  A single policy may implement more than one mode at a time, and each 
mode has a number of assumptions about how the relationship configuration will 
expand access. This provides a framework for analysing how actors within the system 
are intended to function, and how they do function. As with the REP typology as a 
whole, the identification of these modes helps researchers to better compare policies 
and the different approaches that countries take to electrification.  
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Figure 2.2: Market-based Arrangement 
Country Policy Title Start  End 
Zambia Electricity Service Access Project 2017 2022 
Malawi Malawi Renewable Energy Strategy 2017 2030 
Niger Niger Solar Energy Access Project (NESAP) 2017 2024 
Guinea Decentralized Rural Electrification Project (PERD) 2002 2014 
Gambia, The Renewable Energy Act 2013 2013  
Lesotho Lesotho Renewable Energy-Based Rural Electrification 
Project (LREBRE)  
2006 2013 
Rwanda Rural Electrification Strategy 2016 2016  
Rwanda Rwanda Renewable Energy Fund Project 2017 2023 
Ethiopia National Energy Policy 2013 2013  
Ethiopia NAMA for Off Grid Rural Electrification  2016 2020 
Ethiopia Ethiopia Off-Grid Renewable Energy Program 2016 2023 
Nigeria Nigeria Electrification Project 2018 2023 
Solomon Islands Solomon Island SREP Investment Plan 2014 2014  
Mongolia Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project 2006 2012 
Vanuatu Vanuatu Rural Electrification Project (Phases I and II) 2014 2022 
Nicaragua Offgrid Rural Electrification Project PERZA 2013 2011 
Bangladesh Renewable Energy Policy of Bangledesh 2008  
Comoros Solar Market Development Project 1997 1999 
India JNNSM - Off Grid Scheme 2010  
Afghanistan Rural Renewable Energy Policy 2013  
Table 2.1: Market-based Programmes 
Government 
Service 
Supplier 
Users 
Citizen 
TaxesTransfers 
Services 
Tariffs
a b 
c d 
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2.4.1 Market-based 
 Twenty policies in the sample include a focus on the market-based expansion 
of solar products as a means to expand energy access. Market-based programmes put an 
emphasis on lowering regulatory barriers and providing financing for enterprises trying 
to enter the off grid space. The market-based mode is defined by the manner in which 
end users are selected. In subsequent modes, the government has a hand in determining 
the target end users for the technology, but in the market-based mode, market forces 
make that determination. In practice this means that companies target those who are 
able and willing to pay for their products or services. This does not preclude the use of 
subsidies or financing to narrow a gap between willingness or ability to pay, so long as 
the determination of purchase rests with the company and end user. 
 For instance, the Malawi Renewable Energy Strategy 2017 has a strong focus 
on making the off-grid sector successful as a market independent of government 
support going forward:  
“It is hoped that the off-grid solar sector could play a hugely important role 
in achieving this goal through the spread of very small-scale personal solar 
devices to larger home systems. Initially, in the run up to 2020, with off-
grid solar devices currently owned by only 13% (Business Innovation 
Facility, 2016) of households the industry will still rely on support from 
social enterprises and NGOs in order to develop the supply chain and 
provide subsidies for those who are most in need. By 2020, with costs 
falling and greater consumer awareness as the market develops, many 
sections of society will already be able to afford these products and make 
the switch to off-grid solar devices. By 2025 the market should almost be 
fully commercial as prices continue to fall and finance models are available 
for the poorest in society. By 2030 it is hoped that the market will have 
already reached full penetration and mini-grid and grid-scale power will 
begin to displace those who initially purchased off-grid solar products.” 
(Republic of Malawi 2017, p 14-15) 
This example is notable for the clarity of its strategy for future off grid energy. Both 
small solar systems and minigrids aim for commercial market status, with minigrids 
taking over for initially purchased systems. In order to reach this goal, the strategy also 
includes tax exemptions for solar imports, as well as introducing international 
technology standards for off grid solar and licensing for solar importers. The hope is 
that this will make it easier for private sector operators to work in the country and for 
end users to feel confident in the products available.  
 As a means to increased energy access, the market-based mode assumes that 
access will be expanded by a commercial off grid market, which in turn implies that the 
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price of the off grid technology will be low enough and willingness to pay will be high 
enough that there will be no gap between need and access. The high cost of distribution 
in rural areas is also a challenge as private sector companies try to maintain a sufficient 
profit margin. This was a challenge in the Mongolia REAP, which had to switch its 
programmatic mode, as outlined in its ‘Lessons Learned’ section: 
“Proper market assessments are an essential requirement for projects that 
rely on the private sector for distribution of equipment, after-sales service, 
or the operation of local off-grid utilities. In small dispersed markets, scale 
may be insufficient for profitable private sector participation. In those 
circumstances it is important to determine whether the private sector has the 
financial capacity to benefit from purchasing the equipment at wholesale 
prices or to take on utility operation and maintenance. In Mongolia, owing 
to limited financial capacity, concentration in the capital city, and 
logistically challenging and small-scale market of herders, sales of SHS 
equipment by private dealers were slow. Similarly, owing to weak 
institutional and operational capacity of soum center utilities, the project-
installed RDHT systems were transferred to be managed by aimag utilities.” 
(World Bank Group 2018) 
The challenge is that those most in need (ie most rural) are also those with the lowest 
ability to pay and the hardest to reach (Haanyika, 2006). That half of the market-based 
mode policies also include a subsidy suggests that governments are aware of this gap 
and are seeking to address it. 
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Figure 2.3: Energy Service Company Arrangement 
 
 
 
Country Policy Title Start End 
Lesotho Energy Policy 2015-2025 2015 2025 
Namibia NAMA in Namibia Rural Development 2015 2018 
Cambodia Cambodia Rural Electrification Strategy and Implementation 
Plan  
2009  
Kenya Sessional Paper no.4 on Energy 2004 2023 
Kenya Off Grid Solar Access Project for Underserved Counties 2017 2017 2023 
South 
Africa 
Energy Security Master Plan - Electricity 2007 2025 
South 
Africa 
Non-Grid Electrification Policy Guidelines 2012  
Comoros Solar Market Development Project 1997 1999 
Lao PDR Decree on Solar Energy Development 2011  
Table 2.2 ESCO-based Programmes 
 
Tenders 
Energy Service 
Co. 
a b 
c
 
d 
Government 
Service  
Supplier Users 
Citizen 
Taxes
 
Transfers 
Services 
Tariffs
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2.4.2 Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) 
 Nine policies in the sample use a private ESCO mode, which establishes 
enterprises as service providers for particular designated regions, even where off grid 
electrification in necessary. ESCOs are essentially distribution companies and may have 
a purview that includes both grid and off grid regions. The key aspect of an ESCO is its 
comprehensive nature. Direct contracting may be for a single village or product, but an 
ESCO serves all the customers within its concession in order to meet their energy 
needs. In that way, ESCOs could be conceived of offering off grid energy services, as 
opposed to off grid products, although there is not a clear delineation between the two. 
It should be noted that ESCOs may take the form of public-private partnerships, as the 
ESCO is defined by its purview and not by its ownership or financing arrangement. 
 South Africa’s concessionaires (another term for ESCO) are a good example of 
how the private sector takes over from government-run distribution companies. South 
Africa’s 2012 Non Grid Electrification Policy Guidelines outline the expectation for the 
six concessions in the non-electrified portions of the country, which are to be served by 
six non-state concessionaries: 
“Off – grid electrification in the INEP is currently carried out by the private 
sector service providers (also known as the concessionaires) who have 
successfully tendered for rendering services in designated concession areas. 
Six concessionaires were identified through a bidding process for the 
provision of non-grid electrification in the concession areas.   
“The selected service providers were allocated exclusive rights to provide 
off-grid electrification in particular geographic areas. These areas are 
situated in broader areas earmarked for non-grid electrification, called 
concession areas. The rights last for 5 years, however, the service contract 
remains binding for a period of 20 years.” (Department of Energy 2012, 7-
8) 
In addition to off grid electrification, the concessionaires are required to provide 
thermal fuels for cooking needs. In the case of South Africa, these concessionaires are 
intended to provide Tier 1 access to the non-grid areas under grid expansion can reach 
them, and therefore, these are short-term contracts. However, as seen in Table 2.2, 
many countries with lower rates of electrification have also chosen this mode of 
enterprise engagement.  
 Finally, employing an ESCO model assumes that there is enough enterprise 
interest in the concession space as well as adequate institutional capacity to monitor the 
progress and quality of the ESCO’s work. This first challenge is made explicit in the 
project documents for Niger’s Solar Energy Access Project (2017): 
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“A careful approach is needed for the scale of concessions. Economies of 
scale are required to sustain mini-grids for rural electrification. Private 
financing is limited for investments in mini-grids except for densely 
populated urban areas because of the perceived high risk of these capital-
intensive technologies in countries where rural consumers have low levels 
of demand and ability to pay. This has often resulted in higher engagement 
of the local private sector in small rural electrification concessions and a 
lesser appetite from the international private sector for larger concessions. 
Over time, the approach can evolve through the bundling of several small 
concessions into a larger one with lower investments and operation costs 
through economies of scale.” (World Bank 2017b, 68) 
 Creating a concession that has financial appeal to enterprises can address the 
first assumption. The second assumption is that the government is capable of adequately 
monitoring the work of the ESCO. Introducing a private sector element into public 
service delivery actually involves greater oversight (Archibugi et al. 2003, p 52). As 
outlined in Section 10 of South Africa’s Non Grid Electrification Policy Guidelines, the 
government is responsible for significant monitoring activities: 
“There should be periodic monitoring of concessionaire’s and service 
providers’ performance and regular reporting. Reports of work done should 
be submitted to both the Municipality and DoE.  
“The Department of Energy will monitor and verify off-grid installation 
claims and will disburse the capital subsidies at agreed intervals.  
“Municipalities are to also monitor and confirm installations.   
“Technical audits are also to be done prior to payment of the service 
provider.”  (Department of Energy 2012, s 10, p 13-14) 
This requires an adequate amount of institutional capacity at the central and municipal 
level, in the case of South Africa. Other policies, particularly through programmes 
funded by the World Bank, are also explicit as the monitoring requirements of such an 
arrangement.  
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Figure 2.4: Public-Private Partnerships Arrangement 
 
Country Policy Title Start End 
Zambia Rural Electrification Master Plan 2008 2030 
Malawi Malawi Renewable Energy Strategy 2017 2030 
Niger Niger Solar Energy Access Project (NESAP) 2017 2024 
Gambia, The NAMA Design Document for Rural Electrification with 
Renewable Energy 
2016 2030 
Tanzania National Electrification Programme 2013-2022 2013 2022 
Ethiopia NAMA for Off Grid Rural Electrification  2016 2020 
Namibia NAMA in Namibia Rural Development 2015 2018 
Namibia Off Grid Energy Master Plan 2007  
Cote d'Ivoire Promoting renewable energy-based grids in rural 
communities for productive uses in Côte d’Ivoire  
2012 2016 
Kenya Off Grid Solar Access Project for Underserved Counties 
2017 
2017 2023 
Nigeria Rural Electrification Strategy and Implementation Plan 
(RESIP)  
2016  
Vanuatu Vanuatu NAMA 2015 2020 
South Africa Non-Grid Electrification Policy Guidelines 2012  
Bangladesh IDCOL SHS Program/Minigrids 2003 2021 
Table 2.3 PPP-based Programmes 
 
 
 
 
Government 
Service 
Supplier Users 
Citizen 
Taxes Transfers 
Services 
Tariffss 
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2.4.3 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 Fourteen policies have at least one component that relies on partnerships 
between the government and the non-state sector. In this case, PPPs are a short hand for 
all partnerships involving the government and private or non-state actors, not 
exclusively commercial companies. PPPs may even be a partnership between the 
government and an NGO in the case of Tanzania’s National Electrification Programme 
(Innovation Energie Developpement 2014, s 6.5.3). The definition of the PPP is 
nebulous, but is included in this list as separate from ESCOs or direct contracting due to 
the prevalence of the term in the policies sampled. PPPs are most popular with large-
scale infrastructure projects, and so they are more likely to be relevant for minigrid or 
microgrid projects (Hughes 2012, p 155). Nevertheless, any REPs that use the term 
‘public-private partnership’ are included in this discussion.  
 The focus here is on cooperation between actors and on sharing the benefits 
and risks of a project (Hughes 2012, p 154-156). While there is no standard contractual 
set up for a PPP, the logic behind their popularity is this: government has access to the 
liquidity and efficiency of the private sector, while the private sector has access to the 
clients (citizens) and risk mitigation of working with the government. This quote from 
Duffield (2010) outlines the exchange well: 
“PPPs are significantly different from other procurement approaches. PPPs 
involve the private sector taking the greatest responsibility for service 
delivery over the life of the facility compared with the other contracting 
options considered. They also have the highest level of price certainty, but 
this comes at the cost of responsibility for day-to-day decisions relating to 
both assets and the way in which services will be delivered – the setting of 
service standards remains a governmental decision.” (Duffield 2010, p 212) 
 A good example of this is the Off Grid Solar Access Project for Underserved 
Countries in Kenya, a World Bank funded programme that included PPPs for minigrid 
development:  
“Mini-grids will be developed under a public-private partnership (PPP) 
whereby private investment and public funds co- finance construction of 
generation facilities, and public funding is used to construct the distribution 
network. A single private service provider (PSP) will be responsible for 
construction (and partial financing) of the generation system and for 
construction of the distribution network of each mini-grid. The same PSP 
will sign two long-term contracts with KPLC: (a) a 7–10-year PPA for the 
operation and maintenance (O&M) of the generation system and recovery 
of the privately financed part of the investment and (b) a 7–10-year service 
contract for O&M of the distribution network, including revenue cycle 
services (as required). Ultimately, after the recovery of the private 
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investments, all assets (both generation and distribution) will be in GoK 
ownership. All electricity consumers supplied through mini-grids will be 
KPLC customers and pay the same tariff for each category charged to users 
connected to the national grid, ensuring effective implementation of a 
national uniform tariff policy.” (World Bank 2017b, s 30, p 21) 
 Both parties have a financial stake in the project, which will then revert to 
government ownership once the private company has recouped its costs. At this stage, 
the service provider also becomes the government (KPLC). In the meantime, however, 
the government is able to access private financing and technical capacity to electrify 
rural households. For the private company, they have access to government financing 
and the opportunity to recoup their costs, thus mitigating the risk of taking on such a 
capital-intensive project in an area with low demand. 
 Taking partnerships as the primary programmatic mode assumes that the 
private sector is able to recoup their costs within the agreed upon framework (time 
period, financing, etc.). Low demand and low ability to pay are the hallmarks of the 
rural electricity customer (Haanyika, 2006). The PPP must be arranged in such a way as 
to allow the private sector to turn a profit over the course of the project. This may be 
less of a hurdle for partnerships with international aid organisations, nationally based 
NGOs, or social enterprises, which have a lower bar for cost recovery (Sengupta and 
Sahay, 2017). 
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2.4.4 Direct Contracting 
 With sixteen policies, direct contracting is the second most popular 
programmatic mode in the sample. Contracting (or direct contracting, or contracting 
out) public services creates ex ante competition, in which public service providers 
compete for the market rather than in it. The aim is to reduce costs and improve quality 
standards as bidders compete to provide the best service for the least cost. In the context 
of electrification, projects are identified by the government, who tender a contract for 
the completion of the project, usually to the private sector. In contrast to ESCOs, direct 
contracting programmes treat off grid as an energy product, rather than service. 
However, these are not discrete categories, but instead there is a continuum between 
energy service companies and direct contracted projects. 
 Mozambique recently instituted a programme – Off-grid renewable energy for 
rural electrification in Mozambique managed by FUNAE – in 2017, which takes this 
approach to off grid solar: 
“For solar PV electrification, FUNAE has a number of “kits”, each tailor-
made to suit a hospital, school, micro-enterprise, or households of different 
income levels. During the “baseline study” that FUNAE conducts for each 
community, they identify how many of each kit are needed in the 
community. The baseline study is used as a basis when tendering for 
suppliers, and the technology choices offers by suppliers must match this kit 
list.” (CCC 2016, p 6) 
As we can see, direct contracting allows the government to provide very specific 
contract requirements. Typically there are requirements for the bidder (eligibility 
requirements) as well as for the completion of the project. As with private ESCOs and 
PPPs, there is an emphasis on monitoring to ensure that the contract is completed 
adequately. However, unlike with private ESCOs, contracts are project-based not 
customer-based. This line can become blurred as contracts increase their emphasis on 
post-construction maintenance and monitoring.  
 Because of its cost-effectiveness, flexibility and perceived quality control, 
direct contracting is very popular in providing services. However, there are conditions 
that make contracting more (or less) successful. These have been outlined by 
Domberger and Jensen: 
“Contracting is likely to be more (less) successful wherever the magnitude 
and specificity of the physical assets required to provide the service are 
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smaller (greater). Note that asset size and specificity have independent 
effects on contracting, but their interaction can be particularly powerful. 
“Contracting out is likely to be more (less) successful whenever the quality 
characteristics that are non-contractable are less (more) significant. 
“Contracting out is likely to be more (less) successful whenever the 
availability of competitive supply in the market, both actual or potential, is 
large (small).” (Domberger & Jensen 1997, p 71) 
The first condition refers to the implications of ownership division. In short, with a 
small-scale asset, the contractor is more likely to have ownership and thus interest in 
maintaining the asset past its contract period. With larger assets, there is a greater 
chance of government ownership, which reduces the incentives for the enterprise 
contractor to consider long-term success. In the second condition, contracting works 
better when it is easy to quantify the quality characteristics of the service required 
(Domberger and Jensen, 1997). Finally, many have pointed out that tendering a project 
only works if there are already a number of prospective bidders to compete. 
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Figure 2.5: Direct Contracting Arrangement 
Country Policy Title Start End 
Zambia Electricity Service Access Project 2017 2022 
Mozambique Off-grid renewable energy for rural electrification in 
Mozambique managed by FUNAE  
2016  
Lesotho Lesotho Renewable Energy-Based Rural Electrification 
Project (LREBRE)  
2006 2013 
Angola Power Sector Long Term Vision 2025 2018 2025 
Tanzania National Electrification Programme 2013-2022 2013 2022 
Uganda Rural Electrification Strategy and Plan 2013 2022 
Namibia NAMA in Namibia Rural Development 2015 2018 
Myanmar National Electrification Plan 2015 2020 
Nigeria Nigeria Electrification Project 2018 2023 
Nigeria Rural Electrification Strategy and Implementation Plan 
(RESIP)  
2016  
Solomon 
Islands 
Solomon Island Electricity Access and Renewable Energy 
Project Phase II 
2017  
Solomon 
Islands 
Renewable Energy Strategy and Investment Plan  2014 2019 
Vanuatu Vanuatu Rural Electrification Project (Phases I and II) 2014 2022 
Vanuatu Vanuatu NAMA 2015 2020 
Gabon Access to Basic Services in Rural Areas and Capacity 
Building Project 
2015 2019 
India DDG Scheme - DDUGJY 2015  
Table 2.4 Direct Contracting-based Programmes 
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Government 
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Supplier Users 
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Chapter 2: Rural Electrification Typologies 
Victoria Anne Plutshack – November 2019  101 
Word	T
emplat
e	by	
Friedm
an	&	M
organ	2
014 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Government as Distributer Arrangement 
 
 
 
Country Programme Title Start End 
Cambodia Program For the Development of Rural Electrification  2013 2015 
Mongolia Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project 2006 2012 
Table 2.5 Government as Distributer Programmes 
2.4.5 Government as Distributer 
 Government as distributer is the least common form of programmatic 
engagement, only occurring in the sample twice: in the case of Cambodia and 
Mongolia. In this mode the government assumes the responsibility of distributing the 
product or service itself, although typically purchasing the off grid solar systems from a 
commercial manufacturer. Mongolia’s Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project 
provides an excellent example. The programme provided solar home systems for rural 
herders, initially through private dealers with a subsidy. However, low sales caused the 
project to shift modes: 
Government 
Service 
Supplier Users 
Citizen 
Taxes
Services 
Tariffs
Solar 
Manufacturers 
Tenders 
Goods/Services 
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“Initially, it was expected that selected private dealers would supply the 
certified SHSs to herders, using the project subsidy of $160 a unit. 
However, the dealers had only sold about 200 SHSs by 2008, while the 
government procured and sold over 40,000 SHSs during the same period. 
…Given these challenges, the project was restructured in 2009 to include 
bulk procurement, which allowed the purchase of SHSs at wholesale prices 
and reduced the capital cost for herders. The SHSs procured in bulk were 
distributed to herders through both private dealers and the government’s 
administrative network.” (World Bank Group 2018, p 6) 
 Distribution through the government’s administrative network was expected in 
this case to address the poor reach of the private sector. However, for wider application 
of this mode, policymakers must determine that the government has the reach and the 
institutional capacity to be the primary distributer.  
2.4.6 Modes in Practice 
 The sections above have considered modes as ideal-type, discrete service 
arrangements. In reality, a country may shift its programmatic mode over time, or a 
single country may employ multiple modes at once. Shifts over time may occur due to 
past experience, changes in funding arrangement, or political changes. The section 
above described the shift in Mongolia’s Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project as 
it became clear that the private sector did not have the rural reach necessary. Another 
example is Lesotho’s 2006-2013 Lesotho Renewable Energy-Based Rural 
Electrification Project (LREBRE). The project initially tried to set up a variety of pilot 
business models to develop the off grid solar market, however: 
“The GoL elected to amend the subsidy mechanisms and adopt a direct 
contracting approach that they proposed as a means to fast track the delivery 
of the proposed SHSs. This decision directly undermined the original design 
of the project, that removing barriers to the widespread uptake of renewable 
energy would support a market driven approach. The change in subsidy 
mechanisms and delivery models shifted the design of the project from a 
market-drive performance-based approach to a Government-led social-
welfare type project.” (GEF 2013, p 14). 
On the other hand, we see multiple programmatic modes at work within a single 
country. Usually this is the case because of policy layering, or the use of different 
modes to target separate technologies and end users. In the case of Tanzania’s National 
Electrification Programme 2013-2022, there are two tracks for off grid energy. Track 
one is a top-down approach similar to countries like India, which directly contracts out 
projects in rural areas and offers subsidies for products. Track two is a bottom-up 
approach where companies can offer up project ideas that may take the form of PPPs. 
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This can also include an agreed upon subsidy (Innovation Energie Developpement, 
2014).  
 Due to the flexibility of PPPs, they are sometimes partnered with another 
mode. For instance, in Niger, the private ESCOs are considered to have a partnership 
with the government: 
“29. Two approaches will be promoted in this component. The first top-
down approach (similar to that of PASE-Safo) will enable ANPER to 
prioritize the electrification of the biggest population centers outside the 
national utility concession through a competitive bidding process for the 
selection of PPPs to invest, construct, operate, maintain, and further expand 
access. The second bottom-up approach will encourage subproject 
developers and investors to submit unsolicited proposals to ANPER for 
electrification through isolated hybrid PV/diesel mini-grids …PPP 
arrangements to be used in both approaches will range from licenses to 
authorizations to mini-concessions, depending on the size of the installed 
generation capacity and the private sector’s financial ability.” (World Bank 
2017b, s29, emphasis mine) 
It is clear from the italicized text that PPPs may be private ESCOs or smaller projects, 
depending on the ability of the non-state service provider. This highlights the flexibility 
of the PPP mode, which may overlap with others, but also provides a way of describing 
partnerships that fall outside of the other four modes. Although policy layering and 
changes in modes over time provides added complexity in analysis, the typology helps 
us to more clearly articulate these complexities. 
2.5 Historical Trends in the REP Typology 
 This collection of two decades of policies offers an opportunity to reflect on 
the trends in governance. What policy instruments have become more or less popular in 
the 21st century within off grid solar governance? Looking at the rate of each policy 
instrument from within policies from 2002 to 2017 (n=51), a few patterns emerge.  
  
2002-
2005 
2006-
2009 
2010-
2013 
2014-
2017 
Subsidies 19% 33% 55% 53% 
Tax Incentives 0% 13% 11% 12% 
Credit/Financing 31% 46% 43% 20% 
Capital Grants 13% 33% 48% 12% 
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Rural Electrification Fund 63% 8% 4% 4% 
Rural Electrification Agency 69% 0% 4% 0% 
Technical Standards 6% 38% 77% 43% 
Licensing 25% 33% 41% 8% 
Tariff regulations 38% 33% 36% 27% 
Table 2.6 Percentage of REPs that incorporate each policy instrument 
 Firstly, institutional policies – rural electrification funds and agencies – are 
must more prevalent in the period of 2002-2005 than in any other period. It is possible 
that countries first address institutional aspects of electrification before implementing 
additional programmes. Another possibility, is that rural electrification agencies (and 
their attendant funds) are required in the wake of power sector reform programmes that 
disincentivise expanding electricity access (Haanyika 2006). Therefore, it is possible 
that this spike in institutional policies is related to an increased incidence of power 
sector reform in South East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa in this period, especially given 
that after 1993 the World Bank and other development banks shifted towards lending 
conditionally on privatisation and reform (Wamukonya, 2003). Secondly, the incidence 
of subsidies appears to increase over time, although is should be noted that the number 
of policies for any one year is two to seven, so these numbers are merely indicative of 
possible trends. 
 Moving to look at programmatic policies alone (n=42), two main trends 
emerge. First, government as distributer has never been a popular programmatic mode 
during this period. Second, the incidence of direct contracting has increased 
substantially since 2002 within the sample. It is possible that this is the case because off 
grid systems are being treated as mature technology, and therefore governments are 
treating off grid energy like other energy infrastructure and contracting out projects, 
rather than treating them as emerging technology and focusing on approaches that 
purport to support greater innovation (Domberger and Jensen, 1997; Foxon et al., 
2005).  
 However, is hard to draw any significant conclusions from these findings, as 
they are limited by the small sample size, as well as skewed by the need to focus on 
English-language texts. In addition to privileging Anglophone countries, it always 
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increases the prominence of World Bank programmes in the group, which means that 
the changing philosophical stance of the World Bank may have outsized impacts on the 
sample., Expanding the set of policies through adding other languages and working to 
find more policies from the 1990s would improve the data, and perhaps allow the 
researcher to test these trends for significance. 
 
 
 
2002-2005 2006- 2009 2010-2013 2014-2017 
Market 33% 25% 38% 23% 
PPP 33% 25% 20% 32% 
ESCO 33% 38% 33% 11% 
DC 0% 6% 6% 35% 
Govt as distr. 0% 6% 3% 0% 
Table 2.7 Percentage of programmatic policies taking each mode 
 These findings do not fit neatly into Sovacool’s paradigm-based periodization 
in which programmes of the early 2000s focused on creating a market and programmes 
from the mid-2000s onward take a more holistic approach to energy access and 
development with multiple partners (2013). In this sample, market-based and public-
private partnership modes appear to share a degree of popularity across each period.   
 However, the increasing use of direct contracting is suggestive of the long-
running trend towards increasing contractualism in the new public management 
approach to governance (Manning, 2001; Lane, 2002). It is possible that LMIC 
governments are increasingly attuned to the potential benefits of outsourcing previous 
government functions to the private sector. This implies that electrification was 
previously the purview of government, and that is partly the case. State utility 
companies are often tasked with the responsibility of expanding access (Haanyika, 
2006). However, the manufacture, assembly and installation of off grid solar 
technologies – as a novel technology – is unlikely to be a capacity that the government 
previously had, unless through state-owned energy companies. Additionally, NPM’s 
popularity began over 40 years ago. So what accounts for a very recent increase in the 
direct contracting approach?  
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 The strongest argument in my mind is that direct contracting has gained in 
popularity as off grid solar has found itself to be a more mainstream technology. That 
is, governments now view this as a mature technology, and therefore able to be 
implemented at scale (Khan and Arsalan, 2016). However, as the innovation systems 
literature suggests, innovation need not be the hardware but also the application of that 
hardware in a new context, and there is a good argument that off grid uses of solar 
would still fit within that definition (Ockwell and Byrne, 2017). Further research could 
be done into the assumptions behind the rise of direct contracting and whether this 
approach is the ‘best fit’ for off grid solar. Some possible answers will be touched upon 
in the coming chapters in the India context. 
2.6 Conclusion 
 The aim of this chapter was to provide a new typology for rural electrification 
policies, so as to improve the comparison of policies and the contextualisation of single 
case studies. Without a shared vocabulary, it is difficult to ensure that comparisons are 
fair, hindering our ability to make causal claims about efficacy. Without a typology, it is 
difficult to determine the generalisability of our findings. The aim of this typology was 
to tackle both these challenges. 
 In order to do that, this chapter first explored how the literature has tackled 
rural electrification policies in the past, before considering the conceptual frameworks 
used to describe the relationship between government, non-state service provider and 
end user. This was done through the literature on political economy, innovation and 
public administration, before taking up the triangular framework (Archibugi et al., 
2003). The triangular framework helped to describe the programmatic modes that were 
outlined in the rural electrification typology. Using 54 policies from 30 different 
countries, the typology developed here provides a framework for determining policy 
type: institutional, regulatory or programmatic. Engagement in the programmes is 
incentivised through a number of common policy instruments. Finally, the chapter 
breaks down the relationship outlined in the programmatic mode: market-based, private 
ESCO, PPP, direct contracting or government as distributer. Each mode has its own 
assumptions about the competency and capacities of the market, economy, end user, 
government and its institutions.  
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 The following chapters of this thesis will focus on India’s two largest national 
electrification policies: the Deendayal Upadhyaya Grameen Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) 
and the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM). The DDUGJY is a direct 
contracting policy, while the JNNSM focuses on market development. In exploring 
these policies more deeply, the REP typology will provide a framework for making 
claims about the generalisability of these findings. For instance, where the findings are 
specific to particular modes, it may be considered that the findings may be applicable to 
research on other, similar programmes. The typology is also central to the 
deconstruction of these policies in the following chapter. 
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3 INDIA’S RURAL 
ELECTRIFICATION POLICIES 
3.1 Introduction 
 Programmatic policies, as detailed in the previous chapter, are the most 
common policies in the sample. These programmes actively address the problems of 
electrification by trying to expand access. Each programme comes in one of five modes 
with incentives that encourage participation and attempt to align actors in the system: 
namely, the end user and the solar enterprise. There is an underlying logic to how each 
mode is intended to function and how it offers incentives to align the actors within its 
framework. There are assumptions underlying each logic, and often requirements that 
the government, end users and market must meet to maximise the efficacy of the mode.  
 This research is interested in how policies impact the market actors and the 
factors that influence that impact through these modes of engagement. Therefore, we 
must first distinguish between the types of programmes, which is the role of the REP 
typology presented in the previous chapter. This chapter asks, how do India’s rural 
electrification policies fit into this typology? By understanding the assumptions of the 
approach that the Government of India takes, we can later compare these assumptions 
to the empirical evidence from the subsequent chapters.  
 India offers an excellent case study in the two most popular modes: direct 
contracting and market-based electrification. This chapter will break down these 
policies according to the REP typology, according to the policies most commonly cited 
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in interviews with enterprises, government officials and experts in the field. These 
programmes take different approaches to how enterprises should be engaged in 
providing public services, and they target their incentives differently to align the 
relevant actors. This chapter addresses how the two most popular modes, direct 
contracting and market-based electrification, are intended to function, what the 
assumptions or requirements of that logic are, and touches on how their incentives try to 
align end users and solar enterprises .  
 First, section 3.2 offers up a brief note on the methodology. Section 3.3 breaks 
down the policies according to the REP typology while section 3.4 takes a deep dive on 
the logic and requirements of direct contracting and market-based electrification, and 
looked into how each programme uses incentives to align the interests of end users and 
solar enterprises. If the logic of the modes and incentives is not met, this will impact the 
efficacy of the programme. The next question, then, how do enterprises respond to these 
policies? 
3.2 Methodology 
 As described in section 1.5.1, the most commonly cited policies within the 
interview data were broken down by policy instrument and programmatic mode in order 
to apply the typology from chapter two, and provide context for the rest of the thesis. 
Categorising the policies also helps define a universe of comparable policies to which 
these results could hold some generalizable lessons. 
3.3 Deendayal Upadhyaya Grameen Jyoti Yojana & Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Solar Mission By Type 
3.3.1 Typology of India’s Rural Electrification Policies 
 The breakdown of India’s rural electrification policies by type is found in 
Figure 3.1. Noticeably, there are no recent institutional policies recorded. In India, rural 
electrification is the purview of the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), 
which designates nodal agencies for state-by-state implementation. The rural 
electrification corporation (REC) was created in 1969, and is the national and state 
nodal agency for the disbursement of funds for RE, but there is no official rural 
electrification fund (REC, 2018a). Funding for each project comes through the national 
and state budget to MNRE and its state nodal agencies.  
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 There are three policies that fall primarily under the ‘regulatory’ type. The first 
is the Electricity Act 2003, which outlines the notified rural regions in which tariff 
setting and private power provision are unregulated (GoI, 2003). The second two are the 
past and current standards regulations for solar products undertaking work for MNRE. 
Past standards required licensing based on the specifications determined b the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (MNRE, 2012b). Current standards, as of 
2017, is the new “Indian Standard” that also requires regular testing of products and 
series of products (MNRE, 2017c). 
 The two main programmatic polices, the DDUGJY DDG Scheme and JNNSM 
off grid component take different modes. The DDG scheme takes a direct contracting 
approach, using product-subsidies to the non-state service delivery company as an 
incentive to participate and lower the cost for end users (MoP, 2013b). The JNNSM on 
the other hand uses a market-based approach, making the gap between cost and 
willingness to pay smaller, and thus increasing the potential market for off grid systems 
(MNRE, 2012a).  
 Last is the National Draft Microgrid Minigrid Policy, whose future is 
uncertain, but which was cited occasionally within the interviews (MNRE, 2016). This 
programme follows the guidelines set out by other state-based policies (see Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh) and offers support, which “ can be in the form of upfront capital funding 
or grant, or low interest loans, generation- based or operational incentives etc., 
essentially to support the market for minigrid development” (MNRE 2016, p 12). 
However, it also outlines tariff regulations for companies that accept government 
funding. In that regard, it is considered a programme in the market-based mode, but it 
does contain regulatory elements (MNRE 2016, p 14). As this programme is similar to 
other minigrid programmes at the state level, it is included here to illustrate such 
policies. It is not, however, explored further as it is not yet official policy. 
3.3.2 Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY)  
 The DDUGJY is the primary rural electrification scheme in India, and has a 
budget of 39,175 crore rupees (approximately 5.6bn USD) transferred from the budget 
of the RGGVY, the original rural electrification scheme (Ministry of Power 2014, 
section 2.1, 2.3). Primarily, it contracts out the off grid electrification of rural villages in 
which grid connectivity is not feasible or cost effect, although amendments have 
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changed that definition over time. New guidelines in 2011 allowed for electrification 
projects in smaller hamlets and in villages that have access to the national grid but are 
not receiving power (MNRE, 2011). More recent guidelines in 2013 further defined 
DDG as being for areas “which are getting less than six hours of power a day” (MoP, 
2013a). Latest guidelines also offer greater specificity on the technology recommended: 
“1. If cost of electrification per HH with more than 1 lakh and no. of 
Households in the habitation is less than 15, it is recommended to provide 
connectivity through solar lighting or standalone system. However in case 
grid connection is not possible due to difficult terrain or forest, stand alone 
or solar lighting can be permitted irrespective of costs. 
“2. If the HHs in a hamlet are largely scattered and average length of 
distribution line per HH is more than 200 meters, standalone systems may 
be provided to restrict LT line losses under the scheme.” (REC, 2015) 
Villages are identified by the state nodal agencies (typically the state’s renewable 
energy agency) based on the national census data, and then contracts for those villages 
are tendered by the nodal agency for non-state enterprises to bid for. The project 
developer shall be identified through direct contracting:  
“Selection of the Project developer shall be on the basis of tenders which 
will be called by the Implementing agencies in two parts, one part covering 
capital cost (as per 12.1 (a) above) and another covering cost of providing 
power for five years (as per 12.1 (b) above). The reimbursement of gap 
between operation and maintenance cost and revenue recovery to the project 
developer (after adjusting the collected tariff) will be paid out of service 
charges of the Implementing Agencies … As part of agreement (a) the 
project developer will be authorized to collect tariff in project area and (b) 
the state government will agree to reimburse the gap between O&M 
expenditure and revenue income from out of the service charges of 
implementing agencies to the project developer.” (Ministry of Power 2009, 
p 9) 
 Usually these tenders are for solar home system-based electrification, but some 
have been put forward for solar, biomass or hybrid micro/minigrid systems as well. 
While the products are purchased or manufactured by the contractor at the market price, 
products are provided to the rural end user at a subsidised price. The difference between 
the two prices is provided to the contractor in instalments over the course of five years 
after inspections verify the quality of the work (MoP, 2013b). This was a change in 
2013, with the idea being “to ensure that the developer has sufficient economic interest 
in the continuation of the project till five years of the commissioning” (MoP, 2013a).  
Finally, as mentioned in the section above, all participants in MNRE’s programmes 
must adhere to certain technology standards. Further standards are also specified in the 
programme. 
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3.3.3 Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) 
 The JNNSM off grid component also targets end users with little or no grid 
access, but follows a market-based approach by providing subsidy and financing to end 
users to allow them to better access the solar market. The aim of the JNNSM off grid 
component is outlined in its Phase II Policy Document: 
“Solar Energy is the need for the developing country like India where large 
section of country’s population is primarily located in rural areas and lacks 
access to electricity. Electricity is vital for a better quality of life - along 
with reduction in poverty and improvement in education, health and 
livelihoods. Rural areas in the country mainly lack in distribution 
infrastructure and itself developing a reliable distribution infrastructure will 
have a major fixed cost which the utilities presently not in a position to 
support. With this backdrop, NSM Phase II would focus on standalone solar 
off grid generating systems which would facilitate the rural consumers to 
meet their routine requirements of electricity. During Phase-II, it envisaged 
that around 20,000 villages/hamlets/basti/padas shall be covered through 
‘Energy Access’ scheme by way of deployment of Off-Grid electricity 
generation projects… With this backdrop, Phase II of the mission would 
also focus on the off grid lighting systems such as use of solar lanterns, 
solar home lighting systems, and solar street lighting systems. Phase II 
would target for deployment of around ten (10) lakh off grid lighting 
systems.” (MNRE 2012a, p 24-5) 
 The key difference between the JNNSM and DDUGJY is that the technology 
is primarily the criteria for support, not the specific end user. Starting with the now-
defunct SHS portion of the programme, we see the use of subsidies tied to financing 
and technology specifications, as above. In this portion, particular systems were 
provided with both a subsidy and financing arrangements through the National Bank of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). The still-extant microgrid/minigrid 
portion of the scheme is more straightforward, offering a capital subsidy to system 
integrators, but with certain requirements for the technology (MNRE, 2017a). While 
both portions of the scheme aimed to provide power to the rural user at a subsidised 
rate, the microgrid/minigrid scheme does so through directly providing the subsidy to 
the enterprise. In both the SHS and microgrid/minigrid scheme, the focus is on 
improving the financial ability to purchase the systems, but customers are identified and 
financing paperwork is supported by the solar enterprise, with the expectation that the 
right price and financing for the end user will be sufficient to allow the market to reach 
those in need. As above, in order to access the financial benefits, systems must meet 
requirements above and beyond the component standards for the industry. 
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Figure 3.1: Breakdown of India’s extant National REPs by type 
3.4 Modes and Incentives 
 As briefly explored in Chapter 1, there is an underlying logic to each mode in 
terms of how it is intended to functionally bring power to off grid consumers. This 
section will go into greater depth on the logic behind direct contracting and market-
based programmes before outlining how the incentives in the DDUGJY and the 
JNNSM hope to attract market actors (private, NGO, etc.) to participate in the 
programme. The two portions of the programme must work together to attract non-state 
actors to provide off grid services. 
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3.4.1 DDUGJY & Direct Contracting 
 The aim of direct contracting is to target the intended end user while also 
lowering costs, improving efficiency and improving the quality of service, the logic 
being that introducing competition to public service delivery will improve standards and 
lower expenditure (Hughes 2012, p 151-2). Evidence suggests that cost cutting is 
possible, but that it depends significantly on the sector and its characteristics (Hodge, 
1998). The additional need for a certain profit margin – not necessarily present when 
the government is the distributer – also limits the ability to lower costs through this 
mode. It is also important to note that most research in the field focuses on high-income 
countries, specifically the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia (Prager, 
1994; A. Hefetz and Warner, 2012; Johnston and Girth, 2012). Little explores whether 
such cost cutting remains valid for low- to middle-income countries. 
 However, to achieve positive results from contracting, there are certain 
characteristics that the government and the market must have. In the first instance, as 
off grid electrification targets specific populations, the government must know where 
those target populations reside. In India’s case, the GoI relies on the nationwide census, 
which is conducted every ten years, to identify unelectrified villages and hamlets. There 
is also a need for institutional capacity to handle the implementation of the bidding as 
well as ongoing monitoring of the projects. The capacity requirements of contracting 
out are often underestimated, and in some circumstances make contracting a poor fit for 
service delivery (Prager 1994; Archibugi et al. 2003, p 52). The Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS) – the main branch of the All India Services – is the key civil service 
institution. In addition to state civil services, the IAS handle the policy crafting and 
implementation across Governments in order to maintain administrative continuity. 
Despite the reputation of the IAS, it currently faces understaffing issues (Vaishnav, 
Mehta and Kapur, 2017; Anand, 2018), and near-constant complaints about corruption 
(Gupta, 2005; Quah, 2008; Peisakhin and Pinto, 2010; Tribune News Service, 2018). 
 Domberger and Jensen also note that it can be difficult to quantify – and thus 
make contractible – service quality elements (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). Although 
there are some quality aspects of electricity that are difficult to measure, the multi-tier 
framework offers criteria that are often copied in policy – such as hours of evening 
power supply, total hours of power supply, maximum capacity (ESMAP, 2015).  In 
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India’s case, the prerequisite that contributing companies have their systems meet 
certain technical standards also addresses this quality issue (MNRE, 2017c).  
 The greatest caveat to the success of contracting is that the government must 
be tapping into a market with sufficient competition to reap its benefits. In other words; 
“Contracting out is likely to be more (less) successful whenever the 
availability of competitive supply in the market, both actual or potential, is 
large (small).” (Domberger & Jensen 1997, p 71) 
A competitive market need not be a large one, but certainly requires at least two 
companies of sufficient quality to both be interested in bidding. It is interest in bidding 
that is an additional factor in the success of tenders; the contract must be favourable 
enough for the competing enterprises to turn a profit. Research suggests that, at least in 
an RE context, there needs to be financial support to enable enterprise engagement. 
Haanyika explains: 
“Commercialisation, privatisation and independent regulation usually leads 
to increased tariffs as these were suppressed by government department 
regulation for a long time on the understanding that electricity supply was 
an essential social service that needed to be affordable. Although increased 
tariffs enhance revenues thus availing more financial resources for system 
expansion and RE financing where consumer levies are used, higher tariffs 
are less affordable for rural consumers. This means that increased public 
subsidies may be required to support RE.” (Haanyika 2006, p 2980) 
 This is certainly the case in the DDG Scheme. The projects initially had their 
capital costs and operating costs subsidised. The pattern of payment was such that 90% 
of the total project cost (capex and opex) were provided as a subsidy, with the first 70% 
of the capital cost paid over the course of development and the final 30% paid after the 
five year period of operation was completed (Ministry of Power 2009, p 6-7). As the 
guidelines have changed over the years, the subsidy amount has been adjusted. As of 
2015, the subsidy regime was set out as in Table 3.1. It should be noted that the 
Government of India describes this support as a grant, but it is considered a subsidy in 
this typology because the subsidising cost is passed directly on to the consumer. That is, 
the consumer pays the subsidised rate for the solar system. 
 Through offering the subsidised rate to end users, and financially 
compensating the market actors, the government essentially offers up a market for the 
enterprises to capitalise on. These financial support mechanisms – note the loans as well 
as subsidies – incentivise market actors to participate in the tenders. 
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Agency Nature of support Quantum of support (percentage of project 
cost) 
Other than special 
category states 
Special Category 
States # 
Govt of India Grant 60 85 
Discom Contribution Own Fund 10 5 
Lender (Fis/Banks) Loan 30 10 
Additional Grant 
from GoI on 
achievement of 
prescribed 
milestones 
Grant 15 5 
Maximum Grant by 
GoI (including 
additional grant on 
achievement of 
prescribed 
milestones) 
Grant 75 90 
Table 3.1 Central Financial Support for DDG Scheme (REC, 2015)   
3.4.2 JNNSM & the Market-based Mode 
 In the REP typology, however, the market-based mode is only competition in 
the market. Market-based programmes focus on developing markets through 
incentivising investment, offering financial support, and knowledge sharing. The logic 
of a market-based approach is that competition allows the market to provide quality 
products at the lowest price. However, the assumption is that there is a financial 
incentive for companies to work in this space – that is, that enterprises can make a profit 
even from the rural poor. 
 Some research has claimed that this is possible. In 1999 Prahalad introduced 
the concept of the bottom of the pyramid, in which private enterprises considered the 
poorest segments of society as potential consumers, producers and entrepreneurs. Over 
the course of a decade he and colleagues outlined why multinational enterprises should 
target the poorest people on the planet as a way of ameliorating poverty while making a 
profit (Prahalad and Hart, 1999, 2001; Prahalad and Hammond, 2002). India has seen a 
range of these bottom of the pyramid approaches, most popularly the Amul ice cream 
offering (Karnani, 2007). This concept has proven very popular, although in recent 
years there has been a greater shift towards national, small and medium enterprises 
rather than MNEs (Kolk, Rivera-Santos and Rufín, 2014). However, detractors have 
pointed out that Prahalad overestimated the financial capabilities of the poor and that 
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there are weighty ethical concerns about providing so-called “bad” products into a 
sensitive marketplace (Karnani, 2007). 
 In the case of electricity products, it has been estimated that energy 
expenditure of the world’s poor is about $433 billion, accounting for 9% of total 
expenditure (Subrahmanyan and Gomez‐Arias, 2008; IFC, 2012). As many of the 
world’s poor live in rural areas lacking in reliable electricity access, several solar 
companies have taken a bottom of the pyramid approach (Subrahmanyan and Gomez‐
Arias, 2008). Because off grid solar energy often has a high up-front cost, microfinance 
has a large role to play. Microfinance is considered an important part of building a 
market at the bottom of the pyramid, but the poor often do not have access to banking 
services (Reeves and Sabharwal, 2013). 
 In terms of rural electrification in particular, Haanyika points out that: 
“Commercialised and/or privatised utilities tend to focus on profits and are 
therefore less interested in supply of electricity to non- profitable rural 
areas. On the other hand, the need for profits could stimulate innovations 
particularly in the approach to rural electrification and the application of 
cost-effective technologies.” (Haanyika 2006, p 2980) 
This may lead commercial enterprises to target peri-urban or grid-connected customers, 
who typically have some grid power and a greater ability to pay. In fact, this is the 
second assumption of the market-based mode: that those in need will be reached by the 
market. Evidence actually suggests that market-based approaches can work contrary to 
redistributive efforts (Warner, 2006). Given that, there is a role for governments to 
advocate the needs of the citizen (Warner and Hefetz, 2008). In the Indian context there 
are a number of NGOs and social enterprises (SEs) working in the off grid solar sector. 
A recent survey of the off grid solar market found that 22% of respondents were NGOs 
(Singh, 2016a). Both NGOs and SEs put a greater emphasis on reaching those in need, 
but based on my own enterprise interviews, distribution is one of their biggest issues 
(see ENT25). 
 In order to open the rural market to non-state enterprises, the GoI uses the 
JNNSM to narrow the gap between willingness and ability to pay. Capital grants are 
offered to microgrid and minigrid projects– originally at 30%, they are at 25% of capital 
expenditure as of March 2017 – through the programme. Solar home systems were 
originally financed and subsidised through the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD). End users would submit a request for a subsidised loan and 
an additional subsidy for the SHS. Sometimes companies would collect the prospective 
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customers and help them fill out the loan documents before submitting them to 
NABARD. The aim was to make purchasing a SHS feasible for poorer customers who 
could not pay the entire up front cost of the system. In turn, it allowed market forces to 
determine which customers to target, but opened up a deeper rural market. 
 However, there were implementation challenges that stymied the longevity of 
the SHS programme. In particular, NABARD was not familiar with energy products 
and was hesitant to grant the loans, particularly when central financing became 
backlogged (see interview with ENT33). The JNNSM Phase II policy document 
emphasises need to ease access to subsidies: 
“The Phase II would focus on ease of flow of subsidies with major 
contribution of capital subsidy schemes instead of interest subsidy schemes. 
There would be special support provided to individuals’ for solar lanterns, 
solar home lighting systems, power plants up to 3 kWp and pumping 
systems up to 5 kWp capacity. The scheme will involve RRBS and 
scheduled commercial banks for solar home lighting systems and solar 
pumps. The scheme will be modified in order to make it more simplified to 
operate. …. Phase II would also provide support for providing solar power 
packs to individuals and support available for solar charging stations 
specially for village level entrepreneurs, etc. Focus of phase II would also 
involve support to SPV power plants for micro/mini grid SPV power plants 
with storage systems and distribution network.” (MNRE 2012a, section 
3.2.1) 
In the Phase II policy document, there is also a provision for a JNNSM Energy Access 
Scheme, which offers 90% financing to off grid areas, but it should be noted that no 
enterprise or government official interviewed seemed to have experience with this, and 
it is possible that this programme is not currently in implementation (MNRE 2012a, 
section 3.2.2). In 2015, the solar home system portion of the programme was cancelled. 
It was reinstated in the next year before being cancelled again in March 2017 (MNRE, 
2017b). For microgrids and minigrids, the national solar mission still offers a capital 
grant. 
3.4.3 Target Enterprises 
 Returning to our triangular relationship framework, incentives are put in place 
to align the interests of the government, end user and service provider. Lowering the 
price of systems for end users aligns their needs for energy access with the non-state 
sector’s needs for customers and profits. Profit, in this instance, being subsidised by the 
government. However, it should be noted that not all the policies in Figure 3.1 target the 
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same non-state actors. Instead, they target specific types of enterprises, based on 
technology, turnover, supply chain position, and experience, among other 
characteristics. Table 3.2 gives a brief overview of which policies are applicable to 
which types of enterprises. 
Policy Technology Applicable Other Applicability 
DDUGJY – DDG Scheme SHS primarily, some 
Micro/Mini 
Larger, more experienced 
enterprises 
JNNSM – SHS Off Grid SHS Must meet component 
standards 
JNNSM  - Micro/Mini Off 
Grid 
Micro/Mini Must meet component 
standards 
Electricity Act 2003 – 
Notified Rural Regions 
Micro/Mini N/A 
Component Standards SHS, Micro/Mini Manufacturers, participants in 
MNRE programmes 
(DDUGJY and JNNSM 
included) 
Micro/Minigrid Policies Micro/Mini N/A 
Table 3.2 Policy Target Enterprises 
 As we can see, SHS enterprises were previously able to access both the DDG 
Scheme and the JNNSM programme, although now only larger-scale enterprises that 
work with SHS have access to any government support. This is because the cancellation 
of the JNNSM SHS scheme ended the only support available for smaller SHS 
enterprises. Chapters 4 and 5 will delve deeper into the eligibility requirements for the 
DDG Scheme. For microgrid and minigrid enterprises, there is a wider range of 
applicable policies that offer deregulation of the space, financial support and tariff 
regulations for those that do receive central financial assistance. 
 This section has outlined the logic behind how the GoI tries to align the needs 
of end users and enterprises in order to promote rural electrification, as well as which 
types of enterprises are targeted by their incentives. Chapter three will next explore 
empirically how enterprises react to these policies and how their business models have 
changed over time in response to these modes and incentives. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 Programmatic modes have an underlying logic as to how they are intended to 
improve energy access, and they use incentives to align the interests of end users and 
solar enterprises in order to do so. The assumptions and criteria for these logics is 
crucial for the efficacy of the programme. If a country does not have the requisite 
institutional capacity or if the social demographics make purchasing systems out of 
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reach, the programme will lose its efficacy. Importantly, we see also that the 
characteristics of the market play a role in meeting these requirements. In the case of 
direct contracting, markets must contain a certain degree of competition for the 
government to see its benefits. In the market-based mode, market actors must be willing 
and able to reach those customers with a lower ability to pay.  
 There are other perspectives from which to view these assumptions. From the 
end user perspective, competition for the market in direct contracting is perhaps less 
important than ensuring the governmental capacity for monitoring and oversight (Duke, 
Jacobson and Kammen, 2002; Sovacool, D’Agostino and Jain Bambawale, 2011). In 
the case of market-based electrification, this issue becomes more clearly one of 
improving access to financing for the end user (improving ability to pay) or better 
signaling technology standards on products (improving willingness to pay) (Urpelainen 
and Yoon, 2015).  
 These are important perspectives, but ones that are already racking up large 
numbers of papers (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Abdullah and Jeanty, 2011; Lemaire, 
2011; Sovacool, D’Agostino and Jain Bambawale, 2011; Urpelainen and Yoon, 2015). 
Rather than focus on the perspective of the end user, this research is interested in the 
business perspective. If this chapter has outlined the logic and assumptions for market 
engagement, do market actors react in an expected manner? Are there implications for 
the market of applying both a direct contracting and market-based approach to 
electrification? How to enterprises respond to the incentives that seek to align these 
actors? Enterprises and market participants can take all sorts of forms: NGOs, social 
enterprises, commercial enterprises, sometimes even governmental organisations that 
act as NGOs. It is in exploring the breadth of these actors and the impact of REPs on 
their activities that we can answer these questions. 
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4 ENTERPRISE RESPONSE TO 
POLICY CHANGE 
4.1 Introduction 
  Refocusing the study on the enterprise perspective, this chapter explores how 
enterprises respond to policy change. Although public administration literature 
evaluates the empirical evidence for impacts of changing policy on the market, this 
approach is generally ignored in the work on off grid technologies (Brass et al., 2012; 
Girth et al., 2012; Lecy and Van Slyke, 2013).  It is important to take a step back and 
understand why an enterprise-centric approach is important, and the role of this chapter 
in the bigger picture of the thesis. The success or failure of a government intervention is 
dependent on the outcomes of that intervention. In this case, if a government sets up a 
policy of public-private partnerships to electrify remote rural areas, it is the 
electrification of such areas that determines the policy’s success. And yet, that success 
is partially dependent on the private sector enterprise that makes up that partnership and 
the arrangement determined by policy. Therefore, in studying why policies succeed or 
fail, it is important to understand the relationship between policy and enterprise. An 
enterprise-centric approach allows for an inside look into how policy impacts those 
enterprises by seeing causal relationships at work. How have off grid solar enterprises 
in India changed their business models over time in response to policy change? 
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 This chapter explores the impact of the Government of India’s rural 
electrification policies through the lens of off grid solar enterprises. Shifting down to 
the organisation-level of granularity is necessary to see the effects of policy on the 
market landscape for two reasons: first, a lack of global market data over time prevents 
country-level analysis, and second, without this initial organisation-level investigation, 
it is challenging to determine which data to gather and where to focus analysis. Thus, 
from this point forward, the thesis focuses on an embedded case study of off grid solar 
enterprises in India. Using interviews with off grid solar enterprises, experts and 
government officials, I compare narratives of enterprise change to understand how 
business models change in response to policy interventions. Findings suggest that 
policies impact areas of the business models that are exposed to change, which in this 
case is an enterprise’s revenue streams and customers. These changes have knock-on 
effects within the business model, which suggests that policies do not simply increase 
or decrease revenues, but change the shape of the enterprise landscape. In India, 
changes can be seen in a broad trend 1) towards grid-connected customers, and 2) some 
movement away from solar home systems by small and medium-scale enterprises. 
 In section 4.2 I go into greater detail on some of the methodological choices 
made in the change. Section 4.3 explores incentive impacts on finance and end user 
selection, and the causal relationships between enterprise characteristics. The findings 
have implications for the efficacy of the Government of India’s energy access plans. 
Therefore section 4.4 outlines policy implication based on these findings. The chapter’s 
findings are then summarised in section 4.5. 
4.2 Methodology  
 In order to compare and contrast narratives of business model change, all 
narratives were categorised by business model component, followed by an exploration 
of the narratives based on the precipitating change element in the narrative.  In the 
first instance, interviews were transcribed in NVivo. This chapter incorporates no 
grounded theory analysis, and therefore coding stopped once all narratives were 
identified, and these narratives are compiled in Appendix 2.  
 The characteristics of the enterprises were then categorised according to the 
nine building blocks of Osterwalder’s business model canvas in order to better interface 
with other literature on business model development (Osterwalder, 2004; Osterwalder 
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and Pigneur, 2010). Unlike in the following chapters, this chapter borrows 
Osterwalder’s framework rather than creating an ontology through grounded theory. 
This is for three reasons. First, the interviews often focused on one or two aspects of the 
business model, and therefore acted as a single window into the enterprise. Even 
piecing together the view from each window, I would have been unable to describe the 
full picture. This leads on to the second point: Osterwalder’s framework is very robust, 
enabling most descriptions to find a place within in (see Table 4.1). Although Hisham 
Zerriffi’s approach (see Table 1.3) would also have been a reasonable choice, given that 
it was developed for describing off grid enterprises, it does not offer the same 
specificity. For instance Zerriffi’s ‘organisational form’ must at least cover 
Osterwalder’s ‘distribution channel,’ ‘relationship with customer,’ ‘capability,’ ‘value 
configuration,’ and ‘partnerships.’ Using Osterwalder’s canvas allows greater clarity 
through its specificity. Finally, it is commonly used, improving the comparability of the 
findings (Chesbrough, 2010; Muzellec, Ronteau and Lambkin, 2015; Upward and 
Jones, 2016). 
Product	 Customer	Interface	 Infrastructure	Management	 Financial	Aspects	
Value Proposition Target Customer (Customer Segment) Value Configuration Cost Structure 
 Distribution Channel Capability Revenue Model 
 Relationship with customer Partnerships  
Table 4.1: Nine components of Osterwalder’s Business Model Canvas  
 The business model concept was created specifically as a building block for 
future research, and Osterwalder anticipated that computer based research would be a 
part of that, therefore the components needed to be adequately defined (Osterwalder, 
2004, p 2). Hence all the parts of the model connect to one another. The product is the 
offering of a value proposition. The customer is a criterion linked to the value 
proposition through a channel by the mechanism of the customer relationship. Cost 
structure and revenue model are linked to the value proposition through the price of its 
offering. And the value proposition is linked to infrastructure management through the 
value configuration activities (how things actually get done), partnership agreements 
and capability resources (Osterwalder, 2004). That is to say, all elements of the business 
model are interconnected within Osterwalder’s ontology. 
 Once narratives were broken down into their parts, they were compared to 
explore how characteristics were impacted by policy (section 4.3.2) and what other 
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factors influenced characteristic change (section 4.3.3). Finally, section 4.3.4 takes a 
step back and outlines what changes to the business model have occurred most 
commonly, attempting to sketch the changes that policy has made to the enterprise 
landscape.  
 In categorising these narratives, I have included the precipitating change as 
cited by the research subject, which sometimes were not attributed to aspects of the 
business model. Those elements were included in a longer list of factors within the 
narratives, which can be seen in the key (Table 4.2). Because each narrative of change 
includes the precipitating event, it is possible to determine which changes result from a 
particular programme. However, although it is therefore possible to determine which 
changes relate to the market-based or direct contracting mode, given that the enterprises 
exist within the context of both programmes, this chapter will not attempt to make a 
comparison of the two programmatic modes. As the main change within the past three 
years has been the double cancellation of the JNNSM subsidy and financing for solar 
home systems, India serves as a case study of a layered policy mix of the two modes, 
and the impact of policy change within this context.  
 
Code	 Business	Model	Component	 Code	 Business	Model	Component	
C Distribution Channel IM 
Infrastructure 
Management 
CI Customer Interface P Product (Value Proposition) 
Cost Cost Structure Pol Policy 
CR Cost Recovery Partner Partnerships 
CS Customer Segments RM Revenue Model 
D Demand Sales Sales 
FA Financial Aspects SC Supply Chain 
Table 4.1  Key of narrative elements  
  It should also be noted that the business model components represent the 
dependent variable of this study. However, the findings suggest that when one 
component changes, other components may change as well, turning the dependent 
variable into an independent variable. This is a part of the argument within this chapter. 
The nature of the interviews is such that causality is explicitly discussed, and therefore, 
challenges with dependent variables subsequently becoming independent variables are 
partially side-stepped by focusing on the narrative order and explanation. It should be 
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noted however, the human sensemaking often creates linear narratives where 
complexity exists, and so this approach is perhaps a necessary simplification (Dawson 
and Buchanan, 2005). 
4.3 Narratives of Enterprise Change  
4.3.1 Summary 
 Tables 4.3 and 4.4 cites 19 examples of the impact that the prominent rural 
electrification programmes have on the enterprises. The findings suggest that policies 
primarily influence revenue streams and customer segments, although the product 
offered is inextricably linked to the customer and finance options. Eleven enterprises 
are represented here, the majority of the enterprises in the study. Of the changes, 14 
relate to subsidy regimes and three cite grid expansion. The two key policies cited are 
the JNNSM-NABARD subsidy and the RGGVY/DDUGJY programmes of grid 
extension. It is interesting to note that no enterprises cite the DDG Scheme.   
 While assessing the impacts of these changes on policy outputs is outside the 
scope of this study, the public administration literature would suggest that changes to 
the enterprise landscape would influence the success of these policies. However, as 
much of the JNNSM change influences firms that are generally not targeted by the 
DDG scheme, the greater influence is likely to be on end users outside of that scheme, 
which will be further explored in Chapter 5. 
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4.3.2 Impacts of Policy on Enterprise Characteristics 
4.3.2.1 Subsidy and Finance 
 All seven changes to the revenue model are precipitated by subsidy changes. 
The connection is an intuitive one, but there are broader implications for financing and 
the lifecycle of an enterprise’s revenue model. Once an enterprise has access to finance, 
it becomes easier to access additional finance, essentially creating a “virtuous cycle” of 
financing. Subsidies can reduce the time it takes for enterprises to break even, 
improving the attractiveness of the business model to investors. ENT32 described the 
importance of the 25% JNNSM capital subsidy for their minigrids like this: 
“And I was telling you that the business model is recovering it in 7 years 
time, but that's with the subsidy. If the subsidy wasn't around, it'll take us 
20% more time, so possibly we would get it in 10 years back, 10 years time. 
Therefore the banks, which lend at the moment, are not accepting over a 10 
year time frame, so to get back to the 7 year, 6 year time frame, we need to 
bring the capital cost down, operation cost down” (ENT32) 
Similarly, once a customer has access to an end user subsidy, they also have access to 
the financing institution that provides it, because they are often channeled through some 
form of banking or microfinance, which allows the end user to also access loans. The 
two biggest examples are the JNNSM end user subsidy that was channeled through 
NABARD to the end user, and JNNSM subsidy channeled through SHGs.  
 A government subsidy can be used a seed money while an enterprise is still 
working out what its value proposition should be. This is what ENT27 did, although 
they were only able to do so because of the reputation and pro-social orientation of their 
umbrella organisation. 
Case Study 1: ENT27 – NGO turned Social Enterprise  
ENT27 is a spin out enterprise of a large non-governmental organisation, which was 
founded in 1984 and addresses the needs of rural working women. The NGO is active 
in 13 states, and acts as an umbrella organisation for a number of programs and projects 
interested in protecting and promoting women’s livelihoods. ENT27 works solely in 
Bihar and sees solar energy as a way of improving productive working hours, as well as 
quality of life. 
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ENT27 was initiated in 2013 as a project that leased solar home systems to poor 
women, with the support of NABARD, the national rural development bank, which was 
attracted by reputation of ENT27’s umbrella organisation. Initially they provided solar 
lamps, but found that they were of poor quality and broke within a year. They then 
provided solely small solar home systems with a panel, module, LED light and battery, 
enabling self-employed women to work longer hours. They worked through self help 
groups, which would do the work of collecting monthly rentals:  
 “… we used to procure solar home light systems from manufacturers, we 
had project money for that. We used to provide it to self help groups, one 
of, part of the self help groups, and they in turn rented it to the local 
villages, and they would collect monthly rentals from these households. 
And what- the amount which the self help group was provided, these lights 
were subsidised…so it was almost 40% subsidy was offered to them” 
(ENT27) 
This connection with an MFI worked out well for end users, who were later able to buy 
the systems through the SHGs when the enterprise shifted to a grant-based model.  
Over time, it because clear that their customers wanted to own the products, not just 
lease them. This was challenging for poorer women, so they sold their systems with a 
40% subsidy. This work was initially done in partnership with NABARD, and therefore 
the subsidy came through NABARD and the financing through the self help groups. 
However, the backlogging of subsidies in NABARD made the partnership untenable, 
and so the enterprise moved from a subsidy to a grant-based model. Revenues raised as 
grants helped to finance the systems. This had the additional impact of opening up the 
type of products that ENT27 could sell, since the NABARD subsidy had been tied to a 
single system. Currently they market, sell, install and service these solar home systems 
and are moving towards financial sustainability. When interviewed, the enterprise was 
beginning their own limited company and moving away from subsiding their products. 
 In all of these cases, central financial assistance improved access to financing, 
whether through banks or MFIs for enterprises and end users. However, it is worth 
noting that ENT27 is a good example in another way: all the enterprises that described 
being impacted by changes to the NSM are social enterprises. Typically, these are 
newer, smaller organisations (with the exception of ENT26) that do not bid for large 
DDG tenders but rely on programmes lower bars to entry. 
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ENT	ID	
Changes	to	
Business	Model	
Overall	
Themes	
Responsible	Policy	
Change	 Reasons	for	Changes	
ENT11 
1. Shift away from 
bank financing for 
end users 
1. RM, 
CI 
1. NABARD subsidy 
cancelled  
1. The loss of subsidy broke 
the link between the ENT and 
NABARD banking 
2. Move from SHS 
to microgrids and 
rooftop solar 
2. P 2. NABARD subsidy cancelled 
2. Revenue model for SHS no 
longer worked without 
subsidy, so moved tech 
requiring no end user subsidy 
3. Move from SHS 
to microgrids also 
caused a shift from 
total cost recovery 
to partial cost 
recovery 
3. RM 3. NABARD subsidy cancelled 
3. Revenue model for SHS no 
longer worked without 
subsidy, so moved to 
microgrids, with a high capex 
and low to moderate 
likelihood of cost recovery, 
subsidised by rooftop projects 
4. Shift from both 
electrified and 
unelectrified areas 
into unelec hamlets 
4. CS 4. NABARD subsidy cancelled 
4. Revenue model for SHS no 
longer worked without 
subsidy, so moved to 
microgrids, which are most in 
demand in unelec clusters 
ENT12 1. Sales dropped for a time 1. Sales 
1. GoI introduced a 
scheme with 50% 
subsidy on SHS 
1. When high subsidies are 
introduced, customers stopped 
buying full price products 
from ENT, alternatively, the 
rumor of subsidies cause 
prospective customers to 
anticipate subsidies, 
depressing demand 
ENT14 
3. Trying to move 
away from grant-
based financing 
3. RM 3. Micro/ Minigrid capex grant 
3. Policy uncertainty makes 
incorporating subsidy into 
revenue model risky 
ENT23 
1. Increasing 
manufacture of grid 
connected 
technology 
1. P 
1-2. “Government 
incentive schemes” 
are “promoting grid 
tied” projects 
1. Incentives from 
government encourage ENT 
to manufacture products for 
grid-connected projects 
 
2. Adding more 
grid-connected 
customers 
2. CS  
2. Increasing the manufacture 
of grid-connected products 
increase the amount of the 
ENT's work that focus on 
grid-connected customers 
ENT24 
1. Shift from 
microgrids to 
minigrids 
1. P 
1. Grid expansion 
under RGGVY/ 
DDUGJY  
1. Grid expansion decreased 
the market for small off grid  
2. Shift from 
unelectrified to 
electrified villages 
2.  CS 
2. Grid expansion 
under 
RGGVY/DDUGJY 
programmes 
2. Grid expansion decreased 
the unelectrified market, 
unreliable grid increased 
demand in electrified villages 
3. Shifting focus of 
new work to Uttar 
Pradesh 
3.  CS 
3. New UP 
Microgrid/Minigrid 
Policy is “one 
reason” for change 
3. The new UP Microgrid/ 
Minigrid is favourable to the 
ENT's product, and is a 
reason why they are starting 
more projects in the UP 
Table 4.3 Enterprise characteristics impacted by policy Pt I 
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ENT	ID	
Changes	to	Business	
Model	
Overall	
Themes	
Responsible	
Policy	Change	
Reasons	for	
Changes	
ENT25 
1. Shift from 
unelectrified end users 
to both electrified and 
unelectrified 
1. CS 
1. Grid expansion 
under 
RGGVY/DDUGJ
Y programmes 
1. Grid expansion 
brought electricity 
access into areas that 
they work in 
ENT26 
1. Shift from 
government subsidy to 
no subsidy 
1. RM 
1. NABARD 
subsidy was 
cancelled 
1. JNNSM subsidy 
cancellation meant 
that it was no longer 
available for the 
ENT's end users 
ENT27 
1. Enterprise began 
work in conjunction 
with government 
NABARD subsidy, 
connecting NABARD 
bank with SHGs for 
financing. 
1. 
Partner, 
RM 
1. NABARD 
subsidy 
1. Needed financing 
for rural end users, 
NABARD subsidy 
was available and 
NABARD was happy 
to partner because of 
ENT's reputation 
2. Shift from subsidy 
to grant-based model 2. RM 
2. NABARD 
subsidy 
backlogged, then 
cancelled 
2. The backlogging 
and then cancellation 
of the subsidy meant 
that the revenue model 
was no longer viable, 
so the ENT moved to 
grant-financing 
3. Increased product 
range 3. P 
3. NABARD 
subsidy was 
cancelled 
3.  Previous 
NABARD subsidy 
had only applied to 
one product, once 
cancelled, ENT27 
added new tech 
ENT32 
1. Moved from 1 
engineer with each 
grid to new monitoring 
technology and fewer 
engineers 
1. CI, P 
1. JNNSM 
subsidy decreased 
from 30%-25%, 
putting strains on 
their finances 
1. As capital 
expenditure subsidy 
decreased, ENT had to 
decrease the number 
of engineers and focus 
more on monitoring to 
cut costs 
ENT33 
1. Incubatees do not 
offer subsidyto their 
end users. 
1. RM 
1. NSM-
NABARD 
subsidy 
1. Incubatee have too 
little experience to be 
elifible for NSM-
NABARD subsidy & 
financing 
ENT29 
1. Targeting 
unelectrified areas 
with SHS 
1. CS 1. Government partnership 
1. Partnership with 
government allowed 
for subsidy, influenced 
type of end user 
Table 4.4 Enterprise characteristics impacted by policy Pt II 
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 Comparing the changes in business model, specifically the source and presence 
of the end user or capex subsidy, there is a common trend towards a subsidy-free model. 
The predominant financial pathway starts with a government subsidy, then moves to a 
grant-subsidised model and, finally, a number of enterprises are trying to remove the 
subsidy component from their model. This posited financing pathway is outlined in 
Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1: Proposed Financing Pathway  
 While enterprises rarely go through all three financial states, no enterprise in 
my sample has successfully moved from a later state to an earlier one. Six enterprises 
change their financial states according to this pathway. While some enterprises may 
adopt additional technologies that start at a grant based model (see the adoption of SHS 
by ENT13 or the adoption of microgrids by ENT28) no enterprises have yet moved 
from a subsidy-free model to a grant-based model, or from a grant-based model to a 
government-subsidised model with the same technology.  
 ENT26 and ENT11 moved from working with government subsidies to 
creating subsidy-free models. ENT 27 moved from a government subsidy to a grant 
subsidy when bottlenecks for the subsidy occurred: 
“We could have reached out to more number of people, but financing was a 
major problem for us. That was when we raised our own grant funds, so we 
got some funding for light 2,700 lights from one of the funders, then we 
started getting these lights and providing it to end users, even on individual 
basis. " 
They are now setting up a private limited company with a subsidy free model.  With 
their compound business model, ENT32 has moved from a government and grant-based 
capex subsidy to a government subsidy that no longer relies on grants: 
“So at first we tried to scale this model, we found the commercial 
establishments are the shops and the educational institutions, the schools 
where we are able to make this model viable because until that point we 
were 70% of the cost was the Capex which was met by this loans from 
NABARD. And other banks also pitched in later. 20% which is operational 
Government-
subsidized model 
Grant-subsidized	model	 Subsidy-free	model	
Chapter 4: Enterprise Response to Policy Change 
Victoria Anne Plutshack – November 2019  131 
Word	T
emplat
e	by	
Friedm
an	&	M
organ	2
014 
cost, which is salaries and maintenance costs for these batteries and so on, 
was met from our own foundation, and then a few other people started 
pitching in to help us out - other like-minded foundations. But before that, 
this was not a scaleable model unless we got rid of the grant part. It had to 
be completely financed, and you know?” (ENT32) 
While this could be seen as a counter argument, the government grant was already 
present within the revenue model, and so removing the grant subsidy is actually a step 
towards a subsidy-free model, rather than a regression to greater reliance on 
government funding. 
 As another example, ENT23 typically works with a government-subsidy 
through engaging with tenders, but is now including more work with grant-subsidised 
models. Finally, ENT14 currently has a grant-based model, but is actively setting up a 
variety of projects to test a new subsidy-free model, because: 
"…these policies change so often that you cannot build on this, right? You 
can't invest, and solar is a long-term investment, it's not like a short-term, 
one-year pay back. It's like a seven, eight years, and in the seven, eight 
years, which is a long period on which the policy needs to be stable, 
suddenly the policy can change, suddenly. So that's why for solar I 
definitely struggle with the government policy. And we wanted to make it 
viable without government policy, without support of government because 
that can change” 
Only two enterprises challenge this model. ENT21 works with seven ESCOs, all of 
which have grant financing and one of which has also has received the JNNSM subsidy. 
However, other ESCOs they work with are planning to apply for the NSM subsidy. 
Likewise, ENT24 currently does not receive a subsidy for any of its systems, but it is 
planning to apply for the subsidy moving forward. In both cases the application has not 
been approved, but the intention is present.   
 While this model seems to suggest that enterprises require a subsidy to initiate 
their work, eight enterprises never receive central financial assistance on their products, 
with many starting from a grant-subsidised model. It is possible that the difficulties of 
receiving subsidies, such as extensive bureaucracy and stringent enterprise and 
technological criteria, make grants more attractive. For instance, ENT24 has not applied 
for a subsidy until now because “the procedure is so winding.” However, although this 
might account for the lack of enterprises that have successfully moved from grants to 
subsidies, it does not explain the number of enterprises that begin their work with 
subsidies. In the end, the greatest implication is that enterprises have a drive towards 
financial sustainability. ENT27’s story complicates that story. 
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4.3.2.2 Subsidy, Product & Customer 
 Of the eight changes related to customers, five were precipitated by the 
initiation or cancellation of subsidies. Subsidies target specific beneficiaries, which 
changes the customers that an enterprise is financially capable of serving. Additionally, 
the move away from the government end user subsidy, and the increase in corporate 
social responsibility donor funding, changes the customers that enterprises are 
incentivised to serve.  
 Are subsidies required to give a temporary handicap to technologies that have 
not yet reached market readiness or is a subsidy needed for these technologies to reach 
the rural poor? India’s two primary rural electrification subsidy regimes disagree on the 
answer. The JNNSM subsidy for off grid solar focuses on supporting a nascent 
technology as part of a general push towards solar, although the cancellations of the 
SHS end user NABARD subsidy impact the poor end user. However, the Government 
of India supports the rural poor specifically in their DDUGJY DDG Scheme, which 
focuses the subsidy on the location of end user rather than on the technology. Thus, the 
removal of the NABARD subsidy led to several enterprises – especially social 
enterprises - either picking up microgrids and moving deeper into the rural areas, or else 
shifting to minigrids and focusing on those areas with unreliable grid connections, 
shifting both product and customer, since appropriate financing was no longer available.  
 Additionally, eight enterprises have added donor-funded projects to their 
portfolio in the past few years, either as grant-based SHS projects or by adding 
microgrid projects to their repertoire. At least one enterprise attributed this to the 
Government of India’s Corporate Social Responsibility policy, which came into force in 
2014 as section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013. The CSR policy states that companies 
that have a “Net worth of INR 500 crore or more; or Turnover of INR 1000 crore or 
more; or Net Profit of INR 5 crore or more during any financial year” must spend 2% of 
their net profit on projects for stakeholders that support the common good (Government 
of Bihar, 2014). However, enterprises that engage with grant-based models find that 
donors have a great deal of control over the project, specifically the end user. ENT14 
described an episode in which a donor company nearly pulled out because the intended 
village had become electrified in the course of the project, and they had wanted the 
project to be in an unelectrified area. This applies also to government enterprises: 
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Case Study 2: ENT23 – Public Sector Enterprise 
Government-affiliated enterprises have the government as a bigger stakeholder in their 
work, but not the only one. ENT23 is the oldest organisation in the sample, having been 
founded in 1974 as a Government of India company. It was explicitly created in order 
to commercially produce products that were created through national R&D 
programmes, and has since focused on its own R&D in solar PV and on the 
commercialization of solar products. 
Unlike many of the enterprises in the sample, which have focused on distribution, 
ENT23 manufactures solar home systems. As a government company, their systems 
meet the specifications for most government tenders, and they were the only enterprise 
in the sample that reported regularly bidding for and winning tenders for off grid solar 
home system projects. In addition to bidding on government tenders for the DDG 
scheme, they also did CSR projects, partnering with local organisations like ENT29 in 
Bihar to build and operate a small solar minigrid. Unlike most other enterprises in the 
sample, ENT23 does not have any significant partnerships, excepting those with smaller 
organisations for contracting work or local capacity. It does have a programme to give 
small contracts to start-ups in order to develop smaller companies in the sector. 
The organisation manufactures and assembles stand-alone solar systems, as well as 
manufacturing panels for other types of systems. For instance, the company is 
increasing its manufacture of grid-connected products and increasingly turning its focus 
to customers on the national grid, in part because incentives from the government are 
“promoting grid-tied” projects. However, ENT23 does not need to wait until the 
government unveils a new programme to make its moves. Once a year, the company 
sits down with representatives from the central government to discuss priorities for the 
coming year and to ensure that their priorities are aligned.  
 ENT23 regularly works with CSR grant-based projects, and described the 
location and end user as being selected by the corporation: “See, if a project is being 
donated by someone else, they have their own way, their own specifications and we 
have to follow them” (ENT23). In this case, corporations wanted to provide their 
projects in areas that are near to their own factories, offices or other manufacturing 
facilities. This can mean that grant-based models have to manage an additional 
stakeholder whose interest is not necessarily in the financial sustainability of the 
project, or the need of the end user.  
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4.3.2.3 Grid Expansion, Customer & Product 
 On the other side of the spectrum is the Government of India’s fast-paced grid 
expansion programme, the primary aspect of the DDUGJY. This policy focuses on the 
national grid as the solution to under-electrification, and there is a complicated 
relationship between the success of this programmes and that of off grid enterprises. 
This tension is played out in the competing narratives about the future of off grid 
energy, and its multiple possibilities. In the end, grid expansion changes the market by 
increasing the grid connected customer base, which is more commonly served by 
minigrids and larger solar home systems. The pace and quality of the grid extension has 
created two dominant narratives: one, the grid will soon be nearly everywhere, and two, 
the grid is elusive and of poor quality. Most government officials interviewed, 
especially those working with MNRE or the state nodal agencies, supported the first 
narrative. Off grid technologies are, in this narrative, for very remote areas only.  
 However, of the 16 enterprises, eleven provided off grid technologies to grid-
connected customers, where the grid was considered to be unreliable. This gap between 
the government’s expectation and the work of the enterprises was clearly described by 
minigrid system integrator ENT21:  
“Yeah, see there you could find a little bit of dichotomy between what the 
state government might be looking out for and what our programme is 
looking out for, because the state government would be looking out for 
areas which are off grid. So off grid is a very different beast, compared to 
unreliable grid areas where our programme primarily works. [Ours is] a 
private sector model, it's a market-based model … So in such cases, if you 
start looking at off grid areas then you would get into places where you 
have 15, 20 households and absolutely no productive load and there's no 
possibility of going. So I think that what I see is that, the government - there 
has been a UP policy last year, in fact that happened to a large extent 
because of this programme. The UP government came out with a mini grid 
policy last year. It was the first state ever in India to come out with a policy, 
so there, we do see - the government wants the mini grid operators to go 
into off grid areas and believes that the unreliable grid areas, as such, where 
the government grid is going to come anyways over a period of time, we 
should not be spending our time there.” (ENT21) 
However, all but one minigrid operator worked in unreliable grid areas, rather than in 
exclusively off grid villages. Where the national grid is unreliable, off grid enterprises 
see a range of new customers who need a technology that will augment their 
substandard access.  
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 The related expectation was that grid extension would negatively impact off 
grid sales, but the experience so far has been mixed. Three enterprises experienced a 
drop in sales or demand, which has caused them to move to a different area or 
technology, such as ENT28, which claimed to have moved microgrids when the grid 
arrived in the village. On the other hand, SHS enterprise ENT25 has had the grid arrive 
in a number of their pilot villages, and they claim that sales drop slightly before the grid 
actually arrives, but increase after the grid has arrived: 
“So when the poles and wires got, were introduced to the village, demand 
went down, from this point, because people got this hope that, okay we will 
get electricity now. So, and they thought, we'll get stable, more capacity, so 
demand actually went down. After a few months they realised that even a) 
either the power is not coming at all, coming in the near future, or even if it 
has been introduced, it's unstable… then after a point, there was no hope 
from grid electricity, they got a reality check - that's the way it is in rural 
India, right? - so they got a reality check and demand shot up.”  (ENT25) 
So even with a grid connection, customers revert to using their SHS in addition. This is 
proto-typical ‘energy stacking,’ in the same way that we might use an oven, a 
microwave and a rice cooker for our cooking needs. The impact on demand is therefore 
related both to the quality of the national grid and the anticipation of that quality. Both 
of these aspects will change as grid expansion continues, which actively changes the 
potential market for off grid products. 
 Expansion is a key component of the move towards providing for grid-
connected customers. With a rapid expansion, but questionable quality of the grid, a 
new market of unreliably grid-connected customers has emerged. The enterprises that 
have moved into this market have had to shift their technology offerings and revenue 
models in order to capitalise on their demand, and this has primarily been reflected in 
the rise of the minigrid. In the past three years alone, five of the enterprises began 
minigrid projects for the first time (ENT32, ENT29, ENT31, ENT14, ENT21). 
Minigrids are, with one exception, for grid connected villages, because they are large 
pieces of infrastructure and require commercial, as well as domestic loads: 
“You see, why we are gravitating to commercial hubs. Earlier our biomass 
plants were primarily based in areas that had no grid, now that reality is 
going to change with the government promising every village is going to be 
grid connected. So earlier our offering was, I would say, meant for [not grid 
connected] people. …The changing reality of time is that every village is 
going to be grid connected, so you switch over to commercial hubs who are 
in need of reliable and good quality power, 24 by 7. And this is our focus 
now. “ (ENT24) 
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However, while minigrids offer domestic lighting services, their focus is on 
commercial, agricultural or other productive loads, which may have implications for 
hamlets or other impoverished areas that require only domestic lighting. What is most 
clear is that these enterprise characteristics are interrelated, and the expansion of the 
grid does not just open up a new market, but changes the way in which end users are 
getting their power and the capacity of the systems that may serve them.  
Case Study 3: ENT22 – Social Enterprise  
Missing from these narratives are those enterprises that seemed un-buffeted by policy 
changes, which was sometimes achieved by finding financial support elsewhere. 
ENT22 was founded in 2009 with a large grant from a prominent international 
foundation. The aim of the enterprise was to bring the right products into rural India in 
the right way. That has meant focusing of the right type of products, which address 
health, livelihoods and quality of life. These products are sold at a small profit and are 
typically sourced from large, sometimes multinational corporations. The company bills 
itself on being responsive to demand, and so products are regularly being introduced 
and phased out as the business is tweaked.  
These products are sold through rural entrepreneurs, who are predominantly women 
from low income areas. In this regard, the company is a distribution company, with a 
great deal of its time and effort going to training and communication with its network of 
entrepreneurs, which act as sales people as well as raising awareness in their 
communities of the value of these products. As of writing, the company worked with 
over 16,000 rural entrepreneurs across 13 states. 
This enterprise expressed no narrative of change in relation to the government’s 
national programmes, primarily because they do not engage with them. Their solar 
products do not receive a government subsidy, although the company itself sells the 
product at a subsidized rate. The focus of the organization is on scaling up, and it seems 
to work mainly through partnerships. 
Financial support has instead come primarily from large international organisations. Its 
primary partners fall into three categories: development banks and agencies, 
multinational corporations and local skills and development organisations. 
Development banks and agencies have provided funding (World Bank, DFID, GIZ), 
multinational corporations sell their products through the enterprise (ie. Unilever) and 
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Indian based organizations focus on the development side (ie. Skill Council for Green 
Jobs). These funding partners were only possible because of ENT22’s laser focus on 
social impact, which enable them to ignore the coming and going of subsidy regimes. 
4.3.3 Impacts of Enterprise Characteristic Change 
 Stepping away from policy and exploring other narratives of change, we see 
that changes occur because of both exogenous and endogenous factors. Specifically, 
nine out of 18 enterprise changes are precipitated by another change within the business 
model. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 outline the precipitating factors of all changes described that 
do not directly cite policy, although the exogenous factors that they cite may be 
indirectly driven by other policy decisions. Half of the changes take place due to 
external circumstances, or factors exogenous to the business model. In three cases, 
demand changes the enterprise’s off grid product, whether that is through sales of 
products or the opinions of the customer (ENT12, ENT28, ENT32). In the case of 
ENT28, they found that an increase in consumer demand led to a “natural progression” 
to larger systems, including microgrids. Likewise, ENT27 found that their customers 
preferred to buy panels out-right rather than renting them, and so they change their 
revenue model and their value proposition: 
"So we're two things: one was self help group model in which home light 
systems were being rented, and the other model was where women 
entrepreneurs were selling solar lamps on direct purchase and sale. And 
slowly what the impact of home light systems was tremendous and then 
there were households, at least 57 households came back to us, and said we 
want to own these products. We don't want to endlessly pay rent for it, and 
that was a very critical learning for us. That ownership of these 
decentralized renewable energy systems, and we realised that if actually we 
let them own it, then there would be more care and maintenance problems 
would be less. If people pay more attention, it's going to be easier for us to 
manage." (ENT27) 
 In other examples, a lack of cost recovery from a post-payment system leads to 
a shift to a pre-payment model (ENT24), and the low cost of solar led that same 
enterprise to shift towards solar hybrid minigrids. All these changes take place because 
external forces (demand, customer responsiveness, cost of solar) led to a change in the 
business model itself. 
 The other changes occur due to endogenous factors, namely shifts in other 
enterprise characteristics. A change in the supply chain position, for instance, shifted 
the products sold (ENT11, ENT13) and the channels (ENT25) that enterprises worked 
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through. ENT25 chose early on in their lifespan to focus on product development, rather 
than distribution, which influenced the channel through which their customers receive 
the technology: 
"So as a company we decide that we won't get into distribution, we will 
have distribution partners, like micro finance institution, or government 
institutions, or NGOs, and there are other companies, like, other... 
companies who have foothold in rural areas. We ultimately use their 
services. So we'll have distribution partners across. They will distribute the 
kit for us, that is how we'll get the reach." (ENT25) 
Other enterprises found that starting and ending partnerships affected the means of 
distribution also (ENT14, ENT26). In the case of ENT14, microfinance partnerships fell 
apart, which meant they were no longer able to provide financing, which led to a 
breakdown of their distribution channel and a move away from solar home systems: 
"And normally, the people work with a micro finance business, but they, in 
India the solar lantern, solar household system - it is sold mostly through 
micro finance, because people don't want to buy credit or 6 month of 
installment papers, that a microfinance company can do, because they have 
a much better... So anyone who's a micro finance company - so some of 
these product companies, they're tying up with these micro finance 
companies. So the smaller product, they don't even charge interest, they just 
give a four month installment and you pay. For a bigger product they give 
you also loan and all, right? Somehow in the basics what happened, after 
this 2009/10, our micro finance system was off. So without micro finance 
business, for us distribution was very challenging" (ENT 14). 
 Essentially, changes with one aspect of the business model, can lead to 
changes to other aspects. A good final example is ENT12, which used to sell a wide 
range of products, but then focused on solar products when only they were selling. 
However, having a small basket of products negatively impacted their village level 
entrepreneur channel of distribution: 
“So we started with different models to reach in rural market, so VLE, then 
we tried to associate with NGOs, then our dealer were already selling 
something and they're interested in our product. So VLE didn't work, 
because the basket was too small. Once we have a basket, then we will see 
again whether it works or not, but for now. … [VLEs] are bread earners in 
the family, they could not provide a sufficient basket so it didn't work….So, 
finally the model we developed was through dealers.” 
While it was an exogenous demand that caused the enterprise to alter the products 
available, that change affected the success of their distribution channel. The implication 
is that some modes of distribution are more effective with a smaller selection of 
products (whether women VLEs or dealers). These findings reinforce the 
interdependency of business model components, which explains how a change in a 
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single policy instrument may have an outsized, or unexpected, impact on the enterprise 
landscape. 
4.3.4 Changes to the Enterprise Landscape 
 These findings suggest that during the course of their lifespan, enterprises that 
survive are highly agile, changing business models frequently. And so, rather than 
simply increasing or decreasing demand, a policy change can shift the shape of the 
entire enterprise landscape. Six enterprises adopted new technology, two scaled up 
microgrids to minigrids, and six dropped technologies. Similarly, enterprises changed 
payment methods (1), changed funding sources (5), changed end users (6), changed 
maintenance plans (1), and changed distribution methods (8). While each change comes 
with its own set of circumstances, we can see three broad trends: increased targeting of 
grid connected customers, an uptick in the popularity of microgrid and minigrids, and a 
general trend towards financial sustainability. 
 The move towards working with grid connected areas includes both grid 
connected technologies or, more commonly, off grid technologies in areas with 
unreliable connectivity. As seen in section 4.3.2.3, grid extension has opened up a new 
range of customers while limiting the number of truly off grid customers. Currently 
only two enterprises (ENT11 and ENT23) work in only off grid areas with their off grid 
technologies, and both these enterprises also have added additional grid connected 
technologies and projects. However, six enterprises have changed their end users, and 
five of those changes included work in more grid connected areas. Some enterprises 
expressed a belief that the grid was shortly going to be everywhere, and explained that 
it was increasingly difficult to find areas that were truly off grid, although many areas 
suffered from unreliable and poor quality electricity access.  
 Related to a shift towards grid connected end users, there is also an increase in 
the system size of technologies, with enterprises adding microgrids to their repertoire 
and microgrid enterprises scaling up to minigrids. Of the thirteen enterprises that have 
started or added new technologies since 2000, ten added or worked exclusively with 
micro and minigrids. Currently, five enterprises work with both SHS and a grid-based 
system, six work with just grid systems, and only four enterprises work solely with 
solar home systems. Minigrid systems have risen in popularity along with the move 
towards grid connected areas, in great part because minigrid operators require a certain 
amount of productive or commercial demand, which they believe is more readily 
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available in areas that have unreliable connections. See ENT21, ENT24, ENT32, and 
ENT31 for examples. 
 The final trend noticeable in the narratives is a move away from government 
financing and towards greater cost recovery, which is partially a response to the end of 
the JNNSM-NABARD subsidy. For the most part, total financial sustainability, defined 
as complete cost recovery for the capital cost of the system coming from the end user, is 
an elusive dream for anything other than solar home system enterprises. Four out of 
seven minigrid operators already reported that their minigrid models should allow for 
total cost recovery over the payback period, although few systems have reached the end 
of their payback period. Multiple enterprises did identify the aim or plan to reach total 
cost recovery going forward, such as ENT27, which began by working with 
government, and is now trying to move to a subsidy free model:  
“We've done almost some 2,500 systems until now, and we're just in the 
process of setting up a distribution company now. We taking…this model 
and scaling it up, and we set up a company, it's a private, limited 
company…It will be functioning as a distribution company in the sense that 
we get products from manufacturers, provide end user financing and after 
sales service and products, and bridge that last mile gap…We also finalized 
what the model is, what the business plan is, where we're going to raise the 
investments in any case.” (ENT27) 
Or, as it was described by ENT29 who currently provide subsidised SHS, moving 
forward they are “planning a stable business model,” which will not include a subsidy 
for end users. While some of these changes may be a natural progression away from 
policy risk (see section 5.2.1), some are a direct response to the changes to the off grid 
subsidy regime in the past three years. Additionally, the adoption of larger scale 
systems with more grid connected customers has improved the ability of the business 
model to recoup costs, highlighting the manner in which rural electrification policies 
shape the enterprises that provide off grid technologies. 
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ENTID Changes to Business Model Overall 
Themes 
Reasons for Changes Overall 
Themes 
ENT11 1. Shifted from manufacturing 
and distribution to just 
distribution 
1. SC 1. Could not compete with 
other manufacturers 
1. FA 
      
2. Moved from solar lanterns 
to solar home systems 
2. P 2. Shift of focus to 
distribution, rather than 
manufacturing 
2. SC 
ENT12 1. Moved from selling a range 
of products, now primarily 
sell solar products 
1. P 1.  Only solar products sold 1. Sales 
2. Shifted from VLE for 
distribution to selling via 
NGOs, now selling via 
dealers 
2. C 2. Small basket of products 
did not 
allow for (male) VLEs to 
make sufficient money 
2. P 
ENT13 1. Stopped sale of solar lamps, 
but still 
provide in grant-based 
projects 
1. P 1. Found distribution difficult 1. SC  
2. Began manufacturing solar 
panels 
2. P 2. Acquired enough capital to 
manufacture panels, felt there 
was unmet demand 
2. IM 
ENT14 1. Stopped providing 
financing for products 
1. CI/C 1. Previously enterprise had 
worked with 
microfinance, but 
microfinancing fell apart 
after 2010 
1. Partner 
2. Stopped selling SHS  2. P 2. Manufacturing and 
Microfinance partnerships 
that were used for selling SHS 
ended 
2. Partner 
    
ENT24 1. Move from post-pay to pre-
pay 
model  
1. RM 1. Poor cost 
recovery from post-pay model 
1. CR 
2. Inclusion of solar/biomass 
hybrid systems 
2. P 2. Low cost of solar 2. Cost 
ENT25 1. Focused on 
manufacturing and 
integration, use VLEs 
and MFIs for distribution and 
collection 
1. CI/C 1. Early on, the enterprise 
realised 
that they could not produce 
and 
distribute the product 
1. SC  
Table 4.6 Enterprise characteristics impacted by other factors Pt I 
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ENTID Changes to Business Model 
Overall 
Themes Reasons for Changes 
Overall 
Themes 
ENT26 
1. Including built-
in financing for 
systems 
1. RM, CI/C 
1. In period 2007-2009, 
enterprise finds range of new 
financing through partnerships 
with rural banks, credit 
cooperatives and microfinance 
agencies for end users 
1. Partner 
ENT27 
1. Stopped selling 
solar lamps 1. P 
1. Solar lamps were of poor 
quality and broke 
1. 
Quality, 
Knowled
ge after approx. one year 
2. Enterprise 
moved from 
loaning to selling 
systems 
2. RM 2.  There was a desire to own products from end users. 2. D 
3. Enterprise 
beginning own 
limited company 
and moving 
towards a 
financially 
sustainable model 
with no subsidy 
3. RM 3. Aim for sustainability 3. RM  
ENT28 
1. Adding larger 
and larger systems 
to their product 
line 
1. P 
1. It is a “natural progression” as 
end users 1. D experience a growth in 
consumer demand 
      
ENT32 1. Focusing on solar products 1. P 
1. Started with a range of 
products, but 1. D had demand for more solar 
capacity 
ENT29 
1. Enterprise aims 
to build 
maintenance 1. VP 
1.  In order to “build a stable 
business 
1. RM 
capacity model” and run future projects as a business 
Table 4.7 Enterprise characteristics impacted by other factors Pt II 
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4.4 Policy Implications 
 Governments do not stand alone in providing public services, but increasingly 
engage with and expect non-governmental organisations and the private sector to play 
their part. The Government of India is no exception, in that the current DDG Scheme 
requires the participation of third parties in tendering large-scale SHS projects. 
However, this research has highlighted how changes in levels of support have a strong 
impact on the enterprise landscape. It follows that if the Government of India hopes to 
minimise the number of tenders that are unmet, it would be wise to improve their 
support for the solar home system market. The Government of India’s DDG Scheme 
presupposes a burgeoning SHS market, which can be tapped into to provide least-cost 
solutions for the most remote villages. In order to do that, the programme routes large-
scale SHS tenders through state nodal agencies, which ask for bids from third parties. 
However, several enterprises noted that off grid tenders were regularly cancelled, 
postponed or re-tendered (BREDA, 2017; UPNEDA, 2017). While there is limited 
evidence confirming that these tenders are cancelled at higher rates than other 
programmes, there is recent evidence for tender cancellations of off grid solar projects. 
 Unmet tenders could occur for a variety of reasons: poor tender construction, 
changes to the grid expansion plans, or a lack of competition within the off grid solar 
sector. That lack of competition may not relate directly to the move away from SHS by 
SMEs, but other empirical studies have suggested that government has a role in 
supporting the sectors that it expects to provide public services (Girth et al., 2012; Lecy 
and Van Slyke, 2013). As discussed in section 2.1, contracting out public services 
assumes robust competition in the sector in order to reap the intended benefits 
(Entwistle and Martin, 2005; A. Hefetz and Warner, 2012; Girth et al., 2012). However, 
reliance on a few larger companies may not be viable in such a new industry. SMEs 
play a large role in the Indian economy, and although every sector is different, SMEs 
are considered to a key part of economic progress and a site of innovation and new 
competition particularly important in newer industries (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1982; 
Reynolds, 1997; Savlovschi and Robu, 2011; Das and Banerjee, 2018). 
 As mentioned above, poorly drafted tenders and changes to the DDUGJY 
plans are possible contributing factors to phenomena. However, the movement of 820 
villages from the DDG scheme to the grid expansion scheme suggest that 
implementation has been slower than anticipated (REC, 2018b). Challenges in 
garnering enough bidders for the DGG scheme are likely to play a role. At the same 
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time, support has moved from SHS to micro- and minigrids. This study has shown that 
enterprises are very responsive to changes in support, and there is evidence that this 
policy shift has contributed in part to the enterprise focus on grid-based systems. The 
double cancellation of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission end user subsidy 
through NABARD was the most frequently cited policy change in the interviews. As 
explored in greater depth above, enterprises that relied on the subsidy moved either to 
larger grid-based systems, or towards subsidy free models. This limits their customer 
base to those rural users who can pay full price for energy access. Current off grid 
subsidies, outside of the tender system, focus solely on capital costs for minigrids and 
microgrids. 
 The public administration literature suggests that a more fruitful symbiotic 
relationship exists where the government supports the sector that it engages to provide 
public service (Girth et al., 2012; Lecy and Van Slyke, 2013).  If this is the case, the 
Government of India might consider improving its support for the solar home system 
market, which could be achieved in three ways. The first way to do this might be to 
better incorporate enterprise stakeholders in decision-making. Although stakeholder 
meetings and conferences already exist, enterprises broadly felt that their interests were 
not fully considered, and that these meetings existed more as a symbolic show of 
support than a true consultation.  
 Secondly, although officially all relevant households have access to electricity, 
financial support for SHS may still be necessary, whether through subsidy or through 
improved financing options. This is because many households fell outside the 
Saubhagya scheme, and those in areas relying on off grid energy will still require 
replacements in the future (Urpelainen, 2019). A key challenge in providing this 
support is that the costs of these systems are very low, making the administrative 
charges relatively high for each small loan or subsidy. This was a challenge that 
NABARD faced when it was administering the JNNSM SHS subsidy, but some experts 
believed that NABARD is still the correct institution for administering such a subsidy, 
because of its experience with implementing other rural policies.  
 Another way to address the issue of administration would be to have the 
enterprise act as an aggregator of subsidies. In this capacity, the enterprise would sell 
systems to the end user at the subsidised price, and apply to receive the subsidy on 
behalf of those customers, cutting down on administrative costs for the bank, but 
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shifting them to the enterprise (Jain & Ramji 2016, pgs 25-26).  It may also be worth 
considering using the new Direct Benefit Transfer scheme, which is already being 
rolled out for kerosene, to provide subsidies to those end users that already have bank 
accounts. This might add an obstacle for those who do not currently have bank 
accounts, but, conversely, it may encourage more rural customers to apply for bank 
accounts, which are commonly seen as the first step on the credit ladder. 
 Finally, eligibility requirements for participation in the DDG Scheme exclude 
small to medium sized enterprises, which is a challenge to scaling up through winning 
government contracts. While the scheme has now reached its end, future technology-
based programmes will likely be in a similar position. To incorporate SMEs into the 
tender systems, eligibility requirements could be relaxed to allow enterprises with a 
shorter history to apply. Another challenge in accessing those tenders is that the size of 
the contract often precludes SMEs. By breaking tenders into smaller packages of 
households, SMEs could take on more manageable contracts, and larger enterprises 
could have more control over the amount of work they wish to take on. However, doing 
so would undoubtably increase administration and transaction costs. Still, studies in 
other contexts have suggested that current infrastructure and competition within the 
market are greater indicators of successful contracting than transaction costs (Amir 
Hefetz and Warner, 2012). While we cannot extrapolate such a study to this precise 
context, it does suggest that other factors than transaction costs may be important. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 Governments are relying on non-state actors to provide rural electrification, 
and in the case of India, this involves central financial assistance that targets particular 
off grid technologies, as well as contracting out the electrification of rural villages. 
However, the impacts that policy changes have on enterprises have thus far been 
understudied (Brass et al., 2012). In this study, fifteen enterprises have given their 
accounts of enterprise change, which have been analysed and compared.  
 The findings suggest that enterprises are impacted by policy directly where 
their business models interact with programmes, but changes have knock-on effects to 
the rest of the business model. When policy changes, it alters the entire enterprise 
landscape, which may impact the successful implementation of policy. In the Indian off 
grid solar context, revenue streams and technology are the two aspects of the business 
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model that are initially impacted by rural electrification programmes. However, knock-
on effects led many enterprises to change large parts of their business model.  
 In India, changes can be seen in a broad trend 1) towards grid-connected 
customers, 2) some movement away from solar home systems by small and medium-
scale enterprises, 3) some evidence of a move towards financial sustainability. 
However, the main off grid electrification DDG scheme mainly floats tenders for solar 
home system projects. Given that the implementation of the DDG scheme has faced 
challenges, it is possible that these changes to the enterprise landscape have impacted 
the success of the programme. In either case, the changes to the enterprise landscape are 
likely to have implications for which end users are being targeted and which 
technologies are available for them. Further research might broaden these findings to 
additional rural electrification contexts, exploring whether enterprises in other countries 
respond in similar ways to policy changes. 
 There are also more general implications. Given that changes to the business 
model follow particular logical pathways (ie a lack of financing for solar systems leads 
to wealthier target customers and changes in the technology offered), there is an 
element of predictability to the impact of policy on the market. Analytical 
generalisation also applies, and therefore we might conclude that such logics also apply 
in other contexts. While the particular customers or technologies might depend on 
country- or region-specific features, the logical rules should apply. As a caveat, it is 
important to consider how the characteristics of a particular enterprise may influence 
the extent to which an enterprise is affected by policy change (see the next chapter). 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to anticipate how the introduction of a new 
programme, or the cancellation of an existing one, will influence the characteristics of 
the market. Given that certain programmatic modes have requirements – a degree of 
competition, for instance – it is crucial for policymakers to consider not just the 
immediate impact of a policy change on sales, but whether the policy supports the type 
of market that programmes require.  
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5 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE 
POLITICAL STRATEGY OF 
ENTERPRISES 
5.1 Introduction 
 The findings from the previous chapter suggest that policy interventions may 
create unintentional changes to the enterprise landscape. In India’s case, small and 
medium-sized companies showed a movement away from solar home systems, in part 
because they were unable to access subsidies and financing for the systems. These 
companies were no longer eligible for subsidies, but even some companies that were 
eligible chose not to apply for them. This decision to engage with or disengage from 
rural electrification programmes affects the impact that policy change has on the 
enterprise. 
 The assumption inherent in much policy analysis is that enterprises will always 
engage with government programmes when they are able – that is, eligible (Niez, 2010; 
Khandker et al., 2014; van de Walle et al., 2015). However, the way in which 
enterprises position themselves towards government and policy is an oft-overlooked 
aspect for analysis in the RE context (Brass et al., 2012). To design effective policy, 
enterprises must participate, information must be shared with enterprises, and 
government needs to understand the needs of enterprise. This relies on a flow of 
information, relationships and engagement. From the enterprise perspective, we are 
discussing political strategy (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004; 
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Mellahi et al., 2016). Enterprises make conscious decisions about how to work with the 
government, in an attempt to mitigate the risk that policy plays to their environment 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). By understanding the 
actions of enterprises, we are better able to work with them and to anticipate their 
strategic reaction to policy change. So what political strategies do these enterprises 
employ, and what enterprise factors influence political strategy? 
 As seen in chapter 1, political strategy research focuses on big companies in 
HICs in contexts in which complying with regulation is mandatory, as opposed to 
working with optional programmes, which is much more common in this context. 
Therefore, the prior literature emphasizes lobbying over all things, because it is the 
most forceful way of minimising the risk of new regulations (Moore, 2001a; Polk and 
Schmutzler, 2005; Vining, Shapiro and Borges, 2005). These studies are inapplicable to 
a resource-constrained context full of small and medium-sized organisations in which 
policies are primarily in place to support new technologies and poor populations. We 
need to look within these interviews to understand what political strategy means in 
these contexts, and which factors are most prominent in influencing these strategies. 
While some new literature is trying to bring relevant theory to developing country 
studies, LMICs are also still underrepresented in accompanying theory (Ali, Frynas and 
Mahmood, 2017; Jamali and Karam, 2018; Frynas and Yamahaki, 2019). The findings 
of this chapter can improve our definition of political strategy by challenging the 
emphasis on lobbying, exploring new facets of political strategy and by applying old 
theory to new contexts.  
 This chapter has several overlaps with the previous chapter, which looks at 
changes within the business model. Aspects of the business model include political 
action, revenue model, and target customer, which will also be evaluated here as a part 
of political strategy. The question underpinning this chapter is not, ‘what political 
strategies do enterprises take?’ but instead ‘what factors influence political strategy?’ A 
change in business model may be in response to a change in policy and simultaneously 
an aspect of political strategy.  In that way, this chapter approaches the issue of 
engagement with the government with the aim of improving policy design.  
 Section 2 details how a new framework for political strategy and tactics was 
derived from the interview data, while that framework is explored in section 3. Then 
section 4 breaks down the tactics used by enterprises in order to better articulate the 
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factors that lead to particular strategies. Finally, in section 5, the chapter takes a step 
back to evaluate the conceptual contribution to political strategy literature, place those 
factors within the broader context of resource development theory, the resource-based 
view and institutional theory, and offer up some implications for policy design. 
5.2 Methodology 
 This chapter begins by using grounded theory to describe the phenomenon of 
‘political strategy’ within the interviews, and follows up by exploring factors that 
contribute to an enterprise’s choice of tactics. As there is no single definition of political 
strategy, this chapter applies Mintzberg’s definition of strategy as a plan, a pattern, a 
position or a perspective (Mintzberg, 1987). As Mintzberg also advocates for 
eclecticism in the use of these definitions, all four concepts were included here. The 
term ‘political’ is defined as anything from ‘self-interest’ in organizational studies 
literature to ‘governmental personnel and/or policies’ in comparative politics (Conge, 
1988; Drory and Romm, 1990). This thesis sides more with the latter, including 
government and its actions as political.  
 Therefore, for primary coding, the question asked of the data was “What 
strategies (as in, plan, pattern, position or perspective) do these enterprises use to 
engage with government and the actions of government?” Secondary coding then 
collated those codes into broader categories of action. Finally, tertiary coding sought to 
synthesise those codes into higher-level tactics that fall within broader strategies of 
engagement or disengagement. Within our data, a set of behaviors emerged that does 
not fit within the current literature on political strategy (ie. leveraging policy), which 
will be discussed further in section 5.5.1. 
 It should also be noted that this portion of the research initially began during a 
collaborative paper with Dr Subhanjan Sengupta of BIMTECH, New Delhi on the 
strategies that new and renewable energy social enterprises take towards government 
and policy. In the initial paper, of which I was first author, a similar conceptual 
framework was constructed, and thereafter reassessed with the full data of all 17 
interviews, as opposed to only those social enterprises. In the collaborative paper, 95% 
of the data belongs to my dataset, as well as the primary analysis and drafting. In this 
chapter 100% of the dataset is my data. The 5% data from my collaborator was on a 
different market – social enterprises that work in renewable energy, not necessarily off 
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grid solar. Using all of my data, the conceptual framework developed here differs 
slightly from that collaborative paper. 
 In section 5, the excavated constructs are then used as a framework through 
which to understand the factors that impact decisions on political strategy. At this stage, 
each enterprise is treated as a case study of political strategy within the off grid solar 
sector. By examining which enterprises employ each tactic, buttressed by the contextual 
information given in the interviews, this section posits causal relationships between 
certain factors and enterprise strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). These factors are 
subsequently considered in light of broader theories of resource dependence and 
institutional theory in section 5. In so doing, this research aims to explore the factors 
that influence decisions on political strategy in enterprises working in a sector that has 
traditionally relied heavily on central financial assistance and government support. 
5.3 Excavated Constructs: Strategies & Tactics 
5.3.1 Engagement and Disengagement 
 Enterprises within the sample took actions that represented either a strategy of 
engagement or disengagement. Actions of engagement sought to benefit from working 
with the government, while actions of disengagement attempt to avoid wasted resources 
and policy risk. These two key constructs stand in opposition to the majority of the 
literature on political strategy, which focus on typologies of engagement and assume 
that active disengagement is either the default position or legally untenable (ie. 
conforming to regulations are mandatory)  (Weidenbaum, 1980; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Getz, 2002; Mathur and Singh, 2011). However, as the sections below will explore, the 
off grid solar sector is in a position in which significant political attention is married 
with policy interventions that ask for engagement, but do not require it. 
 The resource-intensity of each action varies. Resources are the firm’s assets, 
whether they are manpower, time, knowledge or physical assets (Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Capacity is defined as the capability to deploy such resources (Kamoche, 1996). 
Resource-intensity describes the amount of resources that must be deployed in order to 
complete the action, therefore the amount of capacity that is required.  
 Figure 5.1 outlines the excavated constructs that make up the strategies and 
tactics that enterprises take within the sample. A full word table is found in Appendix 3. 
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Categorising the activities of enterprises illuminates the range of possible approaches to 
government and provides a framework for analysing which tactics and strategies 
enterprises choose. In this framework, enterprises take a strategy by using a tactic 
through actions. For instance, an enterprise may take a strategy of engagement by 
leveraging policy through aligning with government priorities. Codes further clarify 
how those actions are revealed in the interviews. 
5.3.2 Engagement: Leveraging Policy 
 Enterprises take action to leverage policy in order to take advantage of the 
policy environment as it currently exists, whether through directly or indirectly gaining 
access to policy benefits. The first aspect of this is engaging in government 
programmes. Three programmes were most commonly cited in the interviews when 
discussing political strategy: the DDG Scheme, the JNNSM, and India’s CSR policy 
(Government of Bihar, 2014). All of the policies mentioned above are optional, in that 
the enterprises within this sample may take advantage of the benefits that they offer if 
you are eligible, however, it is not mandatory to engage with them. Direct engagement 
with policy typically falls outside of the definition of political strategy, and this will be 
discussed in section 5.1.1. 
 In addition to directly engaging in the programmes above, enterprises also 
align their activities with government priorities. This can take the form of selecting a 
technology to which the government has given its financial support, or else moving 
towards populations that the government has prioritised. Enterprises may also hedge 
risk by partnering with other enterprises that have direct engagement in these 
programmes, or else by shielding their own potential losses in engagement by inflating 
their tender bids or offering financial rewards for certification. Finally, some enterprises 
negotiate with government in order to align priorities or have access to benefits without 
going through the formal processes, which can be highly exclusionary. 
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Strateg
y	 Tactics	 Actions	 Codes	
En
ga
ge
m
en
t 
Leveraging 
Policy 
Engaging in programmes 
Getting accredited 
Applying for subsidy 
Bidding for tenders 
Doing CSR projects 
Aligning with government 
priorities 
Following government priorities 
Moving to areas with favourable 
policy 
Moving towards grid connection areas 
Working in deregulated space 
Hedging policy risk 
Hedging risk through partnerships 
Hedging risk through manipulation 
Negotiating 
Negotiating with government 
Negotiating with implementing agents 
Building and 
Leveraging 
Relationship
s 
Maintaining relationships 
Maintaining relationships 
Talking to government 
Working with local actors Working with local actors 
Partnering with government Partnering with government 
Integrating government  Integrating government into supply chain 
Lobbying 
Offering information Offering information 
Giving feedback 
Giving feedback through formal 
channels 
Giving individual feedback 
Giving collective feedback 
Championing policy Championing policy 
Joining an industry 
organisation Joining an industry organisation 
Monitoring 
Anticipating 
Anticipating government action 
Anticipating integration/non-
integration 
Having awareness 
Being aware of government vision 
Being aware of policy 
Waiting Waiting to know government approach 
D
is
en
ga
ge
m
en
t 
Avoiding 
Avoiding grid Avoiding grid 
Stepping in  Stepping in where the government in not 
Not 
engaging 
Not engaging in policy 
Not applying 
Not bidding 
Disengaging from policy 
Not considering policy 
Not taking grid expansion into account 
Not waiting for policy changes 
Not working with 
government 
Not interacting with government 
Not partnering with government 
Not working with government 
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Figure 5.1: Excavated Constructs  
5.3.3 Engagement: Building Relationships 
 Enterprises build and maintain relationships for future access to programmes 
and policy development (see Lobbying, below). This can take place at the local, state 
and national level, and enterprises regularly had engagement at all three. Relationships 
were maintained through regular communication and offering services. Many 
enterprises also worked with local actors - be that local politicians or councils in charge 
of the Gram Panchayat (census village) in which they were working. 
 In addition to these informal relationships, enterprises partnered directly with 
government or engaged them as a part of their supply chain. Partnerships with 
government took the form of joint projects or related programmes, such as a training 
centre. These differ from the partnerships outlined above, which are explicitly 
partnerships with external organisations in order to access policy benefits. Partnerships 
with government may provide benefits, but they additionally indicate positive 
relationships with government agencies. Another approach similar to partnership is 
integrating government into the supply chain. Two enterprises referenced this feature. 
In one case, the enterprise desired the government to act in the role of distributer, and in 
the other case, they were already providing their systems to a governmental 
organisation for that purpose. In all these cases, the focus of this tactic is on 
encouraging a relationship between the enterprise and government, whether for 
immediate or future benefit. 
5.3.4 Engagement: Lobbying 
 Lobbying is a central, but ill-defined, aspect of the literature on corporate 
political action and public relations. There is a general consensus that lobbying is an 
action that enterprises take towards the government in order to influence policy, but 
what form that action takes is up for debate (e.g. Schuler 1996; Polk & Schmutzler 
2005). For instance, lobbying has been defined as providing information or alternatively 
as financial transactions  (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Mathur and Singh, 2011). Within this 
chapter, lobbying is defined as when enterprises interact with government actors with 
the aim of shaping policy outcomes, as opposed to other relationship-building activities 
that do not aim to change policy. Under this definition, we see enterprises offering 
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information, giving collective and individual feedback, championing policy and being a 
member of an industry organisation.  
 Feedback can be given individually or collectively, through informal or formal 
channels. This differs from championing policy, which focuses solely on suggesting 
particular policies ideas and offering support for policy changes, although of course 
they are related. In terms of collective feedback, the key industry group is the Clean 
Energy Access Network (CLEAN), which offers support to its members through 
networking, as well as lobbying government agencies.  
5.3.5 Engagement: Monitoring 
 The final tactic for engagement can be challenging to identify within the 
interviews, in part because of its ubiquity. Monitoring includes watching for and 
anticipating the actions of government. Therefore, in the interviews it is described by 
actions such as anticipating, having awareness, and waiting. Weidenbaum identifies a 
similar concept, described as “positive anticipation” (Weidenbaum, 1980). In Getz’s 
typology, it would be considered being “proactive” (Getz, 2002). It is an active 
monitoring of the policy landscape. 
 Anticipation describes thinking through the actions, or potential actions, of 
policymakers and considering where an enterprise might fit into the government’s 
conception. This can be based on a kind of political calculus or technical reasoning. For 
instance, the government might be interested in minigrids that are suddenly making a lot 
of money, and may try to capture the benefits of such a business model innovation. Or 
else, the technical challenges of future integration of solar systems with the grid may 
cause a company to anticipate redundancy, rather than integration. Awareness of policy 
is an integral aspect of monitoring, and almost all enterprises expressed a thorough 
understanding of the policy landscape in their field. 
 Deciding to wait and see the outcomes of policy negotiation or change was 
framed as an active decision within the interviews. This was not described as a passive 
activity, but an active choice. In the case of ENT25, they prioritised other work over 
pursuing the benefits of recent policy change: 
“We have to see the details of [the policy], we are still eyeing for it, not that 
we are completely ignoring it, but again that's not top two priorities or top 
three priorities." (ENT25) 
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The enterprise is not disinterested in engaging with policy, but has lowered the priority 
of engagement, while still keeping an eye on government actions. In all cases, 
monitoring was the most common form of engagement.  
5.3.6 Disengagement: Avoiding 
 A strategy of disengagement can be achieved through two routes: actively 
avoiding government interaction or simply choosing to continue work without 
considering the government or the impacts of its policies. It should be noted that the 
interview data is robust enough to define these as separate tactics, but that in 
application, there is a great deal of ambiguity as to the characteristic of any one action. 
That is, it is clear that avoidance and not engaging are separate categories, but it is 
difficult to discern in many interviews which is being described. 
 Avoidance is generally unacknowledged in the literature on political strategy 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Getz, 2002), except in the case of 
Oliver’s institutional theoretical approach, which recognises avoidance as a response to 
institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991a). However, Oliver’s concept relies on deception 
given that the assumption is the engagement is mandatory. Once that assumption is 
dismissed, avoidance does not require deception, but only an effort to not interact. 
Within the data, few enterprises described avoidance, with the exception of the 
avoidance of the national grid. In avoiding the grid, enterprises avoid competition for 
electricity. Enterprises also avoided government by stepping in to work in regions 
where the central government was not inclined or able to work. 
5.3.7 Disengagement: Not Engaging 
 As opposed to avoiding government interaction, many more enterprises choose 
not to engage, a tactic that is not even within the conception of most political strategy 
literature, which views policy engagement as mandatory (Oliver, 1991a; Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999; Getz, 2002). This can include not engaging in programmes, talking to 
government or considering the government’s grid plans in their work. As described 
above, the government has a number of relevant programmes that might offer financial 
benefits to enterprises and their end users. However, many enterprises within the sample 
did not seek to engage in these programmes, often for one of three reasons: they were 
ineligible, the risk of policy change is too high, or they had previous, negative 
experiences working with the government. Additionally, enterprises chose not to 
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interact with government, in some cases because of the belief that working with 
government involved a set of skills that they did not possess, or engaging in bribery. 
Finally, a range of enterprises expressed a disinterest in where the national grid was 
going to be installed and a disinterest in adjusting their own marketing to account for 
the grid. The factors and mechanisms behind these decisions will be further explored 
below. 
5.4 Key Factors in Political Strategy Decisions 
5.4.1 Leveraging Policy 
 By examining the enterprises that use each tactic, this research elucidates the 
most common factors in determining political strategy. The characteristics of actors in 
the market influence their actions and how they are likely to respond to policy changes. 
In order to anticipate how the market might respond to a change in mode or incentive, 
policymakers must take into account the characteristics of market actors.  
 In the case of leveraging policy, three enterprises bid for government tenders 
(ENT11, ENT23, ENT13), two within the DDG Scheme, however, only one enterprise 
(ENT23) reports regularly winning such tenders. Currently, three enterprises are 
receiving, or planning to receive subsidies through the National Solar Mission (ENT32, 
ENT21, ENT24), although that number used to be higher. Four enterprises previously 
received the subsidy, but no longer do (ENT11, ENT26, ENT27, ENT14). Finally, three 
enterprises described progressively doing more work in grid connected areas or with on 
grid systems (ENT11, ENT23, ENT32). However, four additional enterprises also do 
off grid work in grid-connected villages (ENT24, ENT21, EN14, ENT31). 
 Perhaps the main factor in engagement is eligibility, which is a required, but 
not sufficient, precondition for involvement in these programmes. Eligibility for bidding 
for tenders includes criteria about enterprise turnover, age, and experience, in addition 
to technical requirements for the solar systems that will be installed. These requirements 
prevent smaller companies from bidding for tenders. For the JNNSM, similar eligibility 
requirements are in place, but they focus more heavily on the technological 
specifications, which have become increasingly stringent (ENT11). The technological 
focus of each policy limits the companies that currently provide SHSs. These 
enterprises can only avail themselves of the DDG tender process, and only the largest 
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(ENT23) regularly bids on DDG projects. It should also be noted that ENT23 is the only 
public sector organisation in the sample. Similarly, minigrid companies are those that 
receive the national solar mission subsidy, which is currently only providing capital for 
microgrids and minigrids. However, eligibility is not sufficient reason to engage with 
the programmes. Two minigrid companies should be eligible for JNNSM subsidies but 
do not report seeking them (ENT13, ENT14), and two large SHS enterprises might be 
eligible to bid for DDG tenders but expressed no interest in doing so (ENT22, ENT26). 
The reasons that these enterprises do not seek to engage are further explored in the 
section 5.6. 
 Within the category of these enterprises that do engage, there were several 
aspects of risk hedging that took place. ENT13, which is a panel manufacturer that 
occasionally bids for non-DDG tenders, found that partnerships were a safer way to 
access the financial benefits. They cancelled their bid, and instead sought to partner 
with the company that had won it. In that way, they did not have to go through the 
costly and difficult process of applying, but were still able to get the work. In other 
cases, ENT13 inflated their anticipated cost for bid, so that they would be able to 
financially cover the cost of the project if the subsidy was held up for years, a 
commonly cited occurrence. The reason behind these actions was clear in all interviews: 
policies are unreliable and difficult to access. This has been cited for the hesistancy of 
minigrid enterprises to apply for the JNNSM subsidy: “There are certain reasons, but 
the procedure is so winding, that we do not avail of that subsidy” (ENT21; emphasis 
mine). Policy risk and its impacts will be explored further in section 5.6. 
 Negotiation is only a major part of ENT23’s approach, which as a public sector 
organisation negotiates with the central government when detailing their annual plan, in 
order to assure that priorities are aligned. However, ENT27 did negotiate with 
NABARD as the JNNSM SHS subsidy was failing, in order to try to ensure that their 
self help groups would continue to receive the subsidy. It is notable that ENT27 does 
otherwise have a close relationship with the central and state governments in enacting 
other non-energy related policy programmes. This suggests that negotiation is more 
likely in enterprises that already have a close relationship with the government and 
enterprises that are viewed as key implementation actors. 
 Finally, enterprises may follow incentives towards new populations, as in the 
case of the general trends towards taking on more work in grid connected areas – either 
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with off grid or grid-connected systems. Those enterprises that work with off grid 
technologies in grid-connected areas may be taking advantage of a new host of 
customers that grid expansion has created: those with unreliable access (Harish, Morgan 
and Subrahmanian, 2014b; Urpelainen, 2014). Technology has a large role to play here, 
in that it is larger solar home systems and minigrids that are typically employed in 
unreliable grid areas. Then there are those who do on-grid systems as a portion of their 
business, such as ENT11, ENT13, and ENT23. There is little connecting these players, 
in that they are all of different sizes, enterprise and organisation types.  
5.4.2 Building Relationships 
 Those enterprises that make connections at the central government level differ 
from those than focus on state governments or local relationships, mainly due to 
technology and capacity. Rural electrification policy is drafted by the Government of 
India, and the off grid component is implemented through state nodal agencies, 
typically the state’s renewable energy department. State governments also have their 
own priorities and policies, which may overlap with those of the central government. At 
the local level, Gram Panchayats (census villages) are run by a local council, who have 
jurisdiction over many of the rural villages in which these enterprises work. Within this 
sample, six enterprises described relationships with the central government, eight 
described relationships with state governments and four mentioned relationships with 
local political actors, as can be seen in Figure 5.2 below.  
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Figure 5.2: Relationships with levels of government  
 Relationships can take the form of partnerships, sharing information or 
offering help. In order to build relationships, enterprises sometimes described doing 
services for officials, as a way of creating a good impression: 
“But the whole point is he's the [bureaucrat], he's staffed with like 2, 3 
people. You see the number of files in his rooms. I send him like 2, 3 
proposals every month, because I'm this obnoxious guy. He reads them, he 
likes me. But he's like, 'uh you're here again, are you going to make me 
work? today is not a good day'. I basically tell him, 'sir, what is happening?'. 
I actually make a proposal for him […], and one of my guys will go and 
defragment his disk because that's the IT that's stressing him out - that's 
because we are smart salesmen.” (ENT11) 
An enterprise that works in dangerous areas explained that they regularly bring the 
government inspectors, who must check on the sites before the subsidy is dispensed, to 
the sites themselves: 
“They are very difficult areas. They're difficult terrain-wise and 
compounded with the conflict kind of a situation, so - and they're quite 
happy that we're working there and doing something. And we don't have a 
civil government option coming there and when I have to take them for 
inspection, I actually escort them to those places because they feel safer 
with us.” (ENT32) 
Another enterprise suggested that they give small gifts to local officials as a way of 
working with them: 
“And I'm learning to speak their language. That's all. I say clearly, you want 
watch? I'll get you watch. That's all. Forget what happens from here to here, 
you give me, you have watch coming out.” (ENT31) 
These types of exchanges were described at the central, state and local level. No 
enterprise explicitly discussed bribery, but only made oblique references to not feeling 
comfortable working with the government.  
 Technology seems to be the key factor in local engagement. Almost all 
enterprises had some kind of relationship with government, even very casually. 
However, only those enterprises working with minigrids went into detail about local 
engagement. ENT32 explains that this is because minigrids require buy-in from local 
authorities: 
“We speak to the village, because these are difficult areas where the 
government grid does not run. So instead of permission to take, we speak to 
the villagers arriving once - even if in a normal areas which is not a conflict 
area. I think that we will still take the okay from the local village Panchayat 
- the village head man and the village committee.” (ENT32) 
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Outside of local authorities, minigrid enterprises place a greater emphasis on 
community relations:  
“In some cases, the ESCOs already had long-standing relationship with 
these communities because they do some other kind of work there, they are 
setting up these mini grids so there the community relationships are already 
there. Some progressively make their community relationships stronger 
after setting up the mini grid, so it's a mixed, but the relationship with the 
community is something which the ESCO at the local level, the last mile 
level has to do.” (ENT21) 
As a price must be agreed upon for the power, this is partially an aspect of business 
model. Community agreement, including local politicians and committees, is a 
prerequisite for the projects.  
 Six enterprises mentioned partnerships as a part of their activities, almost 
exclusively with state governments. Where partnerships are required in order to take 
advantage of those policies – as in the case of ENT27 – this is categorised as partnering 
to hedge political risk, as noted above. Three partnerships focused on particular off grid 
projects, whereas three others did not. Those that did not included a partnership 
between ENT24 and the state government of Bihar on skill development training, 
multiple partnerships between ENT22 and states on particular projects related to their 
non-energy products, and references to a partnership between ENT25 and the 
government for distribution. Those enterprises that were involved in off grid project-
based partnerships were ENT29 (technically, a government organisation), ENT28 and 
ENT23.  
 Partnerships occur in order to take advantage of differing capabilities across 
sectors. Kolk et al summarise neatly what each party typically brings to the table:  
“Companies provide specific knowledge and expertise, NGOs the local 
embeddedness and contacts, and supporting activities such as training and 
capacity building, while the government supplies funding, usually to reduce 
risks, and facilitates the activities.” (Kolk, van Tulder and Kostwinder, 
2008) 
Within the sample, the enterprises that partnered with government for projects were 
predominantly NGOs (ENT22, ENT28), social enterprises (ENT24) and public sector or 
government organisations (ENT29, ENT32). This area is not well explored by Kolk et 
al, which focuses on partnerships with private enterprises, and therefore does not 
consider the prevalence of government-NGO partnerships (Kolk, van Tulder and 
Kostwinder, 2008). However, much of the same logic applies. These enterprises are 
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those most likely to share priorities with government, while still providing 
supplementary competencies. For instance, ENT24 is a social enterprise, which means 
that their interest is in providing both social benefit as well as making a profit (Sengupta 
and Sahay, 2017). ENT24 is in a partnership with the Government of Bihar: 
“Yes, we are - we have relationship with the Government of Bihar for 
training, and like the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy they have 
Surya Programme, that is for solar technicians, we have run one post and we 
have government, they have deputized their state nodal agency so they are 
also providing how they are connecting and that's all. …so basically, we 
have a center, a skill development center that works for government 
programmes.” (ENT24) 
ENT24’s interest in social benefits marries well with the Government of Bihar’s desire 
to improve the solar technical capacity of the state, but the Government of Bihar 
requires the enterprise’s technical competency in order to roll out the programme. 
 All of the enterprises included in this work have a range of technical, business 
or social capabilities, and yet, there were few government partnerships. Why is that the 
case? A look at the capacity of those who engage in the most robust partnerships (ie size 
and longevity) suggests that the size of the enterprise is a key factor. ENT25’s 
partnership with government consists of a single reference to using third parties for 
distribution, and given that they were in their pilot stages, this government partnership 
for distribution appears to be in a nascent stage of development, if it is currently 
functioning at all. The other enterprises that engage on projects were much larger: 
ENT24 is a medium-sized company, but ENT22, ENT23 and ENT28 were all large or 
very large. I define size in this study by the scale of output, ie household electrification. 
ENT29 is a small organisation, but is in fact the government actor with which ENT23 
and ENT28 partnered. It is likely that a degree of size is needed to have the capacity to 
work with government: 
“[Respondents] also pointed at the paradox that smaller companies might 
have a greater need for government support, while larger companies will be 
better able to establish and maintain contacts with the government and its 
various Ministries. It seems difficult for smaller companies to handle the 
complexities, deal with bureaucratic procedures and afford the time and 
money needed to invest in these relationships.” (Kolk, van Tulder and 
Kostwinder, 2008) 
This alludes to a broader theme within strategy decision-making: capacity. It is possible 
that size is a proxy for capacity in this case, which Getz describes as one the primary 
organisational limits to achieving desired outcomes (Getz 2002, p 307). Partnerships, 
like engaging with policies, require far more man-hours than monitoring or 
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transactional lobbying, which may be a one-off exchange (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). In 
summary, technology and size (as a proxy for capacity) are the main factors in the 
extent and focus of a enterprise’s relationships with central, state and local government. 
5.4.3 Lobbying 
 Lobbying is the tactic most discussed in the corporate political action literature, 
and so there are many theories about the reasons for, and limiting factors in, lobbying 
(e.g. Getz 2002; Hillman & Hitt 1999; Hillman et al. 2004; Lawton, Rajwani, et al. 
2013; Mellahi et al. 2016). Lobbying here is defined as seeking changes to policy 
through petitioning, or giving feedback to, government officials or ministries. This can 
be individual feedback and championing of policy, or it can be collectively given 
through industry or trade groups.  
 When enterprises described the types of feedback that they gave, it was 
apparent that the key focus was on improving their access to policy. For instance, 
ENT11 is too small to take on a whole DDG Scheme tender of 150,000 solar home 
systems: 
“So we went back to the UP [Uttar Pradesh] and said 'break this tender up 
into 5 parts' - 30,000 each. Have it going to the district where you're going 
to implement it, have it going to the technology you're going to implement 
it, and then price it.” (ENT11) 
Similarly, ENT24 gave representation to the Government of Bihar on an upcoming 
minigrid policy: 
“[Uttar Pradesh] have brought very good policy, and Bihar is still in draft 
stage, so that is the status as of just now. There are not very many - state 
governments that have set out a clear cut policy - UP was the first one - and 
Bihar is following suit, but still in the draft stage, they have sought inputs 
from all the stakeholders, and still the policy, it is not out.” 
As an enterprise that works solely with minigrids, they stand to benefit from any 
supportive policies in the states in which they work, which in this case is Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh. From this perspective, both resource dependence theory and institutional 
theory provide adequate explanations for why lobbying takes place. The former asserts 
that political action is used to reduce uncertainties, while the latter claims that 
enterprises are trying to claim legitimacy and institutional resources (Getz, 2002).  
 Enterprises within the sample put different levels of emphasis on feedback 
within the interview. Nine enterprises describe regularly giving representation to 
government, with the intention that this representation should improve the policy 
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environment (ENT11, ENT28, ENT21, ENT23, ENT13, ENT26, ENT14, ENT24, 
ENT25). One enterprise very briefly mentions giving feedback (ENT12), and five 
enterprises do not describe giving feedback at all (ENT22, ENT31, ENT29, ENT32, 
ENT27).  
 While enterprises usually champion policies to benefit themselves, it is likely 
that their philosophical orientation as an NGO or social enterprise drives engagement 
even where direct benefit does not exist. Four enterprises championed specific policy 
positions, either with the aim of capturing benefits or because policy engagement is a 
part of their mission (ENT11, ENT21, ENT25, ENT28). However, several enterprises 
seemed to champion policies even where they were unlikely to directly benefit (ENT21, 
ENT28, ENT25). For instance, ENT28 places a great deal of emphasis on promoting 
rural development in the government, despite the fact that they receive no central 
financial assistance: 
“ENT28 has a vast experience of implementing different kinds of renewable 
energy models, which includes development of entrepreneurship, 
development of various technologies, connecting with different 
manufacturers, working with government on policy side, etc etc. So this is a 
very unique institution, where you will find people working on policy side, 
working at the grassroots level, so we have people working from grassroots 
to government.” (ENT28) 
This is in keeping with their mission as an organisation, which aims to promote clean 
energy through a range of activities, including policy advocacy and consultancy. 
Therefore, the larger scope of their organisation’s mission is a contributing factor to 
their political strategy. Likewise, ENT21 and ENT25, have limited financial support 
from government (ENT21) or none at all (ENT25), but both have a strong philosophical 
orientation towards improving energy access, rather than promoting their own work to 
the exclusion of others. Therefore, political advocacy is important to the organisation 
independent of their own benefit from it. It is possible that an enterprise’s social 
mission has greater weight in this particular context because of low instances of 
competition. No enterprise described competition outside of the tender process, and 
most enterprises had a more cooperative approach, engaging in partnerships, sharing 
information, and collectively giving representation through the industry trade group. 
Therefore, advocating policy that might aid another enterprise did not appear to be a 
zero sum game for enterprises. 
 On the subject of trade groups, 11 of the 15 enterprises are members of the 
industry organisation, the Clean Energy Access Network (CLEAN). Started in 2014, the 
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group’s mission is to “bring together diverse stakeholders across India working to 
improve energy access for the rural and urban poor and create an inspiring model for 
countries around the world to follow,” which it aims to do through connecting 
enterprises with investors, policy advocacy, developing technology standards and 
guidelines on capacity building (CLEAN, 2018). Enterprises particularly brought up 
CLEAN when discussing providing government feedback: 
“At central level also, there are many organisations also, we are a member 
of CLEAN…So there're 4, 5 organisations which keep some annual 
meetings. So this question of off grid every time comes, because most of 
them are based in Delhi, they're able to bring people from MNRE also. And 
sometime they try to get people from Ministry of Energy also. So this issue 
keeps on getting discussed, that what are the issues, what are the problems, 
and sometimes we give feedback also. But this happens. State level, it's not 
happening.” (ENT12) 
Essentially, membership of CLEAN provides greater access to the central government, 
based on its connections and Delhi location, whereas CLEAN’s membership has diverse 
locations across India. In a developing context, business associations can also make up 
for the capacity deficiencies of weak states, providing legitimacy to industry actors and 
improving coordination for political actors (Moore, 2001b; Pinkse and Groot, 2015). 
 Within the enterprises interviewed, there is no clear evidence of the main 
factors impacting membership of CLEAN. However, there are a few attributes, which 
may contribute to this decision. We can see that the two government-related 
organisations (ENT23, ENT29) are not members. Additionally, other non-members 
include larger organisations and those with a stronger state-focus. It makes sense that 
those enterprises that are less interested in influencing central government would not 
see value in membership. Literature on CPA regularly assumes that larger organisations 
may have less to gain from membership, as they have the capacity for individual, 
tailored representation (Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004). However, these traits also 
exist within the organisations that are members. When asked, an ex-executive of 
CLEAN described a different set of factors: 
“I'm not interested in the kind of players who spend 10% of their time on it. 
At least about 40-50% of their attention is on energy access, […] the other 
thing that gets left out is there are lots of these start ups that are cropping up 
here and there, […] so we did this workshop two weeks ago to link energy 
companies and micro finance, it was focused on the North East, but we had 
players from Assam and Manipur. We didn't have Himachal Pradesh, we 
didn't have Nagaland, we didn't have Mizoram, we didn't have Meghalaya. 
So I don't think that means that there's nothing happening there, it's just that 
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means it's so much more remote and they're not in the mainstream and we 
don't know about them.” 
Essentially, he believed that the current membership list was representative from most 
perspectives, but may have missed smaller enterprises or those from more 
geographically remote regions.  
 However, given the strong membership numbers (122 organisations at the time 
of writing) and the compact number of players in the India off grid market (40-60 key 
players), it is perhaps an indication of the importance of industry groups within this 
context (Singh, 2016a; CLEAN, 2018). Firstly, as mentioned, industry groups play a 
crucial role in developing markets by compensating for institutional voids, as suggested 
by institutional theory (Moore, 2001b; Sinha, 2005). Secondly, as a nascent industry, 
off grid solar technologies are often provided by smaller organisations, which the 
resource-based view would claim are more likely to be members of business collectives 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Getz, 2002). The fact that CLEAN focuses on the development of 
technological standards and capacity building reinforces this vision of the industry as a 
young one, still developing (CLEAN, 2018). Finally, this is also an industry with a high 
expectation of government interaction, given the years of experience of government 
interventions in support of both rural electrification and solar energy. Resource 
dependence theory supports the claim that industries with a greater reliance on 
government for resources, will have a greater incentive for engagement, which may 
translate in this case to greater membership of the industry group (Hillman, Withers and 
Collins, 2009).  
 There is little clear relationship between almost any known factor and the 
degree of emphasis on lobbying, with the exception of size. All but one of the medium-
large scale enterprises gave a moderate to high emphasis on feedback. It is possible that 
larger scale enterprises have a greater capacity, but it is equally likely a matter of data - 
that larger enterprises are more likely to have a relational lobbying style, which is more 
likely to be discussed within the interview. Lobbying may be transactional (one-off 
exchanges) or relational (based on long term relationships) (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). 
For instance, a transactional approach might be like ENT24’s feedback on a single 
relevant policy: 
“In that - in case that policy comes through, it has got certain negatives for 
us. And we have given our representation, hopefully they should take care 
of those areas.” (ENT24) 
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Whereas a relational approach is closer to ENT25’s example of maintaining 
relationships with the hope that they will be useful in the future: 
“We are still talking to government agencies to, so that we get traction 
somewhere - that's the point.” (ENT25) 
Ironically, in the example above the smaller enterprise (ENT25) describes a relational 
approach, and the larger (ENT24) is describing a more transactional approach. This 
suggests that size is not the only factor in determining which approach to use, although 
larger enterprises are expected to follow a transactional approach, which requires more 
capacity to sustain a long term relationship (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Relational 
approaches are more likely to show up in my data, because of the length and intensity of 
the engagement, rather than a one-off example of when feedback was given. Therefore, 
the data does not give us any clear cut answers about the factors that influence the 
degree of lobbying, but might suggest that enterprises with a greater size are more likely 
to lobby government or else employ a relational approach to lobbying. Therefore, as in 
relationship building, human capacity is a key factor. 
5.4.4 Monitoring 
 The final tactic under the engagement strategy is monitoring, which describes 
maintaining awareness of ongoing policy development, changes to programmes and 
overall political awareness. This is a crucial political activity, as firms are limited by the 
knowledge of their options. Wilts explains that effective political strategising depends 
on “the ability of the firm to recognise context-specific opportunities to influence public 
decision making,” and that  “[e]ngaging in political action thus means that firms must 
carefully monitor their environment to find ways to translate their economic interests 
into aims and goals of corporate political action” (Wilts, 2006). This is because an 
enterprise’s political environment affects the importance of political action, and 
therefore the strategies that an enterprise might choose to employ (Keillor, Pettijohn and 
Bashaw, 2000). In particular, monitoring may play a larger role in sectors in which 
political developments are also seen as a threat, in order to mitigate policy risks 
(Baysinger, 1984; Wilts, 2006). 
 Unlike other forms of engagement, it is harder to judge the role that monitoring 
plays in each enterprise’s political strategy, especially through these interviews. 
However it is worth noting that all enterprises described monitoring, or at least 
displayed an active awareness of, policy. In some cases, enterprises were monitoring 
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specific forms of communication in order to take advantage of opportunities as they 
arose, such as ENT24 keeping an eye on upcoming subsidies: 
“So for the next set of sites, we're looking for government directive, on 
government circular, the government circular is out with, you put, the 
application online” (ENT24) 
In other cases, enterprises kept abreast of the government’s perspectives on the sector, 
differentiating how the government thought about off grid from their own opinions: 
“From the government side, as of now, I would say the focus is entirely on 
grid connected systems. We will see different policy as of now from the 
government side, and then there's a very little focus on off grid, honestly 
speaking. Their thinking is that the grid will reach to all the households, or 
all these villages by 2018. So they are working towards that. However, we 
at the institute think that there is going to be some issue, so we can also 
complement by our own action that is, you know, spreading the 
entrepreneurship or spreading the projects in the remote rural areas. So it's 
like, you know, government is doing through their own thinking, we are 
also doing through own thinking, but the goal is the same.” (ENT28) 
Even enterprises that did not specifically describe what type of monitoring takes place 
did express knowledge about, and interest in, the changing policy environment.  
 Given that, unlike other engagement tactics, monitoring appears ubiquitous, it 
is more pertinent to understand why this sector engages so heavily in this particular 
activity. Empirical evidence suggests why it plays an important role generally in 
crafting political strategy and mitigating policy risk (Baysinger, 1984; Keillor, Pettijohn 
and Bashaw, 2000; Wilts, 2006), but theory can give us greater insight into the 
importance of monitoring within this particular context. Resource Dependence Theory, 
as discussed in section 5.3, suggests that the high degree of policy attention given to 
rural electrification and solar energy will increase the importance of mediating policy 
risk, because enterprises will be more exposed to the vicissitudes of policy change 
(Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). In addition to having a greater incentive to watch 
for policy changes, monitoring has the lowest resource intensity of all the engagement 
tactics. That is, monitoring provides a great deal of potential benefit, without the 
capacity requirements of, say, building relationships with state governments 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Both these theories provide helpful, and complementary, 
explanations for the ubiquity of monitoring within the off grid solar sector. 
5.4.5 Avoiding 
 As we move on to disengagement strategy, it is important to note that an 
enterprise may choose to employ tactics from across strategies; they are not limited to 
Rural Electrification Policy and Off Grid Solar: Sector Engagement Strategies in India 
and Beyond 
  Victoria Anne Plutshack - November 2019 168
one approach. The first tactic in a strategy of disengagement is avoiding. Unlike the role 
of avoiding in Oliver’s study, avoidance in this case does not involve hedging risk in 
engagement, but instead actively keeping a distance between enterprise activities and 
regulated spaces (Oliver, 1991a). In this context, it takes the form of avoiding regulation 
and avoiding the national grid. Minigrid enterprises were those that predominantly 
discussed avoiding regulation through use of legislation on notified rural regions, which 
are areas in which private actors may offer power without tariff regulation (GoI, 2003). 
ENT32 expressed the desire to avoid regulation: 
“I think the biggest support [the government] could give me is to just stay 
out of my way at this point. Because they have all kinds of issues when they 
come in. Yeah, the further I am away from them the better it is working at 
the moment. […] once you come up with a successful business model there 
are all kinds of people who want to get into the game, and therefore you 
have a policy - or here, there is no government presence in those areas we 
work. They are very difficult areas.” (ENT32) 
As the enterprise touched upon, although the regulatory framework currently exempts 
most of the regions in which minigrids and microgrids are situated, there is a fear that 
success will bring regulation. In this way, technology is the key factor in which 
enterprises actively avoid regulation, but the broader reason is to avoid policy risk 
associated with tariff regulation. Although minigrid enterprises spoke most about this 
issue, it is equally relevant for those enterprises working now with microgrids. 
 Five of the 15 enterprises expressed a desire to avoid the national grid, whose 
expansion is the key feature of the current rural electrification programme (Niez, 2010). 
This policy risk is outside the ability of the enterprise to control, and therefore 
avoidance is a tactic to prevent damage to their business interests. Two of those 
enterprises discussed this in the context of their microgrid projects (ENT11, ENT28), 
two in the context of the work they undertook together on a very small minigrid 
(ENT23, ENT29), and one on the development of several of their minigrid projects 
(ENT21). If ENT28 finds that the grid has subsequently reached a village in which they 
have a microgrid, they claim to remove the system: 
“After that, we withdraw the system, if we see that it is not being used, and 
we shift it to some other locations.” (ENT28) 
Likewise, ENT21 describes minigrids being moved. 
“And we're seeing it - we have like 104, 105 plants in our portfolio - you 
would have seen at one point in time or another, at least 10% of them faced 
some problem or the other. So you take that call at that point in time, 
whether you should…The good thing is that it's modular assets, can be 
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moved around to another place. And 3 or 4 such occasions one of the 
ESCOs has done that, moving the assets from one to the other.” (ENT21) 
Although almost all minigrid enterprises described a business model that relied on 
working in grid-connected villages, many still actively avoided them. It is possible that 
the balance required between partial connectivity and demand is difficult to achieve and 
may be hindered by a lack of access as well as too much. For both minigrids and 
microgrids grid expansion and improvement is expected to change the pattern of 
demand, putting the current business model at risk.  
 Alternatively, ENT23 and ENT29 suggest that avoidance of the grid is not due 
to competition but instead a cooperative model of electrification that prevents a 
duplication of efforts. ENT23 primarily manufactures solar home systems, and has a 
few small minigrid projects. ENT29 primarily works to support solar home system 
projects but also worked with ENT23 on their minigrid projects in Bihar. When asked 
whether ENT23 ever works in grid connected areas, like many other solar home system 
enterprises do, they responded that “[t]here's no point. It's just wasted.” In these cases, 
the belief is that the government and these enterprises are working to electrify different 
areas. It is not surprising, then, that ENT23 is a public sector enterprise and that ENT29 
is in fact an organisation within Bihar’s state government. Therefore, it is not 
technology or enterprise type alone which determines whether an enterprise is likely to 
avoid the national grid, but instead a combination of these factors that determines why 
they choose to do so. 
5.4.6 Not Engaging 
 The second main tactic of disengagement is not engaging with government and 
policy. Unlike avoidance, not engaging does not need to be active, but can instead 
represent a range of attitudes from disinterest to disenchantment. Breaking down the 
most common actions of not engaging, we see that technology and ineligibility initially 
play a big role in which enterprises do not engage. However, upon closer inspection, 
fears about policy risk and poor past experiences explain why many enterprises have 
disengaged from electrification programmes. 
 All five enterprises that expressed ambivalence to the location of the national 
grid provided solar home systems (ENT11, ENT22, ENT29, ENT25, ENT27). For 
instance, ENT22 explained that there is demand for their solar home system even in 
grid-connected areas because their product provides a slightly different service – having 
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no need of fuel, and being available when the grid is unavailable. An individual might 
have multiple energy sources – kerosene lamps, grid access and a solar home system – 
in order to be prepared for all situations, essentially engaging in ‘energy stacking’. This 
is the argument for the continued demand for off grid products in grid-connected 
regions. All of these enterprises expressed this ambivalence solely in the context of their 
work with solar home systems. This is a fairly striking argument in favour of 
technology as the primary factor in grid ambivalence. However, there are enterprises 
that provide solar home systems solely for non-grid connected end users (eg ENT23). 
This makes working with solar home systems a sufficient, but not required condition to 
undertake this action.  
 Nine enterprises explicitly described choosing not to apply for subsidy or bid 
for tenders (ENT22, ENT21, ENT26, ENT31, ENT12, ENT24, ENT25, ENT27, 
ENT14). Ineligibility for programmes is the most commonly cited reason for not 
engaging with them, although several enterprises attempted to apply or bid before being 
turned away due to ineligibility. Ineligibility takes a variety of forms. Ineligibility based 
on technology was common within solar home system enterprises (e.g. ENT22, ENT27, 
ENT28), since the NABARD subsidy was cancelled when these interviews took place. 
This led to enterprises shifting technologies, end users and revenue sources, as explored 
in the previous chapter.  
 At the time of writing, the only subsidy available for solar home systems is 
through the electrification programme’s DDG scheme. Working through the DDG 
scheme requires enterprises to be eligible based on experience, size, turnover and age of 
the firm, amongst other similar requirements. As many of the enterprises in the sector 
are small to medium sized organisations, policies exclude most of them. This was 
echoed by ENT12: 
“One time [we bid] it was some technical issue, small technical issue. 
Otherwise our rate was higher. Plus most of the time we cannot even 
participate because the requirement is very high. Sometimes it's that you 
should manufacturer of system - we are only distributer - sometimes 
minimum turnover they put, so we normally don't qualify.” (ENT12) 
The enterprise no longer bids for tenders. Finally, ENT24 notes that applying for a 
government tender often has the prerequisite of having executed a government tender: 
“The second is, we would love to compete in that space, but the government 
tenders are never floated - they have a stupid condition that you should have 
won a contract and then executed that contract for a government 
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organisation, which we have not done to date. So though we are an enlisted 
channel partner of Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, but still our 
tender got rejected by the Jharkhand government on this premise that you 
have not got executed a project of the government.” (ENT24, emphasis 
mine) 
Obviously, this creates a circular situation in which an enterprise cannot bid for a 
government tender without having executed a government tender, which they cannot do 
without bidding for a government tender.  
 The Catch-22 relates to a broader discussion about the poor design of these 
schemes. Even if we assume that blocking the majority of players is in the best interest 
of end users, the construction of tenders was often cited as a reason for not bidding: 
“Nobody bid for those tenders. Because they don't know how to operate! 
[…] So [DDUGJY is] a programme which has two components, grid and 
off grid. In that the off grid model is through mini grids, the definition is 
you come put up the plant, that's the EPC part, and run it for 5 years and 
hand it over to a community organisation. It's extremely simple - they come 
in and put up and run it whichever way for 5 years, nobody monitors what 
they're doing for the consumers, what is the quality of the electricity, how 
they are being run, how the beefing up of community engagement is 
happening. And they pass it on to a VEC - village electrification - and is 
somebody training that committee? Does the committee know what to do 
when the electricity needs go up? Because we typically believe that access 
to electricity enables development.” (ENT21) 
ENT26 concurred that tenders were “designed to fail,” citing this as the reason that they 
do not bid for them. Essentially, the tenders were not constructed to be beneficial or 
operational for both the end user and the enterprise. Poor implementation was also 
evident in the responses about subsidies. Some enterprises are ineligible to apply for 
subsidy because they had not submitted documents in time: 
“So the process of application to, for these subsidies, is perhaps not 
transparent enough. Plus the players are so small and so insulated into their 
area of work in the remote areas, they're not sensitive enough. So that's one 
of the roles we play, we make them aware these are there, what is the right 
time to apply for. So if you are not applying at the DPR stage for the 
subsidy, so they can come monitor your land before the plant was built and 
after the plant was built. So the simple lack of knowledge about this itself 
can delay the process, and then they can come, so - amongst, so I have a 
status of subsidy here, I have 90, this is slightly dated December last years, 
so amongst 94 of my sites, 50 are not eligible because they did not apply at 
the right time.” (ENT21) 
Challenges meeting the timetable for subsidies were also discussed by ENT24, who also 
described the difficult process of applying as “so winding, that we do not avail of that 
subsidy.” Whether or not government is meeting its expected output targets of subsidies 
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awarded or tenders filled, it is clear that the priority is not on smoothing the way for 
enterprise engagement. 
 Finally, other forms of non-engagement might be considered as working in a 
complementary mode. Specifically, ENT32 steps in where the government will not 
work, and ENT28 chooses to work in parallel to government schemes. Starting with 
ENT32, they work in extreme rural regions that the government cannot: 
“… the government wanted us to do something in another district called 
Pururia, […] which is - used to be a stronghold of the Maoist movement, so 
these extremist groups operating from those jungles, hilly jungles. And 
therefore the government was not able to penetrate those areas. So we 
started work there in about 25 villages, and then expanded to 30 villages.” 
(ENT32) 
On the other hand, ENT28 provides solar home systems at the same subsidy rate as the 
government was under the national solar mission, intentionally mirroring their scheme: 
“So earlier, under the National Solar Mission, government had provision of 
subsidy of 40% of the benchmark cost. So that 40% benchmark cost was 
diverted through areas […] regional rural banks, and a lot of people actually 
bought the product through availing that subsidy, and that was one of the 
critical factor in promoting the off grid energy in rural areas. [We are] also 
adopting the same, similar kind of model. We also had similar kind of 
scheme, giving 40% grant to the end beneficiaries and so that they can buy - 
but our target was purely poor, poor and very downtrodden people. Those 
who actually are not able to pay.” (ENT28) 
In mirroring the scheme, the only thing they changed was the end user selection, which 
was based solely on need. As explored in Chapter 4, the inclusion of rural banks in the 
national solar mission’s scheme may have excluded those that are the poorest within 
these communities, and therefore, ENT28 is actually attempting a complementary 
scheme that addresses those that are not addressed by the plans of the central 
government. In which case, both ENT28 and ENT32 are not in competition with the 
government’s rural electrification programmes, but independently acting to complement 
them.  
 Taking a step back, why would enterprises choose not to engage? Why would 
they choose not to seek the potential economic and political benefits of working with 
government or taking part in government programmes? As is pointed out in section 5.1, 
several enterprises should be eligible for participation in these programmes, but choose 
not to (ENT13, ENT14, ENT24, ENT22, ENT26). And even those that are not currently 
eligible for programmes expressed additional reasons for not partnering or working with 
Chapter 5: Factors influencing the Political Strategy of Enterprises 
Victoria Anne Plutshack - November 2019 173 
government in other capacities (ENT12, ENT31, ENT25).  Perhaps the most common 
factor in discussions of political strategy within these interviews is policy risk. 
Enterprises are aware that policy can change overnight, and that past agreements with 
government may not be kept. As discussed in Section 5.1, this is a key reason for 
hedging risk when approaching tenders, as ENT13 does. 
 Negative past experiences with policy highlight this risk and was a key factor 
in disengagement. They were not necessary for disengagement to occur, but were 
sufficient. Take for example, the experience of ENT24, which felt that future attempts 
at bidding would be pointless: 
“No, we did not apply for the Bihar government, but we do - but the 
Jharkhand government, the need in much more. The off grid space in 
Jharkhand is really good vis a vis Bihar, because the area, the Naxal 
affected areas and the population is sparse, spread out. So there the off grid 
solution is much more in demand unlike Bihar so we thought that we will 
fill the bid and win the contract but it got rejected, so now we are 
disappointed that the ninth, that responding to Bihar tender is foolhardy, 
there's not point in wasting and dropping your money for six months and 
they keep postponing tenders, and for one year you keep looking and you 
relax, because there's no point.” 
ENT14 has a similar story. Given that bidding for tenders requires the human capacity 
to watch for contracts, organise the bid, and submit to a long, bureaucratic process, a 
feeling that bids may come to nothing (a regular comment) or that they will be 
cancelled, or that the subsequent subsidy may take five years, or may never come – all 
these narratives contribute to a strategy of disengagement.  
 Back to the subject of capacity, ENT12 explains the huge amount of working 
capital that is required to successfully carry through a bid: 
“So that's another problem, we cannot participate. Even if I qualify, I don't 
have that kind of working capital that I provide the system and I get 
subsidy, which is obviously, I cannot have margin of 50%, I am having 
margin of 20%. So 30% more I still have to pay from my pocket. So that's a 
problem. But presently, most of the schemes are operated like this.” 
The need for working capital may be just another hindrance for smaller organisations 
wanting to work with the government. Likewise, ENT31: 
“MNRE said, we will open the gates for any entrepreneur who wants to 
come and put a micro grid. And we will give them support. Forget all these 
tenders - you go to a village, set up a power plant and come and take 
subsidy from us. When this thing happened a lot of people tried to do that. 
[…] They enforced that you will have to come up with tariff regulations, 
you will have to come up with company to qualify, all that thing. Hence, 
now that work that was supposed to start, that also got stalled, because 
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they're put too much - like in very simple language - they put up too much 
[…] to a game which nobody wants to play. So nobody's coming, right?” 
It also marries with the concerns that this money may never be repaid, as subsidy 
schemes get backlogged, and political winds change.  
 Finally, a handful of enterprises expressed the belief that solar products no 
longer needed a subsidy, which was the primary factor for ENT25 not seeking central 
financial assistance. In this case, non-engagement was less a reactionary approach, and 
rather a view of solar systems as market ready and rural end users as customers rather 
than beneficiaries. Therefore, government attempts at financial support were seen as 
unnecessary.   
 In summary, the largest factors in influencing non-engagement are technology 
and size. These could be seen primarily as proxies for eligibility, but even enterprises 
that are eligible or have been eligible for programmes in the past, choose not to work 
with government. Enterprises cited a variety of reasons, including poor design and 
implementation, policy uncertainty, the need for working capital, a lack of trust in 
government, and the negative impacts of including subsidy within a business model or 
market. The characteristics of an enterprise buffer or expose the organisation to these 
factors in different ways. Therefore, it is the interaction between the policy climate and 
the enterprise’s characteristics that shape their political strategy. 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
5.5.1 Conception of Political Strategy 
 The findings of our grounded theory approach suggest that strategies for 
leveraging – or choosing not to leverage – policy are active parts of a firm’s political 
strategy, which is neglected by the focus on nonmarket strategy. As Figure 5.3 
articulates, there is space for the exploration of another definition of political strategy – 
that which incorporates the market and nonmarket aspect of engaging political actors 
and policy.  This offers a new, expanded definition of political strategy. 
Political strategy is usually conceptualised as including political action and non-market 
strategies that improve the political standing of a corporation (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Mellahi et al., 2016). This research takes a wider scope in order to also look at what 
factors influence engagement or disengagement with government programmes, which is 
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conceptualised as another political decision. This is possible because working within the 
JNNSM or DDUGJY is optional, and therefore a calculation of risk and benefit. By 
widening the scope of political strategy, we can explore the factors that influence all 
levels of engagement, and offer suggestions for improving the policy design process to 
take these factors into account. 
 
Figure 5.3: Positioning of Political Strategy in this chapter 
 Although Baron, referenced above, does not specify where government 
contracts fall in his conception of market vs nonmarket strategy, we might assume from 
his focus on the economic value of market strategy that this is where we might place 
contracts and subsidies (Baron, 1995). In Schuler et al 2002, government contracts are 
seen as a dependent variable, as one might consider ‘public policy’ in Hillman et al 
2004 (Schuler, Rehbein and Cramer, 2002; Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004). 
However, incorporating government contracts into a business’s market strategy is 
another form of political strategising, reliant as it is on degree of dependence that a firm 
chooses to have on government. Therefore, Figure 5.1 places government contracts, as 
well as applying for subsidy, opting into government programmes, or partnering with 
government on projects as market strategies that also fall under political strategy. 
 Following McGrath’s definition of CPA as the “actions by firms which are 
intended to influence government policy”, then the work of CPA overlaps, but does not 
encompass, that of public affairs within the firm (McGrath, Moss and Harris, 2010). 
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The aspects of public affairs that focus on wider social relations fall outside of political 
strategy. Finally, some literature refers to business-government relations, which at first 
glance appears to fit neatly on the definition of political strategy that this chapter is 
attempting to construct. However, despite brief overlap (notably Meznar & Johnson), 
business-government relations primarily refers to the political economy of particular 
industries (Schneider, 1998; Mo and Moon, 2003; Meznar and Johnson, 2005; 
Cammett, 2007). Therefore, this chapter takes the definition of political strategy to be 
the combined actions of an enterprise towards government actors or policy. This is an 
expansion of the definition from previous studies, which have focused on what 
strategies businesses have taken to creating a favorable policy environment, without 
considering how they take advantage of their policy environment.  
Even taking the definition to be limited to affecting the policy environment, it is unclear 
that including leveraging policy falls outside of ‘affecting the environment’, because it 
implies that the policies only affect their targets, and not that the very act of engagement 
with them does not affect the iterative process of policymaking. Take for instance the 
Namibian example from Chapter 2, in which the successful implementation of a solar 
programme through local shops embedded those same shops in future programmes. 
The traditional approach to political strategy taken by past literature is partly a product 
of the context in which it is studied (see Dahan, 2005 for why it was not studied in 
France initially). In the North American context, it has focused on industries that were 
subject to taxes and regulation, for which engagement is mandatory, such as in the steel 
industry (Schuler, 1996; Bonardi et al., 2005). In a context where the engagement with 
policy is not mandatory, it makes more sense to view the option of engagement as an 
aspect of political strategy.  Engagement with public policy is a part of political 
strategy, as such actions forge relationships between the company and the relevant 
ministry and claiming political legitimacy (Kernaghan, 1993; Suchman, 1995).  
 One counter argument is that this definition of political strategy blurs the line 
between political strategy and traditional business strategy, as it is articulated in the 
business model. However, the two are interrelated, as Osterwalder’s business model 
canvas neatly sets out – the political strategy of a firm is a part of its business model, 
and parts of the definition of political strategy find themselves elsewhere in the business 
model (ie partnerships) (Osterwalder, 2004). Therefore, to envision the two concepts as 
separate is to reimagine political strategy as only lobbying. Incorporating the full 
Chapter 5: Factors influencing the Political Strategy of Enterprises 
Victoria Anne Plutshack - November 2019 177 
breadth of actions towards government, as well as policy, allows for a more accurate 
interpretation of how companies function in a space with mixed government 
involvement, high policy uncertainty and a greater dependence on policy support. Key 
Factors 
 The factors that attribute most to determining political strategy also shed some 
light on the inadequacies on the current political strategy literature and its 
accompanying theory. Size, technology and philosophy appear to be the most prevalent 
factors in determining political strategy. It is likely because these enterprise attributes 
may be considered proxies for organisational capacity, eligibility to participate in 
government schemes, prioritisation and the degree of policy risk inherent in their 
business model. More specifically, size may be a proxy for capacity (as in sections on 
engaging, relationships, lobbying) or for eligibility (as in section on engaging). 
Technology influences the degree of policy risk (as seen in the relationship between 
technology, the grid and disengagement tactics). Technology can also be a proxy for 
eligibility (as in section on engaging). Finally, philosophical orientation, related to 
enterprise type, may have an impact on enterprise priorities, leading to a lesser or 
greater emphasis on championing policy (as in lobbying). 
 What are the factors that contribute to the unique pattern of political strategies 
within the off grid solar sector? Size plays a large role in the popularity of some tactics, 
as opposed to others. For instance, monitoring is very popular, as opposed to 
relationship building, which may be related to the prevalence of small and medium 
scale organisations, as explored below. Additionally, the strong influence of 
government policy on the sector may have an impact on the importance of monitoring 
or relationship building, as opposed to other sectors that lack a history of dependence on 
subsidy, or ongoing government attention.  
 Conceptually, the prominence of size in political strategy suggests that there is 
probably an overemphasis in the literature on actions that require greater capacity, such 
as lobbying and relationship building. Those less time intensive tactics may deserve 
more attention, such as monitoring. Perhaps more interestingly, the importance of 
philosophical orientation suggests that the assumptions around political strategy are 
flawed. Political strategy assumes that enterprise’s are self-interested, suggesting that 
any attempts to generally improve the policy environment are a trade off between self-
interest and improving the environment for all firms (Getz, 2002). A good political 
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strategy can be viewed as a “competitive tool” (Hillman and Hitt, 1999, p 826). 
However, many enterprises included are social enterprises or NGOs and competition 
within the sample was very low. Therefore, some enterprises prioritised activities that 
would benefit all actors, potentially as a social good in and of itself. Social enterprises 
are increasingly prominent in LMIC, development sectors, and so our assumptions 
about political strategy as a zero sum game may be challenged in these contexts. 
5.5.2 Policy Risk, Resource Dependence Theory and Disengagement 
 Past typologies have focused exclusively on active, positive political strategies, 
entirely missing the reality that strategies can also include active, negative strategies, 
namely: disengagement. As clearly described above, this is not a lack of having a 
strategy, but instead a decision taken by rational actors to avoid or ignore government 
activities. Avoidance is an option in International Business studies, where countries are 
able to choose their environment, but any option of disengagement is absent from the 
most popular typologies of political strategy (Hillman et al. 2004; Getz 2002; Lawton, 
Mcguire, et al. 2013; Oliver 1991). Only Oliver’s typology of strategic response to 
institutional pressure includes ‘avoid’ as one of its five responses, offering up 
concealing nonconformity, buffering and escaping from institutional oversight as three 
tactics for avoidance (Oliver, 1991a). One possible reason for the under-appreciation of 
disengagement strategies is that government ‘support’, be it subsidies or tax incentives, 
appear to essentially be ‘free money’ for the organisation. Why would enterprises not 
seek to gain benefits from the government, especially in a context in which the MNRE 
have been supporting both the technology and the end users in question?  
 Resource dependence theory explains the rational active, negative response to 
that question. RDT posits that enterprises will be more engaged if their work depends 
on capturing government resources, ie. central financial assistance (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Getz, 2002; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). As a side effect of 
that dependence, enterprises are at the whim of policy changes, which may negatively 
impact their ability to capture those resources, ie. policy risk. Therefore, resource 
dependence theory allows us to see political strategy as a multidimensional decision that 
balances risk and potential rewards (through engagement and not engaging) with 
specific tactics for mitigating risk (through, for instance, lobbying). The degree to 
which enterprises are exposed to policy risk is influenced by some of the factors 
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discussed, primarily technology. Enterprises working with grid-based technologies must 
negotiate the expansion of the national grid, which can be highly unpredictable in when 
and where it arrives. Current engagement also increases political risk, which is a reason 
to follow a strategy of disengagement. In that case, an enterprise is not taking advantage 
of potential financial benefits, but also does not expect significant, and unpredictable, 
disruptions. 
 Conceptually, then, the chapter argues strongly in favour of incorporating 
disengagement into the conception of political strategy. The benefit of doing so is more 
than capturing a fully picture of reality. By identifying disengagement, it allows us to 
actually ‘see’ disengagement as something quantifiable, and to characterise a lack of 
action as something other than unavoidable. By which I mean, if disengagement is a 
strategy, then we can evaluate why actors choose it. It releases us of the assumption that 
actors must engage, and if they are not, it is because they are unable. This leads us 
nicely onto the topic of eligibility. 
5.5.3 Eligibility, Institutional Theory and Legitimacy 
 Eligibility does more than maintain quality implementation, it also has the 
potential to undermine the direct contracting programmes that rely on competition. 
Eligibility, as discussed above, is a critical component of all current off grid 
programmes run by the Government of India. Enterprises must prove their eligibility, 
but evidence from the interviews suggests that enterprises often apply to programmes 
before being rejected for not meeting requirements. Rather than see eligibility as simply 
a pre-requisite to access the benefits that policy provides, we can use institutional theory 
to unpick the ways in which eligibility requirements aim to enhance the legitimacy of 
enterprises and rural electrification programmes, and explore the importance of this 
legitimacy in our specific context. 
 Institutional theory focuses on the way in which institutions permeate society. 
In the context of organisational research, institutional theory sees enterprises as reacting 
to institutional pressures, but also sharing in the same social construction of norms and 
practices that define how enterprises function (Oliver, 1991a; Haanyika, 2006; Tian, 
Hafsi and Wu, 2009). According to institutional theory, firms engage in CPA in order to 
promote their own legitimacy and take advantage of institutional resources (Getz, 2002; 
Lawton, Mcguire and Rajwani, 2013). In this context, legitimacy can mean a variety of 
things, but we can take Suchman’s definition: 
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“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” (Suchman, 1995) 
 What does this have to do with eligibility? Eligibility requirements, and the 
certification that an enterprise can receive upon meeting them, confers a degree of 
legitimacy to the enterprise. Even in the debate between strategic-legitimacy and 
institutional-legitimacy, we can see evidence within this example. In strategic-
legitimacy, legitimacy is claimed and exchanged for benefits, as in how certification 
gives an enterprise access to engagement and potential benefits. In institutional 
legitimacy, legitimacy is part of a broader shared belief system between institution, 
organisation, and the public (Suchman, 1995). An enterprise receives legitimacy 
through meeting criteria and participating in programmes, while the government 
simultaneously maintains the legitimacy of the programme itself by only working with 
enterprises that reach these stringent requirements. This is legitimacy at the macro-
level, rather than solely being a judgement within an individual’s mind, it is the 
collective judgement of an organisation (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). In that way, 
legitimacy is created by eligibility requirements. 
 This concept may have greater importance in the Indian context, in which 
relevant organisations take a variety of forms (NGOs, SEs, etc.), and the government 
faces implementation challenges more common in emerging markets (ie. poverty, 
corruption). A pocket of literature explores legitimacy particularly in the case of novel 
institutional arrangements in developing countries, specifically the role of foreign 
NGOs and the rise of public-private partnerships (Atack, 1999; Börzel and Risse, 2002; 
Lister, 2003; Bäckstrand, 2006; Kapiriri, 2012). Its relevance is also elevated by the 
challenge of weak institutions, which may require additional work to assert their 
legitimacy (Kapiriri and Martin, 2007). It should be noted that while weak institutions 
are a challenge for many low-income countries, defining the nature of India’s own 
institutions is much more complex (Sinha, 2005). Nevertheless, eligibility requirements 
do not simply serve to improve implementation, but also have a role in improving the 
perception of an enterprise’s own legitimacy within the workplace, as well as ensuring 
the legitimacy of government programmes that supply public goods to the country’s 
poorest. 
 This leads to a co-creation of legitimacy that keeps certain enterprises ‘in’ and 
certain enterprises ‘out’, therefore accruing benefits for the same organisations. There 
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are pragmatic reasons for doing so, but this system creates enterprises that hog all the 
benefits, which is especially noteworthy when those enterprises are public sector 
enterprises. An anecdotal example comes from complaints that there was only one 
enterprise that was still eligible for accreditation after new stringent technology 
requirements. This enterprise, who was not a part of my sample, happened to be an 
organisation that had been supported by ENT23, the public sector enterprise. Bias 
towards a few organisations hamstrings the competition that is the base assumption of 
the DDG scheme. 
Another way to look at institutional theory is through the lens of entrepreneurship 
literature, where much of what we would call ‘mitigating risk’ or ‘coming in where the 
government does not’ could be considered bricolage. Bricolage refers to the cobbling 
together of resources to create something new, and is often discussed in opposition to a 
strategy of optimization. Optimization refers to an enterprise focusing on acquiring the 
best possible resources with the aim of creating something that is more valuable than 
the sum of its parts (Desa and Basu, 2013). Enterprises in LMICs may be under 
additional incentives to take a strategy of bricolage, given the different challenges to 
access resources and market opportunities in extreme conditions, such as higher 
transaction costs or discouragement from pursuing certain markets because of the 
“inherent inability for firm to efficiently compete, given the higher costs of operations” 
(Khoury and Prasad, 2016, pg 941).  
These challenges often arise from a lack of supportive institutions, which act of 
resource gatekeepers (Desa, 2012). Enterprises can be both the agents upon which 
institutions act, and influence the shape of those institutions, and bricolage may just be 
one way in which enterprises “mitigate the lack of institutional support” (Desa, 2012): 
“In emerging markets as well as in underdeveloped economies, the explanations offered 
by institutional theory can be strengthened by incorporating the role of informal 
practices that fill voids in the formal institutional structure. Not so much as an 
immediate mechanism of institutional change, but as an alternative, slower process of 
actor–initiated institutional transformation” (Desa, 2012, pg 742) 
Although he does not go into detail, Desa is discussing political strategy: the influence 
of actors within the market on its institutions. In this context, bricolage includes 
“informal practices that fill institutional voids” through mitigating risk or seeing 
potential where the government has not. Optimization would be determining what 
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specific a policy goal would be – ie. getting included in the DDG scheme – and 
focusing resources on achieving that goal. 
 What we see in these interviews follows the bricolage approach much more 
consistently than optimization. A great example is ENT32, who described moving into 
areas in which the government could not reach. This was not just in order to avoid the 
government, but also to take their work to populations that were deemed ‘impossible’ to 
reach. The result was that the government now relies on ENT32 to bring them to these 
regions, which can often be dangerous. This is an excellent example of how bricolage 
may be possible because social enterprises may have a different conception of what is 
possible than established organisations (Baker and Nelson, 2005). It is likely that the 
high percentage of social enterprises in our sample explain the emphasis on bricolage 
approaches.  
5.5.4 Implications for Policy Design  
 By understanding how and why enterprises engage with policy, policymakers 
may be better able to design policies that intentionally support and engage the 
organisations with which they aim to participate. For instance, if a ministry wishes to 
take advantage of new technologies being used by small and medium-scale renewable 
energy enterprises, understanding that resource intense activities will hinder 
engagement allows policymakers to choose more inclusive policy designs. Literature on 
non-market strategies and corporate political action aim to answer questions about why 
government engagement occurs and how effective it is (Getz, 2002; Lawton, Rajwani 
and Doh, 2013). In this context, the concept is primarily of interest to organisations and 
scholars. However, by opening up the concept of ‘political strategy’ to include the take 
up of or disengagement from government programmes and schemes, the concept also 
becomes a useful tool for policy design. Ideally, using this framework to understand the 
strategies of target enterprise populations, government actors can improve the efficacy 
of their policies. 
 Political strategy also plays a part in the broader argument of this thesis. 
Findings in the previous chapter suggest that policy intervention changes the enterprise 
landscape, which may transform the market into one with different characteristics from 
those assumed in the initial intervention. In turn, this may impact the efficacy of policy. 
As explored here, how that market transforms is partially influenced by the engagement 
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that the actors have with policy, as determined by their political strategy. While a 
variety of enterprise characteristics factor into strategy decisions, they do so in a manner 
consistent with resource dependence theory and institutional theory. As with the 
previous chapter, this suggests a degree of predictability in the level of engagement a 
market might have with policy based on its characteristics. Therefore, while the broader 
thesis of unintentional shifts to the enterprise landscape might suggest that policy 
interventions are necessarily flawed, the findings from this chapter offer a way of 
thinking through potential unintended impacts and improving policy design. 
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6 END USER SELECTION AND 
TARGET CUSTOMERS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 As of writing, the Government of India has officially electrified every 
household in the Saubhagya scheme (GoI, 2018). This aggressive expansion has been 
due in part to the Government’s belief that electricity is a “basic human need” and the 
“key to accelerating economic growth, generation of employment, elimination of 
poverty and human development” (MoP, 2006b). While the programme may be at its 
end, for the enterprises that implemented it, the programme was always just one part of 
their activities, which must now continue without it. 
 All enterprises must decide where they will focus their work, whether it is the 
state they choose to headquarter in, the characteristics of the regions they target, or the 
individuals to whom donated or subsidised panels are given. This is perhaps even more 
so the case with microgrids and minigrids, where the individual villages are selected by 
the enterprise, in conjunction with the community. The characteristics of end users 
targeted by India’s main RE programmes and those that are targeted by enterprises can 
be a test of whether their interests align. As a fair metric of the success of RE 
programmes is their ability to reach end users, and enterprises play an important 
implementing role in these progammes, this alignment has implications for the 
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effectiveness of policy. Who are the target populations of rural electrification policies 
and off grid solar enterprises, and what factors influence which populations are 
targeted? 
 A brief note on methodology for this study can be found in section 6.2, 
followed by the outline of dimensions of selection in section 6.3. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 
apply those dimensions as a framework to analyse the role of selection in rural 
electrification policy and off grid enterprises. Finally, section 6.6 concludes with a 
discussion of selection in financing and the implications of these findings on inequality 
and policy design.  
  Literature on targeting the poor has focused primarily on a single dimension: 
per capita wealth (Prahalad and Hart, 2001; Kolk, Rivera-Santos and Rufín, 2014). 
Through using grounded theory to see how customer selection is actually 
conceptualised in a market that targets the poor, this chapter offers a more nuanced 
conception of targeting that allows for multiple factors at multiple levels. It also 
provides a way of testing the alignment of actors in the space. Past research has also 
focused on whether electrification can improve development and gender equity, with 
much less attention being spent to the role of inequality even within off grid access 
(Alstone et al., 2011; Khandker et al., 2014; Urpelainen, 2014; Aklin et al., 2017b). 
This chapter offers insight into the necessary inequalities in the market, casting doubts 
on the equity assumptions related off grid electrification. 
6.2 Methodology  
 Like in chapter five, this chapter first uses grounded theory to create a 
construct of the ‘target population’, which is then used to compare the target 
populations of programmes and enterprises. Primary level codes were the building 
blocks for further abstraction, which creates the dimensions of selection. Primary 
coding asked, ‘what are the target populations for this organisation?’ These primary 
codes are verbatim text from the interviews. Secondary codes are the categories that 
they fall into: namely, individual, village, region, state, demand, demographics, 
geography, need, and grid access. Tertiary codes are selection level and selection 
criteria. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 compile these concepts. 
 In section 5, three key REPs are explored against these dimensions, using 
government interviews to expand on the contemporary intentions of the main 
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implementation bodies.  Government interview responses and primary sources are 
categorised according to the dimensions in the framework. Likewise, in section 6, 
enterprise interviews are categorised according to the dimensions of the selection 
framework, and then compared by technology. Finally, the role of selection in financing 
and inequality is discussion in section 7, using interview data from all three interview 
types.  
6.3 Dimensions of Selection 
6.3.1 Dimensions of Selection 
 Within the interviews, including with experts and government officials, 
selection can be broken down into two dimensions: selection criteria and selection level. 
These dimensions can be seen in tables 6.1 and 6.2. A full word table is found in 
Appendix 4. Selection criteria are the characteristics that organisations use to target end 
users, and they are: demand, need, grid access, demographics, geography and attitude. 
Selection criteria are interrelated, and are the criteria used by enterprises, financing 
bodies and the state and central government. Additionally, there are four selection 
levels, which are the granularity at which selection takes place: by individual, village, 
region or state. These dimensions provide a framework by which to explore how 
government programmes, technology and financing target specific populations. 
6.3.2 Selection Criteria  
6.3.2.1 Demand 
 One of the most common factors in selection is demand, which, while related 
to need, focuses on the economic desire for electricity, meaning that if a solar system is 
available, the end user would hypothetically be willing and able to pay the price for it. 
Demand was most frequently cited as a factor when discussing the microeconomics of a 
project or business model, particularly where the enterprise was looking for productive 
or commercial loads as part of the model. Where business models looked for productive 
or commercial loads, these were favoured over domestic connections, as their demand 
for power was greater and less seasonally dependent:  
“…our first priority is the commercial guys because the probability of their 
staying with us throughout the season … Because residential customers 
during winter, they'll cut off, they'll say no I don't want to recharge or they'll 
reduce the wattage…So we are not denying residential customers, our mix 
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is 60-40. 60% commercial, 40% residential and at places it is the other way 
around. 40% commercial, 60% residential.” (ENT 24) 
The potential for commercial demand was also considered. For instance, one enterprise 
working with minigrids looked to play an active role in ramping up demand, “look[ing] 
at various kinds of interventions for load ramp-up.” (ENT21) Finally, the role of grid 
connection on demand will be addressed in section 6.4.2.3. 
6.3.2.2 Need 
 For some enterprises, the greatest decision factor was need, which could be 
defined as a lack of electricity access or a lack of ability to pay for such access. While 
need and demand are similar, need was based on factors related to socioeconomic 
status, such as wealth, caste and gender. Several enterprises went out of their way to 
incorporate women, both as end users and village level entrepreneurs, such as ENT 27, 
an enterprise selling SHSs: 
“So the idea is that people who is actually very poor cannot afford to buy 
the renewable energy technology upfront. Second, they cannot avail the loan 
also, even they have the capacity to pay installment, the bank will not 
provide them loan, so that's another challenge. So basically, working with 
the different SHG groups, self help groups of women, we basically tried to 
push this technology, and promote this technology, create awareness among 
the women and poor class that this technology is really helpful for you.” 
6.3.2.3 Grid Access 
 Almost all enterprises took grid connectivity into account when deciding where 
to work. In some cases, it was perceived that grid connection would lower willingness 
to pay and that it reduced the end user’s need for solar technologies. Grid access was 
fundamental in targeting customers:  
 “So now that reality is going to change, that is our assumption. I would say 
strategy has to factor in the changing reality of time. The changing reality of 
time is that every village is going to be grid connected, so you switch over 
to commercial hubs who are in need of reliable and good quality power, 24 
by 7. And this is our focus now. “ (ENT24) 
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Primary 
Dimensions 
Secondary 
Dimensions Example 
Selection Level 
Individual 
ENT uses a “rigorous selection process” for choosing the 
beneficiaries within a region to be electrified Most areas are 
about 30% relatively wealthy and 70% poor The systems 
go first to: 1) HHs with school going children, 2) single 
women and 3) not rich people, but poor people “Rich 
people will throw it away”, but you will find poor people 
“appreciate ENT23" (ENT23) 
Village 
“So what is the density of households? What is the existing 
commercial load, if any? Are there any institution which are 
doing well? ....So when we do the site study, we include all 
this, and also see the projection of energy use based on 
these parameters. Then we select the village, identify the 
site for the ESCOs. So when the village will come up, 
typically there is a lot of scalability, because of its 
positioning within a cluster of villages.”  (ENT21) 
Region 
“ We have sort of 3 locations - we have a tribal community 
lab in Orissa, an urban community lab in Bangalore and a 
rural community lab in Manipal, which is on the coast of 
Karnataka. And the idea was that each of these labs are 
imbedded in the areas, or the kind of communities that they 
work in so that it's easier to gauge what the needs are.” 
(ENT33) 
State 
“Rajasthan, geographically is completely different than 
Bihar. Bihar has population density. Bihar has no other 
economic pull factors other than electricity. Bihar is very 
very politically alive and active. Rajasthan is just the 
opposite. It has umpteen numbers of solar days - they have 
very large, dispersed communities. So the entire strategy of 
meeting the energy needs in Rajasthan is very different 
from what a Bihar would be doing.” (ENT21) 
 
Table 6.1: End User Selection Construct Table: Selection Level 
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Primary 
Dimensions 
Secondary 
Dimension
s 
Example 
Selection 
Criteria 
Attitude Once those are done then come back and see that within the site 
assessment you find that some at the judgement level you just 
knock them off, based on certain dynamic. 
Demand “The sec nd part is the demand. So I think d fini ely the demand 
is omewha dependent on the grid connection and al... But even 
then, I thin  there is sufficient demand. Choose the right location 
and I believe the demand is there.”  (ENT14) 
Demograp
hics 
“Where people don’t live in clusters, stand alone systems are 
appropriate” (REC) 
Geography “...the way we modeled out this whole mini grid scenario was 
that there'd be a private operator who would set up this mini grid 
in remote rural areas and the private sector party will raise its 
own financing and the [redacted] would also get in some 
concessionary finance for helping set up this mini grid, in the 
form of debt, concessionary debt.” (ENT21) 
Need “So we did it with the help of DFID funding, and right now we 
are doing it with some of the corporates. So the idea is that 
people who is actually very poor cannot afford to buy the 
renewable energy technology upfront…So basically, working 
with the different SHG groups, self help groups of women, we 
basically tried to push this technology, and promote this 
technology, create awareness among the women and poor class 
that this technology is really helpful for you.” (ENT28) 
Grid 
Access 
“Northeast, because the grid power cannot reach the remote 
locations of Northeast of India, so we are working with 
Northeast organisations for that. It's still going on, as we are 
talking, they are installing our kits. So Northeast we again are 
focusing on because they need electricity and they have been 
devoid of basic electricity for so long. So I personally would like 
to have them have electricity as soon as possible.”  (ENT25) 
Table 6.2: End User Selection Construct Table: Selection Criteria 
 In other cases, grid connected villages were sought out. This was because grid 
connected villages often had greater commercial or productive activities, which 
increased their demand and made providing power more profitable. The low quality of 
the grid in these areas leaves unmet demand for solar technologies to address (Sovacool, 
D’Agostino and Jain Bambawale, 2011; Harish, Morgan and Subrahmanian, 2014b). In 
one instance, this was called “energy stacking”, where a household may have multiple 
energy sources to meet its needs. 
 Essentially, targeting customers based on grid access can be either a proxy for 
demand or for need, but as it is not always possible to disentangle the criteria, it is 
considered as an independent category. As an independent category it has unique 
relationships to other concepts, such as anticipation. In all cases, grid connectivity was 
linked to a change in the end user’s expectation. Where this was damaging to sales, the 
anticipation of the grid lowered demand and a grid connection raised the expectation of 
what power could do, beyond simple home lighting. On the other hand, the expectation 
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of the grid could be greater than reality. One enterprise, which has done research on this 
topic, found that demand decreased before the grid arrived and then increased again 
after the village was connected, because the quality of the grid’s power was less than 
expected (ENT25).  
6.3.2.4 Demographics 
 Selection made on the basis of demographics focused primarily on population, 
population density, and the clustering of households, hamlets and villages. These 
criteria were related to technological applicability, efficiency and profitability. For 
example, ENT12 has the intention for their products “to go to at least each village 
which has a population above 2000.” 
6.3.2.5 Geography 
 In the case of geography, organisations make determinations based primarily 
on how “remote” or “rural” an area is. In many cases, this is to imply that the area has 
little to no grid connection, is agricultural, poor or difficult to physically reach. Such as: 
“the way we modelled out this whole mini grid scenario was that there'd be a private 
operator who would set up this mini grid in remote rural areas” (ENT 21). It should be 
noted that the Government of India’s grid expansion plans and DDG scheme rely on a 
mixture of geographical and census (demographic) data, which will be explored further 
in section 6.5. 
6.3.2.6 Attitude 
 In several interviews, enterprises expressed the importance of the attitude of 
prospective or current states, end users and entrepreneurs. At the state level, some 
states, such as Rajasthan, were regarded as having a pro-business attitude. Rajasthan 
was also regarded as supportive of solar technologies, while beliefs about the attitude of 
Uttar Pradesh were based on the interviewee’s opinion of the state’s new 
Minigrid/Microgrid Policy. Attitude at a more individual level mattered particularly to 
enterprises that used village level entrepreneurs, as ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ was 
important. Finally, the attitude of end users was also taken into account. One enterprise 
expressed the opinion that people who needed the technologies had a better attitude, 
particularly that they were more appreciative (ENT 23).  
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6.3.3 Selection Level 
6.3.3.1 Individual 
 Selection takes place at the individual level to provide highly subsidised solar 
home systems, select local entrepreneurs, and provide financing. Government 
programmes or donor-based projects were the only examples of individual level 
selection for end users, outside of financing. In these circumstances, individuals were 
selected for their socio-economic factors, such as gender, caste and poverty (ENT23). In 
addition to end users, those enterprises using village level entrepreneurs are making that 
selection at an individual level, usually taking into account attitude, capacity and 
gender. 
 However, many of the enterprises that provided solar home systems have 
connections with banks or microfinance institutions, which do select individual 
beneficiaries. Banks and microfinance institutions are interested in the individual’s 
capacity to pay back a loan, and so much of their decision-making revolves about 
wealth and income, and they leave out the poorest of the poor (Hermes and Lensink, 
2011). At least one enterprise implied that social status, such as caste, also makes a 
difference in accessing loans: “so in effect about half of [our potential customers] would 
get the loans. And mostly we saw the pattern that the half that got the loans were also 
the top half of the community. And also sometimes it would also be religiously or 
community motivated” (ENT 11). This is explored further in sections 5 through 7. 
6.3.3.2 Village 
 In this case village-level selection refers to both Gram Panchayat villages, 
according to the Indian government’s definition, as well as smaller habitations such as 
hamlets. The main factors for enterprises that select which villages to market or work in 
are demographics, geography, grid connectivity, demand, and need. Villages are most 
frequently selected using census data as sites in which to set up minigrid or microgrids: 
“So first we do desk research and we identify the exact villages on the basis 
of the census data, and other triangulated data from other databases. We put 
that data together and say, okay, within these states, this state's block, 
villages, these are the ones…and then there are site assessment surveys that 
are carried out on the ground.” (ENT21) 
The Government of India, as discussed in section 5, also uses this data to select which 
villages require DDG technologies, and therefore which villages will receive subsidised 
systems. As above, attitude also becomes a factor where enterprises incorporate village 
level entrepreneurs into their business model. 
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6.3.3.3 Region 
 A region could be considered larger or smaller than a state, based primarily on 
a geographical area, but is usually a smaller area. Most frequently, regions are cited in 
relation to remote areas within a state. The key difference between regions and states is 
the relationship to government. Selection at a regional level never references the role of 
the state government or local authorities. Regions are selected as areas in which to 
create regional offices, search for potential sites, and market or distribute the product, 
with the expectations that higher percentages of potential end users are in the region. 
6.3.3.4 State 
 India is constituted of 29 states and seven union territories. Although this 
research focused primarily on Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, many enterprises 
were present in multiple states, and described the factors that influenced where they 
worked. State-level selection is typically discussed as an issue of need or profit, 
depending on the priorities of the enterprise. For one social enterprise, need was the 
driving factor:  
“Part of the reason [we are not in Rajasthan anymore] is that our focus has 
been more in terms of the more energy starved areas like Bihar and 
Jharkhand, UP, Orissa - our focus is on these states. So Rajasthan we have 
not focused much.” (ENT 14) 
Other factors, such as demographics or grid connectivity contribute to either creating a 
state with a great need for DDG solutions or where profitable demand can be found. 
State government attitudes and policies are occasionally a cited factor in state-level 
selection. It should also be noted also that enterprises regularly changed the states that 
they were working in based on policy or business model changes. 
6.4 Features of Selection in Government of India Policy 
6.4.1 Selection in National Rural Electrification Policy   
 The decisions that governments make about the intended recipients of policy 
influence the range, price and sustainability of the technologies made available to end 
users. Using the framework of dimensions developed in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, this section 
compares the level and criteria of selection for the three most commonly cited 
electrification programmes within the interviews. Findings suggest that selection in 
these policies is primarily driven by the aim to address the needs of the poorest 
populations, and do so by selecting beneficiaries based on geography, demographics 
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and energy access. However, working with banks to provide financing for the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission introduced contradictory selection criteria that 
focused on the ability of the end user to repay the loan (Table 6.3). 
 It is important to note that these interviews took place February-April 2017, 
before Prime Minister Nahrendra Modi announced the Pradhan Mantri Sahaj Bijli Har 
Ghar Yojana (Saubhagya) in September 2017, which aimed to electrify all households 
by December 2018. This new policy addresses several of the criticisms leveled against 
previous electrification programmes, namely the definition of village electrification. 
However, it destabilises the future of off grid energy in India. 
 Selection Level Selection Criteria 
 Indi Village Region State Need Dem
and 
Grid 
Access 
Demo Geo Atti 
Notified 
Rural 
Regions   
x  x    x  
DDG 
Scheme  x   x  x x x  
JNNSM  x x   x      *NABAR
D bank 
financing 
x    
*Wealth, caste, etc. as a proxy for ability to 
repay loan 
Table 6.3 Selection Dimensions in Rural Electrification Programmes 
6.4.2 The Electricity Act, 2003 
 Notified rural regions aim to facilitate access for those in need by using 
geography as a proxy for access at the regional level. The designation of notified rural 
regions from The Electricity Act, 2003 plays a role in the work of microgrid and 
minigrid enterprises. In Section 14, the Act stipulates that a generator or distributer of 
electricity does not require a license in one of these rural areas: 
“Provided also that where a person intends to generate and distribute 
electricity in a rural area to be notified by the State Government, such 
person shall not require any licence for such generation and distribution of 
electricity, but he shall comply with the measures which may be specified 
by the Authority under section 53” (GoI, 2003) 
Essentially, the state government selects regions that allow for non-government 
electricity generation and distribution based on geography as a proxy for those end 
users with the greatest need for private electricity grids.  
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6.4.3 RGGVY & DDUGJY (2009-2015 & 2015-2019) 
 The current DDG Scheme selects villages based on demographics, geography 
and grid access in order to reach those with the greatest access and financial need. The 
intense expansion of access under the scheme is partly possible due to the triaging of 
villages into those which will be electrified by national grid expansion and those which 
will be covered by the government’s DDG programme, based on geography and 
demographics (MoP, 2013b). The aim is to ensure that all villages are receiving 
electricity, even if grid extension is not technically or economically feasible. Interviews 
with officials reinforced the assertion that the national grid expansion was priority, but 
that geography made reaching some villages impossible and that those villages were 
given off grid technology. The expectation is that they will not be able to afford or 
access these technologies on their own. 
 Electrification of these villages are then contracted out to private and public 
sector enterprises, with a large subsidy (between 60-85%) available for the end user 
(MoP, 2013b, 2015). The final number depends on the subsidy provided by the State 
Government and the socio-economic status of the state (MoP, 2013b). Tender-based 
implementation focuses the availability of DDG and financial support to just these 
villages, which the government believes have the greatest need for technology and 
subsidy to access it.  
6.4.4 Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (2009-Present) 
 The off grid portion of the JNNSM provided subsidies in order to promote 
energy access through NABARD, which selected individual recipients based on their 
likelihood to repay loans. In its original form, it offered a 30% capital subsidy for off 
grid solar PV with a 5% interest bearing loan available through NABARD (MNRE, 
2017a). In 2014, the terms of the NABARD loan became a 40% subsidy for individuals, 
with the 30% subsidy available for minigrid or microgrid projects.  
 The scheme identified “energy access” as one of its thrust areas for its Phase II 
Off Grid Scheme, to provide solar energy in “areas where grid has not reached, or the 
areas where grid has reached but the electricity is not available” (MNRE, 2012a). In 
addition to providing financing for these under-developed areas, the scheme offers a 
much higher, 90% subsidy for “special states” that represent the most remote, deprived 
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and unstable states (MNRE, 2017a). Offering additional financing to these areas 
attempts to redress the disparity in their development. 
 However, NABARD’s provision of the subsidy and loan through rural banks 
introduced selection criteria that focused on minimising risk to the banks. Enterprises 
that worked with the solar home subsidy during that period reported difficulties in 
securing loans for prospective customers: 
“Which basically meant that the base of the base of the pyramid, the 
extreme poor would always be left behind. Because nobody would give a 
loan to the extreme poor, I mean it's very difficult for them … somebody 
who doesn't have land, somebody who's a migrant labour, somebody who 
doesn't have capital or livestock of any kind.” (ENT11) 
Without capital or a financial history, banks were concerned about the financial risk of 
providing the subsidy. One enterprise noted that the subsidy would only be provided to 
the self help groups that they were working with: 
“So by the bank financing was limited to self help groups even though the 
scheme allowed financing to individual members, but the banks were very 
focused that they would financed and the financing was done to SEWA self 
help groups.” (ENT27) 
 Self help groups already have financing experience in rural areas. It appears 
likely that the banks were attempting to mitigate risk by choosing ‘safer’ borrowers. 
ENT11 were also concerned that discriminatory practices were taking place: 
“Now we don't work with the banks that closely anymore. The banks decide 
- so the way it used to work is I would go to a rural community, or find 
people, make them sign up all these loan documents, right? And that would 
be be my job. Exhaustive loan documents. And I would figure out what 
would be the right product for them, and I would fill in my paperwork. And 
I would go to the bank with a big file, let's say 50 odd people, and we'll look 
at each file and they'll say, "this guy, no, we can't give it to him - this guy's a 
fucking thief. The guy, oh, I don't like his..." So about 30% of them would 
get shafted right at that point. Then when we would go back and try and 
collect the money, because now another 30% would fuck off, so in effect 
about half of them would get the loans. And mostly we saw the pattern that 
the half that got the loans were also the top half of the community. And also 
sometimes it would also be religiously or community motivated” 
Again, the banks seem interested to providing for the ‘top half’ of the community. This 
creates a tension between the aim of the programme and the way in which the 
programme is designed. For further discussion on the interplay between finance and 
selection, see Section 6.6.1. 
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 Technology 
(& Fin.) 
Minigrid Microgrid 
Selection 
Criteria - 
Demographics 
 So when we do site selection we focus 
on clustering. So what is the density of 
households? (ENT21) 
So when we go in for our 
electrification,… is we've look at 
hamlets and we electrify them. 
Because we know A) they're not 
getting electricity for a long time and 
B) the population of hamlets are 
increasing substantially so these are 
becoming permanent residences 
(ENT11) 
Selection 
Criteria - 
Geography 
So it was again - it has to be remote 
village, right?...So it needs to be 
looked at from both economic strata of 
the society, as well as how remote 
location. (ENT14) 
  
Selection 
Criteria - Grid 
Access 
 The changing reality of time is that 
every village is going to be grid 
connected, so you switch over to 
commercial hubs who are in need of 
reliable and good quality power, 24 by 
7. And this is our focus now. (ENT24) 
Earlier our biomass plants were 
primarily based in areas that had no 
grid, now that reality is going to 
change with the government promising 
every village is going to be grid 
connected. So earlier our offering was, 
I would say, meant for [not grid 
connected] people. One light point, 
one mobile charging point and a 
nominal fee of 100 rupees. (ENT24) 
Selection 
Criteria - 
Demand 
So we select those villages which have 
a high density of productive loads, and 
if given access to energy 24 by 7, 
whenever they wanted it, they would - 
their income levels would dramatically 
change. (ENT23) 
  
Selection 
Criteria - Need 
We go locate these guys who are 
underserved, who have poor access to 
power, to energy and they have a need 
of 24 by 7. (ENT23) 
Which basically meant that the base of 
the base of the pyramid, the extreme 
poor would always be left behind. 
Because nobody would give a loan to 
the extreme poor...So with micro grids, 
we've managed to break through that. 
Because now what happens is our 
micro grids (ENT11) 
Selection 
Criteria - 
Attitude 
It needs to be a good entrepreneur … 
Entrepreneurship, the location needs to 
be remote, and we know that the lights 
won't really come, or it's going to have 
an impact. And at least some 
willingness to pay. (ENT14) 
  
Table 6.4: Representative Quotations: Minigrids & Microgrids 
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 Technology (& 
Fin.) 
Solar Home System Financing 
Selection 
Criteria - 
Demographics 
So this is - now our intention was to go 
to at least each village which has a 
population above 2000. So we should 
have a presentation there - a 
representation there. (ENT12) 
 And mostly we saw the pattern that 
the half that got the loans were also 
the top half of the community. And 
also sometimes it would also be 
religiously or community motivated. 
(ENT11) 
Selection 
Criteria - 
Geography 
So in campaigns we also specifically 
target those regions. So this is our, this is 
a time when - the prior work is done to 
identify such villages and such areas so 
we can go freely in these next 2, 3 
months. (ENT27) 
CSRs who want to develop local 
markets in the regions where they 
have their manufacturing base do 
partner to provide subsidies to 
villages in the local region (ENT22) 
Selection 
Criteria - Grid 
Access 
In the summer months, what we also do 
is we have demo vans, which goes 
specifically to these remote areas, with 
very poor electricity connections. 
(ENT27) 
 In fact, one of our partners...who are 
also funding part of this...had a 
requirement that they would 
contribute only if there was no grid 
connection. (ENT14) 
Selection 
Criteria - 
Demand 
   So you do all of that, and then on 
that basis, on that data you do a 
business model at the unit level. And 
that unit level business model, if it 
sort of seems viable, then 
accordingly then you make that 
decision  (ENT21) 
Selection 
Criteria - Need 
We also had similar kind of scheme, 
giving 40% grant to the end beneficiaries 
and so that they can buy - but our target 
was purely poor, poor and very 
downtrodden people. Those who actually 
are not able to pay. (ENT28) 
You are able to reach the next level 
of customers with greater level of 
subsidies.... especially in semi-urban 
and rural areas your customer 
segment usually remains the same, 
with greater levels of subsidy you're 
able to penetrate that next level of 
the market. (ENT26) 
Selection 
Criteria - 
Attitude 
So I think one of the reason of success 
was, even for 2000 or 3000 rupees, 
[female VLEs] were happy because they 
were not earning and they were not 
expected to earn. But when we tried, we 
tried males. (ENT14) 
 I would go to the bank with a big 
file, let's say 50 odd people, and 
we'll look at each file and they'll say, 
"this guy, no, we can't give it to him 
- this guy's a fucking thief.”… So 
about 30% of them would get 
shafted right at that point. (ENT11) 
Table 6.5: Representative Quotations: Solar Home Systems and Financing 
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6.5 Features of Selection in Enterprise by Technology Type 
6.5.1 Features of Selection by Technology Type 
 The following section explores the dimensions of selection as they apply to the 
three primary technologies represented: solar minigrids, solar microgrids and solar 
home systems. Minigrids and microgrids, due to similarities in their fundamental 
structure, have certain demographic and geographic requirements (ie they require 
clustering) and have a focus on the village-level of selection. Solar home systems, due 
to their range of capacity and costs, also have a range of target end users. Therefore, 
aspects of selection are clearest when viewed through their methods of financing and 
distribution. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 provide some relevant quotations to supplement those 
present in the text. The sections below delve into the purpose and manner of selection 
for each technology type, relying on the narratives provided by the off grid solar 
enterprises. Table 1.7 should be referenced for the enterprise codes cited. 
6.5.2 Minigrids: Focus on demand 
 Interviews included six enterprises that worked with minigrid solutions, with 
most grids serving over 100 households. Four enterprises had minigrids in Bihar, three 
had minigrids in Uttar Pradesh, and only one had ever had a minigrid in Rajasthan. 
Other states that enterprises worked in included: Haryana, Jharkhand and West Bengal. 
 Minigrid enterprises make their selection at the village-level but the greater the 
capacity of the grid, the greater the requirements for the village economy. Minigrids 
have a single or hybrid power source – in this case, a solar or solar hybrid plant – with a 
grid connecting multiple users. Typically this requires multiple members of the 
community to pay for a connection or power, and so the enterprise must decide in which 
villages, or cluster of villages, to install and provide power. 
 Village level selection takes a number of factors into account, but interviewees 
focused on the load requirement for a village economy. Site evaluations or site 
assessments take into consideration geography, demographics, energy usage as well as 
anticipated demand changes using modeling software. The latter two factors were more 
important, with all interviews making reference to the importance of productive loads. 
For smaller minigrids, these loads were more often agricultural (such as a pump) and 
for larger minigrids these loads extended to commercial lighting and refrigeration or 
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small-scale manufacturing (such as sewing machines). This even extended to 
encouraging the demand growth: 
“So a business model to succeed needs to have consumers, needs to have a 
growing load and also works under the demand side, so then to see a 
consistent- So every plant has a life of about 10 years, how would the plant 
survive in a rural setting, how would the plant survive for 10 years, if you 
don't work on the demand side? So we actually look at various kinds of 
interventions for load ramp-up…So if someone's selling milk, you 
encourage them to look at the next level of, let's say, refrigeration, so that 
the shelf life of milk goes up, and then maybe to mechanize some part of it 
so that he can sell more, utilise more of its raw material, then progressively 
go towards making cheese, then maybe, an ice cream parlor….It just 
wouldn't happen by itself, so we call it inorganic enterprise development.” 
(ENT21-B) 
 The interest in fostering demand and in commercial loads mirrored the 
selection of grid connected versus off grid villages. Enterprises with smaller minigrids 
were less concerned with increasing demand. Enterprises with minigrids under 15kW 
looked for customers in off grid regions, whereas minigrid enterprises with >15kW 
capacity exclusively required grid connected villages. Larger minigrids sought out grid 
connected villages because they aimed to supplement the hours of grid electricity. 
Commercial and productive loads required more reliable grid access, and so would be 
willing to pay for additional access via the minigrid: 
“We go locate these guys who are underserved, who have poor access to 
power, to energy and they have a need of 24 by 7. They were provided with 
that kind of a facility, they would better their lot in terms of income levels a 
concern, livelihoods a concern. So we select those villages that have a high 
density of productive loads, and if given access to energy 24 by 7, whenever 
they wanted it, they would - their income levels would dramatically change. 
For instance, in most of our villages they have got access to power in just 
the last 6 months” (ENT32) 
The quality of access via the minigrid was described in similar terms to rural access via 
the national grid. The minigrid was described as providing up to 8 hours of service a 
day, using AC current and providing for commercial, agricultural, community and 
domestic loads. Within houses, access can still be as basic as a few lighting points. 
However, for larger minigrids domestic connections were not prioritised, and it was 
considered a more commercially viable business model with less domestic demand and 
greater commercial load: 
“…our first priority is the commercial guys because the probability of their 
staying with us throughout the season is much more vis a vis the residential 
customers…. So we would love to have more of commercial and less of 
residential for reasons of consistent revenue generation” (ENT24) 
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 These selection criteria – villages with high commercial or productive load – 
originate with the commercially driven business model. Every minigrid operator 
interviewed expected for the grid to generate revenue, at least enough to cover 
operations and maintenance. Most expected the minigrids to recoup costs completely 
and break even in between 7-15 years. For most of the systems, users paid after the fact 
based on their usage, but some charged a monthly rate in advance. Given that most of 
these are social or commercial enterprises, rather than NGOs, the emphasis on selecting 
villages with higher load profiles and expected demand growth is logical.  
6.5.3 Microgrids: Focus on Need 
 Microgrids serve around 40-60 households. Three of the enterprises 
interviewed installed microgrids of between 2-8kW capacity, each having installations 
in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar or West Bengal.  Microgrid enterprises also chose end users at 
the village level, but, as they do not expect 100% cost recovery, their focus is on the 
need of the end user. Instead of productive loads, microgrid enterprises focused 
discussion on the needs of their end users, who were characterised as domestic 
households with low ability to pay and little to no access to clean lighting. There is a 
degree of selection within such villages, since in most circumstances, an entire 
community must agree to a connection for a microgrid to be put in place. However, the 
focus of selection was on seeking remote geographies, clustered households and 
households without grid access. Clustered households, either in the form of a village or 
a hamlet, are required for the microgrid to maintain efficiency. Remoteness and access 
are related both to the willingness to pay and the need for clean lighting: 
“We actually focusing right now on those districts or pockets where the 
scenario is still not very good in terms of electricity condition. So we are 
focusing to reach out there, and then we will think of, you know. We are 
trying to reach out to the remotest area of the country.” (ENT 28) 
All enterprises explained that microgrids were set up exclusively in off grid areas, 
because this was where need for electric lighting was greatest. They actively avoided 
areas where the national grid was expanding and even claimed that where the grid 
arrived, they “withdraw the system, if [they] see that it is not being used, and [they] 
shift it to some other locations” (ENT28). 
 Microgrid enterprises claimed that their grids offered between 4-24 hours of 
electricity, although evidence suggests that 4-6 hours is more realistic (Schnitzer et al., 
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2014). They rarely offered more than domestic lighting and sometimes mobile charging. 
Microgrids utilised both AC and DC current. All of the microgrid enterprises 
interviewed collect money for their service, although it should be noted that no business 
model currently has recouped the full cost of the system. Working in off grid areas can 
be explained both by avoiding grid competition (business model) and the focus on 
serving needs (business philosophy). The link to business philosophy is also apparent 
when discussing end user selection. For example, ENT32 is an enterprise that is focused 
on preventing environmental degradation, and its microgrids were originally in place to 
serve areas with delicate ecosystems. They explicitly claim that environmental 
protection is an ongoing focus of their work. ENT11, quoted above, cites the difficulty 
in serving the base of the pyramid as one of the reasons they work with microgrids. 
Finally, ENT28 has a philosophical focus on “clean energy.” The expansion of the 
national grid, which interrupts their work, is seen in a positive light, rather than 
negatively impacting their model: 
“It's not a problem. The people have got the electricity so what is the issue 
now. We should be happy about it, so our, the programmes reason or 
mission also gets fulfilled. …Our idea is that people should get the clean 
lighting option. If they are having the grid, and they are using - they are not 
having the problem of indoor air pollution. So that's okay.” (ENT28) 
In this context, ‘clean’ energy refers not to total carbon emissions, but to air pollution in 
the home. The focus on a socially or environmentally conscious business philosophy 
impacts the areas in which they work, and the end users that they choose to work with. 
6.5.4 Solar Home Systems: Dependent on Financing and Distribution 
 Nine interviews were conducted with enterprises that had experience with solar 
home systems (SHS). The systems that they sold or provided had a capacity between 2-
80Wp, with most in the 10-60Wp range. At the lowest end, these systems provided light 
for a single point for a few hours. At the highest end, these systems had multiple lights, 
mobile phone charging, the ability to charge other devices and lamps, or a fan. A single 
outlier had enough capacity with multiple systems to power a radio, television or tablet 
for up to 2 hours. The market price for these systems was between 400-6000 rupees 
($5.60-$83.90), although many of them sold the systems at a subsidised rate, most 
subsidies coming from the enterprise or donors. Enterprises had installed between 115 
to 250,000 systems. 
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 Solar home system enterprises have a much wider range of selection criteria 
because there are many more business models in the market. The level and selection 
criteria are based on the method of distribution and the source of financing. Donor-
based models focus on need. These are models whose main source of financing are 
grants. In this situation, funding sources give a large donation, such as through the 
Corporate Social Responsibility scheme, and direct the enterprise to where and which 
recipients should receive the SHSs. In some cases, this is as selective as the enterprise 
surveying each individual in order to prioritise the marginalised. For instance, giving 
systems to women, lower castes, or the extreme poor. In essence, the focus on need can 
be extremely targeted. In its less selective form, donors may just aim to electrify 
villages near their factories or operations.  
 Village Level Entrepreneurship is a very common model for distribution. The 
enterprise will select and train local entrepreneurs who will provide the last mile 
distribution to villagers, educating neighbours, selling and monitoring systems. This 
model has a moderate level of selectivity. VLEs must have a level of ambition to do the 
work, but some organisations also seek to redress inequalities by selecting only women 
VLEs. In addition to supporting women’s employment, the sales for a VLE may be too 
little to support a family, and so a better fit for women working part time, as explained 
by a solar home system enterprise, which saw another enterprise having better success 
with women salespeople:  
“They used only ladies. So I think one of the reason of success was, even 
for 2000 or 3000 rupees, they were happy because they were not earning 
and they were not expected to earn. But when we tried, we tried males. 
Obviously they have an alternate job. They are bread earners in the family, 
they could not provide a sufficient basket so it didn't work.” (ENT12) 
In addition to some selection that takes place at the entrepreneur level, VLE models 
may include microfinancing, which also comes with its own set of criteria. For instance, 
several VLE-based models include microfinancing that comes from self help groups 
(SHGs). These groups were set up in 1985, and now there are over 2 million self help 
groups acting as microfinance agents across the country (Singh, Ruivenkamp and 
Jongerden, 2011). Additionally, wherever financing is required, a degree of selectivity 
is expected in order to manage risk. See section 7.1 for further discussion on the role of 
finance in selection. 
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 Finally, the dealership model focuses on regions with demand. In this model, 
SHSs are sold from the enterprise to multiple dealers who sell systems from their 
storefront or own distribution networks. Only one enterprise (ENT12) currently used the 
dealership model, and they had less knowledge about the customers that they sold to 
and essentially sold their product to any dealers who had demand for solar home 
systems. This was the closest that the formal market got to the informal marketplace. 
6.6 Discussion  
6.6.1 Enterprise user selection and financing 
 Greater sophistication in the end user selection construct allows us to see 
interesting patterns in financing. End user selection is heavily influenced by the 
financier of the DRE technology. The global need for increased access to electricity will 
cost much more money than international investment can provide, and cross-national 
studies on financing for energy access highlight the importance of public financing, 
through either direct investment or subsidies (Mainali and Silveira, 2011; Glemarec, 
2012; Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, 2013). Private finance will also be required to bridge 
the gap, but there are barriers to investment that are limiting private involvement, in 
addition to expected low rates of return (Glemarec, 2012; Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, 
2013). In part due to India’s Corporate Social Responsibility policy, much private 
investment comes in the form of donor-funded projects. Donor funding regularly came 
with stipulations regarding the selection criteria for the end user. For instance, one 
microgrid/minigrid operator had a financial partner who required the DRE grid to be 
placed in an area with no grid connection, which posed a problem when the grid was 
unexpectedly extended to the village.  
 In addition to project financing, there is a need for end user based financing 
(Glemarec, 2012; Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, 2013). One of the great challenges of 
energy access is the inability of the poor to pay upfront costs for off grid solutions. 
Financing options depend of the banking system, which may require public banks or 
microfinance organisations to provide short term loans (Glemarec, 2012). As covered in 
section 6.4, the JNNSM previously routed the end user solar subsidy through 
NABARD. However, NABARD seemed concerned with mitigating the financial risk of 
loaning to the poor, and so it took measures to avoid loaning to those poorest 
populations. Enterprises that were interested in reaching the bottom of the pyramid 
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would help prospective customers work through the paperwork, but there were 
challenges since the banks would cater to the top half of the community (ENT11). In 
addition to discriminating against poorer or lower caste communities, in partnerships 
with NABARD, one enterprise found that they were only comfortable loaning to the 
local self help group, so that the SHG was essentially taking on the risk of lending to the 
poor. While end user financing may be necessary for providing technology at the 
bottom of the pyramid, banks are wary of lending money to such customers. 
 The shift to microfinance after the numerous cancellations of the JNNSM-
NABARD did not come with as many concerns about selection, although one of the 
most common sources of microfinance, women-only self help groups, have historically 
provided loans primarily to female members. Providing credit is still a challenge for 
enterprises, and many mentioned partnerships with microfinance institutions, since 
these were not readily available for most end users. However, MFIs often have shorter 
maturities, which may not be ideal for the poorer, agricultural borrower. Additionally, 
past experience for MFIs across a range of countries found that MFIs experienced 
higher than average defaults on energy systems, in part due to the poor quality of their 
systems (Glemarec, 2012).The poorest of the poor may also not be able to benefit from 
MFIs due to risk aversion and not being accepted into MFI programmes (Hermes and 
Lensink, 2011). The latest evidence from randomized control trials also suggest that 
microfinance may not be the panacea it is often made out to be (Banerjee, Karlan and 
Zinman, 2015). MFIs in that regard fall into the same categories as banks, in that their 
own interests in financial security must be balanced with the social need to offer finance 
at the bottom of the pyramid. 
6.6.2 Selection and inequality 
 Through the prism of the end user selection framework, it becomes clear that 
the inability to pay upfront costs leaves poorer people out of the more sustainable 
business models, and so they are much more likely to be supplied systems that rely on 
one-time donation. A lack of cost recovery may impact the investment that enterprises 
have in the outcomes and future of the projects. This challenges the assumptions 
inherent in much of the literature on energy access, which sees off grid electrification as 
an agent for greater equality by focusing on how it can improve lives, but ignoring the 
inequalities even within the off grid space (Urpelainen, 2014; Monyei, Adewumi and 
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Jenkins, 2018). Although there is a great amount of literature on sustainable business 
models, there is a much greater emphasis on social and environmental sustainability 
than economic sustainability (Schrader, Freimann and Seuring, 2012; Bocken et al., 
2014). Economic sustainability, in the form of cost recovery or market-based models, is 
crucial to the replicability and scalability of models. Experience from a range of 
development literature exposes the institutional issues with donor-based models (Smith, 
2005; Parks, 2008; Bennett et al., 2011). Hisham Zerriffi’s work on rural electrification 
underlines the importance of economic sustainability by placing it as one of his criteria 
for judging off grid energy business models (Zerriffi, 2014). Over-dependence on 
donors has been recognised as a challenge for the market over the past decade (Urmee, 
Harries and Schlapfer, 2009; Friebe, Flotow and Täube, 2013; Ahlborg and Hammar, 
2014). Nevertheless, donor-based models have historically been a popular model for 
providing off grid electricity, and the shift from donor-based models has been difficult 
(Kolk and van den Buuse, 2012).  
 By exploring how enterprises select end users, we see how inequality is 
perpetuated through off grid technologies. Financially sustainable business models, 
which are able to recoup the costs of their systems, are primarily able to reach areas 
with some grid connection or users who are able to pay up front, or through a bank loan. 
The poorest, most remote users are not able to pay in full or qualify for credit. In these 
cases, they are targeted by donor-based models or provided systems that are highly 
subsidised. The financial sustainability of business models also has a relationship with 
technology. Business models that aim to recoup costs are usually minigrids and solar 
home systems. Microgrids – and some solar home system projects – rely more heavily 
on donations, since they do not have commercial or productive outputs that can reliably 
provide profits. It should however be noted that minigrid business models are fairly 
untested, and require 7-15 years of operation in order to break even. 
 The most remote, poorest and disenfranchised members of the rural 
community are targeted by enterprises providing off grid systems with the least capacity 
and least emphasis on financial sustainability. This reinforces existing inequality. 
Enterprises that provide minigrids, which have the greatest capacities and range of 
productive and domestic uses, focus on grid-connected areas that already have 
commercial activity. This is in part because these systems prioritise cost-recovery. Solar 
home systems come in a range of capacities and business models, but their reliance on 
loan financing excludes the poorest from sustainable business models. Finally, 
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microgrids provide basic lighting and mobile phone usage, but are often CSR or other 
donor-funded models, focusing on the poorest of the poor, but only capable of 
recouping maintenance costs. In all these cases, when batteries die (after 2-3 years) or 
panels need to be replaced (after 10-15 years) additional funds will be necessary 
(Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Where there is not enough cost-recovery, these systems will 
rely on donations being available yet again. This leaves the most disenfranchised 
members of society in a continued place of uncertainty and need.  
6.6.3 Policy Implications 
 Given the strong relationship between financing, selection and inequality, this 
chapter suggests that there are broader systemic issues that governments must consider. 
Rural electrification policy, while offering government finance, is only one part of the 
puzzle. The financing system also includes national and international donors, 
independent banks, government banks, and microfinance institutions. As fresh 
economic research has complicated the supposed successes of microfinance, it is 
important to undertake further research into the trade offs between financing types in 
rural regions (Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman, 2015). For instance, are there better 
outcomes from national bank financing or from microfinance? It is also important to 
quantify the results of this study. To what extent are donor-subsidised systems different 
in capacity and outcomes from systems purchased up front or in a pay-as-you-go 
model? Some of this research is already under way, but the findings from this chapter 
underscore their importance (Hermes and Lensink, 2011). 
 However, it is clear from this chapter that some inequality in financial 
sustainability and system capacity is a logical result of the relationship between a 
company’s product, revenue streams and the customer’s willingness or ability to pay. 
Those with a lower willingness to pay are targeted by enterprises with less financial 
sustainability built into their model. As one of the aims of electricity access is reducing 
poverty and inequalities, national and state governments are well-positioned to disrupt 
this inequality (United Nations, 2015). There are two ways in which to do this: first, 
expand government financing, and second, regulate the degree to which microfinance 
and banks can discriminate against poorer or disadvantaged customers. In the first case, 
Rwanda’s Renewable Energy Fund Project 2017, supported by the World Bank, is a 
viable example. The Government of Rwanda opened four financing ‘windows’, which 
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offer loans to customers and to businesses, with a particular emphasis on small and 
medium scale enterprise (World Bank, 2017d). Expanding the realm of who is 
considered worthy to offer finance to includes microfinance. Microfinance institutions, 
both within this research and in other corroborating findings, can exacerbate inequality 
through discrimination against the poor and other disadvantaged social classes 
(Tchouassi, 2011; Johnson, 2013). However, it is possible for MFIs to take a more 
positive, active approach to changing their own institutional culture as a form of self-
regulation (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014). It is also possible that governments can 
encourage codes of ethical conduct. These are possible options, but the reality is that 
exclusion from markets is not necessarily fixed by having rules on paper:  
“Going further, interventions must incorporate strategies for empowerment 
and engagement with social regulatory structures by facilitating agency 
through the myriad types of education and training programmes for women, 
minorities and excluded groups that have long been part and parcel of 
development activity.” (Johnson 2013, S49) 
This truth is social institutions are multifaceted and resistant to change, making concrete 
policy suggestions challenging. 
6.7 Conclusion 
 India’s main REPs invite market actors to participate in the off grid space 
through technology-based subsidies and tendering out projects. At the same time, many 
enterprises have sought to provide rural energy using a range of off grid solar 
technologies and business models. Each actor – government, funding body, and 
enterprise – must determine to which end users to supply or target their activities. Using 
interviews with government officials, experts and enterprises, this chapter has explored 
how these actors determine where they work and who are the recipients of their 
products. 
 Government policies in the off grid space now focus solely on supplying 
technology for the neediest members of society, namely those in the most remote 
regions, or in ‘backwards’ areas. For enterprises, the type of technology influences 
where they can work, as grid-based technologies require a degree of clustering or 
additional demographic needs. There is also an economic element, with minigrid 
business models often relying on commercial or productive loads. Solar home systems 
are the most flexible due to their range of capacity and costs and their stand-alone 
nature. However, in all cases, one of the greatest factors in end user selection is the 
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financier. Decisions around selection criteria are often made by those who are providing 
the up front capital expenditure or the loan. In cases where banks or microfinance 
institutions provide financing to the end user, their criteria for offering a loan are not 
aligned with the government’s programmes. The government’s focus on supplying 
those in need is in tension with the lender’s emphasis on risk mitigation.  
 Business model sustainability is also linked with financial selection. Those 
who are too poor to reach the threshold for loan financing or who are too remote to have 
a minigrid are therefore not able to avail themselves of a system with a sustainable 
business model. The poorest and most remote populations are instead targeted by 
donor-based or highly subsidised systems. This disparity between the focus on cost 
recovery may have real impacts when batteries and panels need to be replaced, and has 
the potential to reinforce existing inequalities. These issues appear to be the 
unavoidable, but they must be addressed by policymakers if financing for rural end 
users is to be truly effective and fair. Offering guarantees to lenders might mitigate the 
risk of lending to end users with no credit history, and providing clear guidelines about 
the integration of stranded solar assets into the national grid may change the economic 
evaluation of rural customers. In all cases, these findings challenge the assumption that 
enough financing can address all development needs.  
 Conceptually, the new framework offers a much broader and more nuanced 
approach to categorising end user selection. Throughout the chapter this nuance is used 
to demonstrate how actors in the system are not aligned. Policymakers must be aware of 
the alignment of the actors within programmatic policies in order to build programmes 
that are more inclusive and cognisant of their limitations. The findings also draw 
attention to the inequalities that are built into the market, despite the best intentions of 
the actors. This challenges the literature on off grid electrification and equality to be 
more nuanced, and to further explore how inequity is baked into the market structure. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Impact of enterprise engagement, reexamined  
 If there are two main lessons to be drawn from this thesis they are these: actors 
within the system must be aligned and if they are not, it can lead to ineffectiveness. 
Actors within the off grid solar market and the rural electrification programmes must be 
aligned in their capabilities and their interests. The conceptual frameworks developed in 
chapters 2, 5 and 6 all improve the articulation of the intended or actual alignment of 
these actors. The REP typology articulates what the capabilities of the market must be, 
while the political strategy construct outlines how enterprises work in their own 
interests. Finally, the new target end user construct creates a framework for testing the 
alignment of policy with the market actors.  
 The empirical chapters explore the impacts of misalignment on which 
enterprises target which end users with which technologies in the Indian context. The 
findings include the bifurcation of the off grid solar market, wherein enterprises with 
greater cost recovery are moving towards wealthier customers after the loss of 
microfinancing. Even when financing was in place, there was tension between the 
interests of the banks and the interests of the government. Finally, the movement 
towards grid connected customers may have played into the challenges in getting 
tenders for the DDG scheme filled, pushing villages into the grid extension scheme, and 
lowering the efficacy of the programme. 
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7.2 Conceptual Findings 
Chapters 2, 5 and 6 offer up new conceptual frameworks where there is either a lack of 
clarity or there is a need to reorient the theoretical constructs to be based in the LMIC 
context. The findings are important because they improve how we see and measure 
aspects of implementation: policy design, political strategy and population targeting. 
Chapter 2’s REP Typology primarily addresses the first concern, in response to the few 
comparative studies of rural electrification that do little to categorise their varying forms 
and approaches (Niez, 2010; Javadi et al., 2013; Sovacool, 2013). In order to situate this 
research, and to improve comparison moving forward, I identify three types of rural 
electrification policy evident in a sample of 52 policies from 30 countries that are 
relevant to off grid solar power. The primary types of policy are institutional, regulatory 
and programmatic policies. Programmatic policies focus on expanding access, either 
through defining a specific population or a target installed capacity, and reach that 
target by 1) setting up a system by which enterprises will disseminate technology, and 
2) creating incentives to align all the actors within the system.  
 Programmatic policies try to engage non-government actors in public service 
delivery. Within programmatic policies, governments try to engage outside 
organisations through five modes of engagement: market-based, energy service 
companies, public-private partnerships, direct contracting or government as distributer. 
Market-based engagement focuses on promoting technology or access to the rural 
market and relies on market forces to reach the target population. Energy service 
company arrangements vary, but are defined by a responsibility to a geographical 
region that includes long-term energy services, as opposed to selling energy products. 
Public-private partnerships are the most flexible arrangement, potentially overlapping 
with some of the other modes, but are increasingly common with governments 
partnering with large multinational companies for off grid electrification (ie BBOXX, 
Off Grid Electric, etc.). Direct contracting involves identifying the particular end users 
that require access and tendering out projects to provide electricity to those end users. 
Finally, governments occasionally take on the burden of distribution themselves, which 
is the final mode of engagement in which the government essentially becomes an off 
grid energy enterprise.  
Turning to the political strategy that enterprises employ, Chapter 5 addresses the dearth 
of literature on strategy in smaller organisations in LMICs by constructing a vision of 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Victoria Anne Plutshack - November 2019 211 
political strategy from within the interviews. Enterprises make active decisions to 
engage with or disengage from policy and policymakers, and these decisions make up 
an enterprise’s political strategy. Findings from the interviews show how enterprises 
may take a strategy engagement or disengagement with the government and policy 
regimes. Tactics of engagement include leveraging policy, building relationships, 
lobbying, and monitoring. Tactics of disengagement include avoiding and not engaging 
with policy.  
This construct that emerges pushes back on several assumptions and trends within the 
political strategy literature. First, political strategy should be expanded to include 
leveraging policy. This has been considered outside the realm of political strategy, 
which has focused on only how organisations attempt to influence their political 
environment. However, there is evidence that engaging with policy does influence its 
future shape, perhaps fitting it conceptually within the pre-existing definitions of 
political strategy. For example, Namibian shops that participated in government solar 
schemes were embedded within future solar policies (Stockmayer et al., 2015). The 
inclusion of ‘leveraging policy’ is arguably also an important dimension in the context 
of a sector with heavy government engagement (Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). 
Second, the new conceptual framework argues for the inclusion a strategy of 
disengagement. This has been an oversight in previous constructions of political 
strategy, which have treated strategies as things that are done to actively improve the 
environment, not other responses to the political environment (Oliver, 1991b; Hillman 
and Hitt, 1999). Besides capturing a more accurate picture of reality, adding 
disengagement allows attempts to avoid or ignore government to become ‘visible’ and 
hence measurable in empirical studies. In this way, we can ask questions about who 
chooses to disengage and why. 
Finally, the empirical findings – that size and philosophy impact strategy – push back at 
some of the assumptions within the literature. First, the prominence of size as a factor 
suggests that there is an overemphasis on lobbying and relationship building within the 
literature, as these can be resource-intensive activities that smaller organisations may 
not have the capacity to do. Additionally, political strategy assumes that actions that 
improve the political environment are done in order to improve it for the enterprise 
itself. That is, that enterprises are primarily self interested (McWilliams, Van Fleet and 
Cory, 2002). However, almost all enterprises in the off grid sector have a social 
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component to their mission. In fact, social enterprises are prominent in the LMIC 
development sectors in general, and so the benefit to other enterprises in the sector – 
otherwise defined as ‘competitors’ – may also been seen as a benefit to the enterprise 
itself, pushing back on the idea that political strategy is a zero sum game. 
 Chapter 6 addresses the implications of these actions, and the prominent 
government programmes, on the end user of off grid solar. By first constructing a multi-
dimensional framework for describing the target end user, it tries to bring nuance to a 
discussion which has often focused on per capita income as its only indicator (Prahalad 
and Hart, 2001). Selection takes place at different levels of granularity (selection levels) 
and using different criteria (selection criteria). Selection levels include individual, 
village, region and state. Selection criteria include demand, demographics, geography, 
need and grid access. These facets of selection are then applied to the government and 
market actors in order to analyse the targeting of populations within policy and 
enterprise business models. The construct allows us to test the alignment of actors in the 
space and observe the way in which programmes that centralize financing create tension 
between cost recovery and social good. This illuminates the inequalities that are still 
prominent within off grid programmes, despite the vision of off grid access as an agent 
of greater equity. 
7.3 Empirical Findings 
 Enterprise business models respond to policy first through changes to revenue 
streams or customer segments. Shifting to the evidence from the 15 off grid solar 
enterprises in India, over two thirds of enterprises explained how policy had shaped 
their business model. Eleven enterprises cited rural electrification policy changes as 
antecedents to change within the business model, with 19 total incidents of change. 
Changes in policy regimes first affected revenue streams or customer segments, as 
changes to subsidy or other forms of support focus on the technology or the customer 
being support. Therefore, these aspects of the business model were most exposed to 
policy change.  
 Single changes to a business model often lead to other changes within the 
business model. Changes to revenue streams or customer segments particularly affected 
the technologies that enterprises provided, but they also affected the partnerships that 
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as well as one another. For instance, when the National Solar Mission subsidy for solar 
home systems was cancelled in 2015, ENT11 was unable to reach their previous 
customer base and changed to microgrids, which forced them to move to Uttar Pradesh, 
which has a greater population density in rural regions. Subsidies or capital grants did 
more than make technologies affordable, they initiated a virtuous cycle of financing, 
allowing enterprises and end users to access loans that they might not have been able to 
access without a government grant or subsidy. ENT32 explained how the subsidy for 
minigrids under the JNNSM allowed them to access other bank financing, because it 
brought their anticipated total cost recovery time to under ten years, the required 
threshold for many additional investments. Where money comes from influences whom 
the enterprises target, such as the increase in donor funding through India’s Corporate 
Social Responsibility policy leading to investment near factory sites. India’s fast-paced 
grid expansion also has a complicated relationship with the success of off grid 
enterprises and the technologies that they adopt, many choosing to move into areas 
where the grid already partially serves customers. Minigrid companies and some 
medium and large-scale solar home system providers explicitly target areas where 
there is already grid connection. 
 A single policy change may drastically change the shape of the enterprise 
landscape. In the case of India, a break in the JNNSM subsidy scheme and the 
expansion of the national grid has contributed to enterprises moving toward grid-
connected customers. When the loan and subsidy to rural end users was cancelled, 
several solar home system companies reported struggling to reach these customers and 
changing their product, customers and financing to take advantage of where there was 
a higher willingness to pay. Notably, a move towards the grid has been partnered by a 
move towards larger scale technologies, primarily minigrids and microgrids. These 
trends are evidenced in all sizes of organisations, but the movement away from solar 
home systems is particularly clear in small and medium-scale enterprises. Therefore, 
although individual policy changes may initially only increase or decrease sales, the 
finding suggest that the characteristics of the off grid market may change significantly 
and quickly as enterprises adapt to the new market conditions.  
 Evidence also suggests that changes in the enterprise landscape have the 
potential to impact the efficacy of other rural electrification policies. The majority of 
tenders in the DDG Scheme require solar home systems. There is some evidence that 
these tenders have been less successful than desired, and 820 villages were moved from 
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the DDG Scheme over to the grid expansion scheme (BREDA, 2017; UPNEDA, 2017; 
REC, 2018b). It is possible to see challenges in tendering the SHS projects as related to 
a lack of support for and move away from that technology.  
 An enterprises’ response to policy is partly dependent on how much of the 
business model (especially revenue streams, partnerships, and customers) is exposed to 
policy changes. An enterprise can adjust its exposure and environment through its 
political strategy. The main factors that influence an enterprise’s choice of tactics are 
eligibility, past experience with government, and capacity. Enterprises are constrained 
by their eligibility for access to subsidies, contracts and financing as governments place 
restrictions on the types of enterprises with which they will work. Both the DDG 
Scheme and JNNSM have requirements for the types of organisations to which they 
offer projects and financing, including turnover, past government experience, and 
technology specifications. Eligibility is sufficient to explain the actions of many 
enterprises, but does not account for at least four enterprises that appear to be eligible, 
but still do not apply for financial support. Here, past negative experiences of working 
with government also played a significant role in decision-making. Past negative 
experiences included applying for subsidies and not receiving them, finding that the 
tender was then cancelled, confusion in the application process or having to wait too 
long for subsidies to be released to the enterprise. 
 The size of an organisation – here, as a proxy for capacity – also has a strong 
impact on the types of political engagement an enterprise will use. Each of the four 
main tactics has a differing level of resource intensiveness. Leveraging policy, for 
instance, requires greater resources than monitoring the government’s outputs. Small 
and medium-sized organisations, those we can infer have fewer man-hours at their 
disposal, are more likely to engage in less resource intensive tactics and actions. Indeed, 
some smaller organisations focus on partnerships and relationship building over 
engaging in programmes because of the resource-intensiveness of direct engagement, 
eligibility concerns, and potential risks in engagement. For instance, ENT13 dropped 
out of one tender in favour of partnering with the winning enterprise, figuring that this 
was a less resource-intensive action with a higher likelihood of success. 
 Finally, although programmatic policies include incentives that align the actors 
within the system, not all enterprises target the end users intended by rural 
electrification programmes. The DDG Scheme targets off grid villages primarily with 
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solar home systems but as many enterprises have moved to working with minigrids and 
microgrids, few enterprises focus on purely off grid customers anymore. The DDG 
Scheme has suffered from a low interest in their tenders, which has led to tender 
cancellations and slowed the uptake of off grid technologies via government 
programmes. Over 800 villages have been moved from the off grid scheme to the grid 
expansion programme (REC, 2018b). In the meantime, there is a move towards 
enterprises providing off grid technologies in grid-connected areas, which is outside the 
scope of the DDUGJY scheme. Minigrid enterprises focus almost exclusively on grid 
connected areas, in great part because those villages already have a certain demand for 
electricity, which is a requirement for cost recovery, given high capital costs of the 
systems. Microgrids are primarily still set up in unelectrified villages, but that is only 
possible because of low cost-recovery expectations and donor financing. Finally, solar 
home systems come in a range of capacities from 2-80Wp, and so different systems and 
business models relate to the range of customers that SHS enterprises target. As a rule 
of thumb, the larger the system, the more they target previously-grid connected 
customers. 
7.4  India and Beyond 
7.4.1 India and the rise of direct contracting 
 The arc of policy has been bending toward greater private sector participation 
for decades, whether that is considered a part of improving the sustainability of 
programs or the long-lasting effect of New Public Management in policy discussions 
(Lane, 2002). India’s DDG scheme and JNNSM off grid component do appear to rely 
on the private sector, engaging non-government actors through competitive bidding and 
financial support. However, those who engage in the DDG scheme are often not 
technically private sector actors. The only enterprise in the sample that regularly won 
DDG tenders was a government-owned enterprise (ENT23). In that case, the DDG 
scheme begins to look more like the government contracting out to that parts of itself 
that have technical competencies required to perform the task at hand. It is possible 
that this is the same in other contexts. Although direct contracting may appear to be the 
result of NPM principles being integrated into LMIC infrastructure projects, it is 
possible that direct contracting is more lip service than true shift in governance (Batley, 
Larbi and Palgrave Connect (Online service), 2004). 
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 The direct contracting approach may also be obscuring the fact that the 
private sector is not in a position to be the key implementing partner of off grid solar. 
There are a number of good reasons for this, many of them cited as arguments against 
the private sector at the bottom of the pyramid. The private sector needs profits, and the 
poorest and most remote people cost the most to reach and have the least money to 
compensate (Haanyika, 2006; Kolk, Rivera-Santos and Rufín, 2014). Another reason 
that the private sector may not be in a position to implement these policies goes back to 
the socio-technical innovations systems literature. While solar energy may be a mature 
technology, it is still innovative in the context of off grid appliances, and may still be in 
need of further refinement as businesses and NGOs discover what works and what does 
not (Khan and Arsalan, 2016). However, rural electrification programs are essentially 
infrastructure expansion programs, which typically work with well-established mature 
technologies. Direct contracting in this context may be a premature attempt to scale a 
technology that is not yet mature. As few countries have what is considered an ‘off grid 
solar market,’ it seems likely that other countries are in the same position: struggling to 
move off grid solar from its niche into the dominant paradigm. 
 The market-based mode on the other hand, as seen in the JNNSM, takes the 
‘private sector entrepreneurship’ approach, focusing on supporting private sector 
innovation (Ockwell and Byrne, 2017). Within this case study, social enterprises did use 
the support of the JNNSM to try innovative technologies and business models. However, 
Ockwell and Byrne are quick to point out that this does not necessarily lead to a 
reorienting of development towards greater sustainability, because an innovative 
approach is more than an innovation, but also its embeddedness in our dominant 
regime and the socio-technical apparatus that makes that possible (Ockwell and Byrne, 
2017, pg 143). All that is to say, India’s support through the National Solar Mission 
seems better aligned to the state of the off grid market. However, whether is through 
market-based mode or direct contracting, inequality has a complicated relationship to 
scale. 
7.4.2 Scale and inequality 
 Scaling up technologies does not just increase the number of people with a 
solar home system, but scales up the inequalities that are a part of the technological 
system. Governments have a role to play in trying to counteract, not exacerbate, 
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economic inequality, whether through pro-poor subsidies or through supportive niches 
where innovators are creating beneficial socio-technical artefacts. 
 Chapter 6 made it clear that, without government support, the poorer end 
users are targeted by enterprises offering less capacity and less long-term 
sustainability, which may have an impact on maintenance and scalability. Unreliable 
policy support has contributed to a move from smaller to larger systems, from solar 
home systems to micro/minigrids, and from off grid customers towards grid connected 
ones. Those enterprises that still target purely off grid end users often do so with small 
systems, high subsidies, and low financial sustainability (ie cost recovery is unlikely to 
cover capital costs and operational expenditures). While this is intuitive, as many off 
grid customers have a lower ability to pay, the upshot is that poorer customers are 
targeted by those enterprises that may not be able to scale without large injections of 
capital from outside donor and government agencies. Therefore, the enterprises that 
target poorer customers are likely to have less long-term sustainability and may no 
longer be extant when systems fail and batteries need to be replaced. Low cost-recovery 
and a reliance on donor grants may also limit the ability of these enterprises to scale 
up. Even those policies that support customers with no grid access (ie DDG Scheme) 
face challenges getting tenders fulfilled. In the end, it is end users with greater grid 
connectivity that are targeted by the enterprises with the largest systems, best likelihood 
of scalability and greatest staying power. 
 But scale also comes at a cost. Scaling up through direct contracting selects 
for established players in the field, further entrenching those organisations in a position 
of market power. Namibia’s solar shops are a great example. Since 2007, each 
subsequent REP has included these same shops into their program, embedding these 
organisations within the government’s support and allowing them to reap further 
rewards (Stockmayer et al., 2015). The benefit is likely that these shops have grown the 
competencies required to implement the policies. This no doubt offers efficiencies and 
may improve implementation, but it does reduce competition for others trying to enter 
the market. It creates an unequal playing field for new enterprises. 
 Scaling up also has an impact on social inequality. Economies (and 
efficiencies) of scale are achieved through the replication of activities. As in, scale is 
the same artefact (technology, application, delivery system, etc.)  replicated many times 
over. Therefore, the nature of the artefact is replicated. That is to say, scaling up a 
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technology and its concurrent artefacts (business models, etc.) replicates its 
relationship to the social actors in its orbit. For instance, the JNNSM solar home 
system subsidy did increase the number of people with access to solar home systems, 
but it also replicated the inequalities inherent in microfinancing (Tchouassi, 2011). 
Likewise, technologies that support greater equality, such as solar home systems sold 
by women, scale up the benefits of the technology as they expand. This is neither good 
nor bad, but instead of feature of scaling that governments should be aware of.  
 Innovators are trying to address social justice. ENT25 spoke at length about 
the way in which their solar modules encouraged interaction between different social 
classes. ENT27 focused on how women had a greater ability to conduct their business 
with solar home systems. These socio-technological systems have the same potential to 
be scaled up as the PV panels of ENT23’s DDG projects. The key is for the government 
to be upon to supporting these niches of socio-technical innovation, and support their 
movement from niche into the dominant regime.  
7.5 Policy Implications 
 The findings of this thesis have potential policy implications both for the 
Indian context specifically and for policymakers designing and evaluating rural 
electrification policies. Broadly put, in designing programmatic policies, policymakers 
must understand the market the mode of engagement needs, understand the market the 
country has, and support the market the mode needs. The implications for the Indian 
context fall along those same logical pathways, but bring specific knowledge to bear on 
the recommendations. In all cases, these are only the implications thrown up by the 
findings of each chapter, and do not take into account what is politically feasible. 
 In the specific India case, there are three primary implications for the Ministry 
of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), under whose jurisdiction sits off grid 
electrification. First, as the DDG Scheme requires large-scale solar home system-based 
tenders, the MNRE may wish to reconsider financial support for enterprises working 
with solar home systems. As many such enterprises have left solar home systems behind 
and are now ‘burned’ by changing policies, this may be a tall order. However, if it is 
possible, support should focus on scaling up enterprises in the hopes that scaled up 
enterprises will reach further customers and be eligible to bid for MNRE tenders 
through the DDG Scheme. As the literature on public administration suggests, it is often 
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the role of government to support the very markets that they require for public services. 
Studies from the USA have shown that where the government supports nonprofits is 
where nonprofits are more prevalent, rather than nonprofits stepping in where the 
government is not (Lecy and Van Slyke, 2013). Likewise, competition is often low in 
areas where the governments wish to contract out public services, forcing the 
government to use their own resources to support the private markets they then wish to 
take advantage of (Girth et al., 2012). Governments must support private and nonprofit 
sectors in order to use them to provide public services. 
 Despite the concerns registered above, Namibia provides an interesting 
example of building upon the market that the country has in order to create the market 
that rural service provision needs. In 2007, the Government of Namibia initiated the Off 
Grid Energy Master Plan, which created Energy Shops from currently functioning 
businesses that would provide a range of off grid solar products and act as a go between 
for customers looking for loans from the government's solar loan programme. Then in 
2015, the Government of Namibia followed up with a Nationally Appropriate 
Mitigation Action Plan in Namibia Rural Development that built upon the previous 
energy shops concept. This voluntary, non-binding action plan outlined how Namibia 
will improve its off grid electrification through two interventions: tendering hybrid 
minigrids and tendering for private actors to set up Energy Zones: 
The OGEMP defined the concept of Energy Shops. Energy Shops are 
established within a reasonable distance of targeted communities and sell 
suitable, approved energy products and compatible appliances to consumers. 
Under Intervention B, this concept is developed further into the concept of 
Energy Zones (EZs), by adding a Rural Productivity Zone (RPZ)) 
component (Stockmayer et al. 2015, 73).  
Energy Zones would be new standalone renewable installations in a single building or 
compound that would promote new entrepreneurial activities by providing a space for 
electricity access and where people could sell appliances and charge batteries. Through 
this slow, conscious building of the off grid market, first through turning rural 
businesses into energy shops and then energy shops into energy zones, the Government 
of Namibia exemplifies the need to create the market you need for rural electricity 
provision.  
 Small and medium-scale enterprises are an important site of innovation and job 
creation in the market, and it is important for governments to support SMEs, especially 
in newer sectors (Beaver and Prince, 2004; Loader, 2007). Scaling up SMEs would be 
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aided by an expansion of enterprises deemed eligible to participate in the DDG Scheme. 
Chapters 4 and 5 note both that small and medium sized enterprises face challenges in 
meeting eligibility requirements and in winning tenders even where eligible. The 
challenge of engaging SMEs in public procurement is well articulated in a study by Kim 
Loader: 
“The findings suggest that while procurement officers would like to do 
business with small firms, in practice their primary aim is to achieve value 
for money. While these two aims are not mutually exclusive, small firms are 
less likely to succeed in winning contracts on the basis of value for money 
while it continues to emphasise cost and quality, because of a view that 
large firms are more likely to meet these criteria. If value for money is 
interpreted broadly, to include a range of criteria beyond cost and quality, 
then smaller, and especially local, firms may have an opportunity to exploit 
their relative strengths such as responsiveness and flexibility. However, 
other developments in procurement—such as collaboration and 
rationalization of the supplier base—emphasise the narrower interpretation 
of value for money and are working against the smaller supplier. The 
continually changing procurement environment is also likely to 
disadvantage small businesses disproportionately.” (Loader 2007, 313) 
 While it is understandable that eligibility requirements should be in place in 
order to protect customers from fraudulent or incapable businesses, shutting out 
enterprises from the primary form of government support (large, subsidised contracts) 
contributed to the bifurcation of the market between large, SHS providers and, now, 
small micro and minigrid companies. A happy medium exists in the case of ENT32, 
which offers tenders separately within their own projects to small and medium-sized 
companies as a way to access new talent and help grow other off grid businesses. As 
ENT32 is a state-owned company, this perhaps fits within their philosophical purview, 
but it is unreasonable to expect other large-scale enterprises to actively promote their 
competition. Therefore, it falls to MNRE to draw smaller companies into their policies 
in a way that benefits both the enterprise and the end user, perhaps through smaller, 
targeted tenders that aim to give enterprises experience with government tenders and 
support in scaling up. Splitting tenders into lots and simplifying procurement processes 
has been recommended by other scholars interested in increasing the proportion of 
SMEs that successfully bid for public tenders (Perry, 2011). Taking a softer touch 
approach, some research suggests that mentoring SMEs and ushering them through the 
tender process can also be beneficial to engagement (McKevitt and Davis, 2015). 
 Finally, the eligibility challenge was not solely a product of stringent enterprise 
eligibility, it was also a result of increasingly stringent technology specifications 
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(MNRE, 2012b, 2017c). Technology requirements are considered to be beneficial to 
developing the off grid solar market as they increase trust in the product and protect 
consumers from fly-by-night operators or the worst effects of technology dumping 
(Luthra et al., 2015; Yaqoot, Diwan and Kandpal, 2016). However, increasingly strict 
requirements for products provided through the DDG Scheme were commonly cited as 
a reason not to apply; the companies found that their products had become ineligible. 
One enterprise even believed that at the time of the interviews, only one other non-state 
enterprise sold products that reached such specifications. While that information is 
unconfirmed, it is true that several enterprises that previously bid for tenders no longer 
did so, some claiming ineligibility. Finding a balance between protecting the needs of 
consumers and allowing for a large enough pipeline of bidders for tenders is 
challenging, but vital, as cancelled tenders and removing 820 villages from the DDG 
Scheme suggests troubles in keeping up with the off grid target (BREDA, 2017; 
UPNEDA, 2017; REC, 2018b). 
 Taking a step back to look at the broader implications, policymakers should 
understand the characteristics of the market they need, the market they have and what 
that means for seeking to support the enterprises that make up such a market. While it is 
important to make these evaluations when designing or revamping programmatic 
policies, this thesis has shown how layered policy has just as much power to bear on the 
market. In the case of India, it was the JNNSM programmatic policy’s cancellation that 
precipitated some of the move away from solar home systems, which is the primary 
technology of the DDG scheme. The impacts of one policy on the market affect others. 
Other countries in the sample for Chapter 2 have both compound policy mixes and 
layered policy mixes. For instance, Cambodia’s 2009 Rural Electrification Strategy and 
Implementation Plan offers up a strategy for the whole power sector in which the 
government electricity operator (EDC) first leads the rural electricity enterprises (REEs) 
in the electrification of rural areas before absorbing their assets in the long term. This 
was followed up by the 2013-2015 Program For the Development of Rural 
Electrification, in which could purchase a solar home system from the government with 
a loan at a subsidised rate. The two policies overlap, but the first takes a private ESCO 
approach, while the second sets up the government as the key distributer of solar 
technology. The relationship between these two policies impacts the market actors. 
Therefore, policymakers should evaluate all policies together in order to rationalize the 
signals to enterprises (Howlett and Rayner, 2007; Rogge, Kern and Howlett, 2017). 
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 Firstly, Chapter 2 defines and explores the five modes of engagement that 
programmatic policies use, as well as describing their assumptions. This is an important 
starting point for policy analysis and policymakers. The question should be asked: do all 
rural electrification policies make the same assumptions about the characteristics of the 
market and the enterprises within it? Are the assumptions compatible? And of course, it 
is then vital to determine whether the market does indeed share the characteristics 
required of the programmatic policy. A classic example would be taking a direct 
contracting approach (in a domestic context) without determining whether the country 
contains at least two viable enterprises that would bid for tenders. Without sufficient 
competition, the benefits of tendering cannot be captured (Prager, 1994; Johnston and 
Girth, 2012).  
 The reality is that national and international political forces have a large role in 
promoting certain policies. As discussed in Chapter 2, there has been a global 
movement towards the privatisation of public service delivery (Donahue, 1989; 
Miraftab, 2004; Cook and Uchida, 2008). Indeed, the World Bank’s latest policy of the 
“cascade approach” prioritises private investment: 
“When a project is presented ask - Is there a sustainable private sector 
solution that limits public debt and contingent liabilities? If the answer is 
‘Yes’- promote such private solutions. If the answer is ‘No’ - ask whether it 
is because of: (i) Policy or regulatory gaps or weakness? If so, provide 
WBG support for policy and regulatory reforms. (ii) Risks? If so, assess the 
risks and see whether WBG instruments can address them. If you conclude 
that the project requires public funding, pursue that option.” (World Bank 
Group, 2017) 
While the aim of such a policy is to maximise the impact of World Bank financing, this 
approach holds firm to the World Bank’s ideological interest in promoting private 
solutions (Dreher, Minasyan and Nunnenkamp, 2015). While the formulation above 
explicitly asks about the market context of the programme, it is important to note the 
private sector starting point of the cascade and the impact that this may have on the 
dozens of rural electrification programmes initiated with the help of the world bank in 
that past 20 years (Cordella, 2018). While true ideological neutrality is impossible to 
achieve, focusing on the assumptions and requirements of each mode is an excellent 
starting point. 
 Once assured that the current market and the assumptions of the mode of 
engagement are a good match, policymakers would do well to anticipate how the 
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characteristics of the market will affect 1) the impact of policy change on the enterprise 
landscape, and 2) levels of engagement. Chapter 4 goes some way to exploring how the 
first question might be answered in retrospect, but similar logic could be used to 
anticipate likely changes. For instance, if the new programme includes financing for 
certain technologies, it is likely enterprises will move towards these technologies, which 
will shift their needs for financing, potentially the types of customers they target, and a 
host of business model aspects. The findings from Chapters 4 and 6 can be extrapolated 
further to show how the interrelations between aspects of the business model lead 
groups of businesses acting in a similar manner. Similar research attempts to track how 
renewable energy enterprises change over time and how the characteristics of the 
country’s institutions and policies affect the business models of such enterprises 
(Gabriel and Kirkwood, 2016). Survey-based studies with a longitudinal scope might 
bridge these two approaches.  
 Chapter 5 goes some way to connecting the characteristics of the market to 
general trends in how enterprises engage with policy and government. It should be 
borne in mind that many factors influence an enterprise’s political strategy, but 
understanding the characteristics of the market might go some way to anticipating the 
degree of engagement (Oliver, 1991a; Getz, 2002; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). 
For instance, small and medium sized enterprises may have a smaller appetite for 
political risk. Therefore, changes to policy are more likely to cause them to disengage 
with government, lowering the engagement with and efficacy of future policy. 
Likewise, larger enterprises have a higher human capacity, which is often required for 
keeping abreast of current developments, building relationships with government and 
certainly with engagement with policy. Therefore, a market with larger enterprises may 
better engage with policy, even in the case of several policy changes. In all cases, it is 
crucial to anticipate how the programme and enterprises will interact by assessing the 
characteristics of the market, via the market actors (or enterprises). 
 Finally, the key lessons of chapter 6 are two-fold. The first lesson is that the 
source of financing has the greatest role in selection, and appeals to increase 
microfinancing do not solve all the challenges of working at the base of the pyramid. 
Indeed, the very nature of financing exacerbates inequalities, as necessary risk 
management within the financing institution prioritises the wealthy (Tchouassi, 2011; 
Johnson, 2013). Findings from this thesis also add a social dimension to these 
inequalities, as some enterprises referenced other markers of social status, such as caste 
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(see ENT11). In all cases, it is challenging to find an appropriate alternative to 
microfinance in rural areas, especially given some of its successes (Reeves and 
Sabharwal, 2013). Instead, it is possible that greater oversight over microfinance 
institutions could seek to embed values that prioritise social justice (Johnson, 2013; 
Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014).  
 Lastly, the chapter reinforces a narrative that has run throughout the thesis: in a 
layered policy mix, changes to one policy can misalign the market and existing 
programmes. Through looking at how programmes and enterprises select target 
customers, it is clear that changes to India’s subsidy regime contributed to a move 
towards grid-connected customers, which was at odds with the requirements of the 
extant DDG Scheme. A broader lesson to be drawn from this perspective is that 
policymakers must not focus on the target population of their policies alone, but also on 
the target populations of the enterprises within the market.  
 A joined up long-term approach requires four things: awareness, knowledge, 
flexibility, and consistency. The first is the hardest to achieve, but governments must be 
aware of the ways in which the mismatch between market and policy design undermine 
their policy goals, and the ways in which inequality can be exacerbated through scaling 
up under each programmatic mode. It may seem like awareness of policy design 
considerations is impossible to manufacture, but the history of ‘evidence-based policy’ 
provides an excellent example of how civil society organisations can draw attention 
even to policy design and the policy process. ‘Evidence-based policy’ became a 
buzzword when the Campbell Collaboration was established to conduct systematic 
reviews of the evidence for social and educational policies, inspired by the Cochrane 
Collaboration, which had done the same for ‘evidence-based medicine’ (Marston and 
Watts, 2003). Now, it is a phrase used globally to encourage more information in the 
policy process (Newman, 2017). Even in this context, civil society organisations can 
promote awareness of how the policy process 1) fails certain segments of the 
population, and 2) neglects to incorporate learning about the state of the market into 
design decisions. 
 This leads nicely into the second requirement: knowledge. Whether its goal-
setting and policy design, governments can act without enough information to make 
effective decisions. Knowledge in this context means both “an accurate or realistic 
assessment of the capabilities of more concrete policy tools or their possible 
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calibration” and a realistic assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the market 
(Howlett, 2009, pg 75). Governments must commission research into the market, the 
impacts of these policies on end users, and new and innovative technological solutions, 
as a starting point. Capturing information and promoting its diffusion within 
government and the civil service is key to creating better policy (Ockwell and Byrne, 
2017, pg 157-8). 
 Next, flexibility or the ability to change is crucial in any policy context, but 
especially when working with nascent technologies. Technological change and learning 
will necessarily alter the visions that government has for the future. Managing that 
change involves keeping knowledge up to date, as above, as well as negotiating what 
that change looks like with other stakeholders. Therefore, governments should meet 
regularly with stakeholders, especially market actors and civil society organisations, as 
well as allow for experimentation (Ockwell and Byrne, 2017, pg 158). Experimentation 
can take the form of pilot projects to test new interventions and technologies, in order to 
promote new visions of what the future of the off grid space could look like, and to 
bring actors towards a shared vision (Ockwell and Byrne, 2017, pg 55-57). 
 Finally, consistency is required. This may seem counter-intuitive given the 
emphasis of the previous chapter on flexibility, but flexibility with alternative visions is 
different from inconsistency.  Consistency in this context refers to adherence to the 
lessons that have been learned and to the principles of improved policymaking as 
described above. This consistency could be achieved through embedding learning in the 
civil service, rather than focusing on politicians. Civil servants move around within a 
bureaucracy but their knowledge has greater staying power than government ministers 
who may be rotated out of power in a relatively short timeframe. In this vision of joined 
up long-term policymaking, the entrenchment of market power and perpetuation of 
social inequalities are checked through buy-in from multiple interest groups. This 
includes the involvement of civil society (through awareness raising), citizens (through 
elections), civil service (through policy design), governments (through goal setting), 
and market actors (through new innovations, stakeholder engagement). Although more 
powerful actors will no doubt attempt to co-opt others into their vision, the large set of 
varied interests set up a system checks and balances. 
Rural Electrification Policy and Off Grid Solar: Sector Engagement Strategies in India 
and Beyond 
  Victoria Anne Plutshack - November 2019 226
7.6 Future research 
 While the findings within this thesis support the policy implications above, 
further research would broaden the applicability and usability of the findings. Both 
additional qualitative and new quantitative analysis could build on this research. Firstly, 
although the findings from the embedded enterprise case studies within India have a 
degree of analytical generalisation, additional case countries could improve the 
applicability of the findings. I would recommend a similar project of enterprise-based 
research in a market with a higher expectation of off grid electrification, such as 
Rwanda, Tanzania or Togo. Despite India’s aggressive electrification policies, the 
Government of India views off grid energy as a temporary measure, expecting that 
almost all villages will eventually be reached by the national grid (GoI, 2018). The 
expectation is that the next ten years will see the future of off grid in sub-Saharan Africa 
(IEA, 2017). Exploring additional countries and markets using the same framework and 
approach would improve the analytical generalisability by filling in gaps that may not 
be addressed by the India case (such as the use of mobile banking). Further research 
could either examine countries with policies that follow the same modes of engagement 
as India to compare changes to the market, or else a contrasting mode of engagement, 
such as ESCOs, PPPs or government distributers. 
 Rwanda is an interesting case because, in addition to having a low rate of rural 
electrification, its Rural Electrification Strategy 2016 places a heavy emphasis on 
market development. The programme explicitly aims for the private sector to 
sustainably provide access in the future through four programmes: 1) providing solar 
home systems for lowest income households, 2) creation of a risk mitigation facility for 
the solar private sector actors, 3) supporting private sector minigrids with site 
identification and government financing, 4) and further grid expansion. Although the 
third component involves tenders and the first involves public provision of solar, the 
emphasis is on market engagement. In this way, the Rwanda case is an inverse of India, 
which has both market-based elements and direct contracting, but government 
procurement is prioritised in the off grid space. Additionally, off grid multinational 
company BBOXX has some presence there, where it is setting up a modern rural house 
as an aspirational pilot for investors to see what the future of off grid technology can be 
(Byumvuhore, 2018). 
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 Indeed, it is worth noting that this research has focused solely on domestic off 
grid solar markets, and therefore has not included growing multinational companies that 
work in off grid solar. These companies, such as BBOXX and Off Grid Electric, are 
increasingly relevant to the story of global energy access as more countries sign large 
contracts for electrifying areas with them (Kabeer, 2018). Off Grid Electric – now 
known as Zola Electric – recently won $55 million from Helios Investment Partners and 
General Electric (Foehringer Merchant, 2018). The US-based company has sold over 
150,000 systems in Africa, focusing their work on Ghana and the Ivory Coast. BBOXX 
is a London-based company, initiated in 2017, who is now working with EDF to 
provide solar systems in Togo, as described above (Krieger, 2018). Further research 
might explore similar research topics – the impact of policy for choice of country, 
political strategy towards managing policy risk – within these organisations. Given their 
international reach, it is possible that understanding how these companies function will 
have an outsized impact in the future, especially given the dearth of research on these 
companies thus far (Girardeau and Pattanayak, 2018). 
 Taking a more quantitative approach, further research could quantify the 
efficacy of these programmes, to solidify and broaden the conclusions of the thesis. The 
two primary challenges here are data access and reliability and untangling the 
contributing factors to efficacy. A more enterprise-specific approach may help with the 
both the former and the latter. For instance, if one were able to access the sales data 
from individual enterprises, the findings of this research could be falsified or bolstered. 
In all cases, the challenges of enlisting quantitative research here stands. Finally, more 
quantitative and survey-based scoping of existing off grid solar markets (as in Singh 
2016) could help cobble together a broader picture of what these markets look like and 
how they are changing over time. 
7.7 Final Thoughts 
 There is no way to provide electricity access without the assistance of non-state 
actors. Despite different politics and policy, all rural electrification programmes must 
engage with private actors, non-governmental organisations, and social enterprises, 
whether to manufacture, sell or distribute technology. These enterprises do the hard 
work on the ground of reaching customers, providing systems, keeping them functional 
and educating end users on their use. To ignore the impact of policy on these enterprises 
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and focus solely on the outputs does little to understand why programmes do or do not 
function. The integral why is the purview of qualitative research and this thesis.  
 The rich and detailed interviews that made up the cornerstone of this research 
offer a peek into the ‘black box’ of enterprise decision-making. Organisations large and 
small believe in the social aspect of their work. Without their solar technologies, how 
can women breathe fresh air in their own homes? How can villages expand their 
agricultural production? How can children do their homework at night? Above and 
beyond all these developmental impacts, the enterprises in this sector believe that 
energy access is a right. This belief is supported by a government that has put rural 
electrification front and centre and by a history of kerosene subsidies. And yet, despite 
the strong social justice element of the work, no enterprise functioned solely on a 
donor-only model. No one was just giving systems away. The range of business models 
on display arose from the interplay between the desire to reach the rural poor and the 
need to create sustainability, to expand scalability and to support a market.  
 Programmatic policies aim to make this balance easier, but no two programmes 
are created the same. To transfer the same approach from one country to another 
without consideration of what makes the approach work is a recipe for inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness. By looking into how enterprises change and what characteristics impact 
their interactions with policy and government, this research offers another way of 
looking at how these programmes function. The findings offer up a set of questions for 
better designing programmes. Policymakers must take account of three things: 1) what 
are the characteristics of the market that each mode of engagement requires, 2) what are 
the characteristics of the current market, and 3) given those characteristics, what are the 
likely changes to the market if this programme is implemented? 
 While there are certainly challenges that are beyond the scope of 
policymaking, a mindfulness that markets are made up of individual actors alters the 
thinking behind our analysis. Changes in support alter the entire landscape of actors, 
sometimes in predictable ways. Improving policy engagement through enterprise-level 
thinking may improve the efficacy of these programmes that seek to provide power to 
so many. Huge strides in electricity access are likely to take place by 2030, but it is up 
to individual governments to make sure that they happen in a way that supports the 
environment, the country, and the people. 
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APPENDIX 1: COMPLETE LIST OF POLICIES SURVEYED 
Country Policy Title Start REF REA Tech License Tariff Subs. Tax Fin. Grants 
Zambia Rural Electrification Act 2003 2003 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zambia Rural Electrification Master Plan 2008 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zambia Electricity Service Access Project 2017 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Malawi Malawi Renewable Energy Strategy 2017 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Malawi Rural Electrification Act 2007 2007 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Niger Niger Solar Energy Access Project (NESAP) 2017 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Mozambique Off-grid renewable energy for rural electrification in 
Mozambique managed by FUNAE  
2016 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Guinea Decentralized Rural Electrification Project (PERD) 2002 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Gambia, The NAMA Design Document for Rural Electrification with 
Renewable Energy 
2016 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Gambia, The Renewable Energy Act 2013 2013 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Zimbabwe Rural Electrification Fund Act Chapter 13:20 2002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lesotho Energy Policy 2015-2025 2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lesotho Lesotho Renewable Energy-Based Rural Electrification 
Project (LREBRE)  
2006 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Angola Power Sector Long Term Vision 2025 2018 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Tanzania Rural Energy Act 2005 2005 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tanzania National Electrification Programme 2013-2022 2013 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Rwanda Rural Electrification Strategy 2016 2016 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rwanda Rwanda Renewable Energy Fund Project 2017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Uganda Rural Electrification Strategy and Plan 2013 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Ethiopia Rural Electrification Fund Establishment Proclamation 2003 2003 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Ethiopia National Energy Policy 2013 2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Ethiopia NAMA for Off Grid Rural Electrification  2016 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Ethiopia Ethiopia Off-Grid Renewable Energy Program 2016 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Namibia NAMA in Namibia Rural Development 2015 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
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Namibia Code of Practice and Register of Products for Namibian Solar 
Energy Technologies 2006 
2006 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Namibia Off Grid Energy Master Plan 2007 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Cambodia Cambodia Rural Electrification Strategy and Implementation 
Plan  
2009 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Cambodia Program For the Development of Rural Electrification  2013 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Cambodia Royal Decree NS/RKT/1204/048 On the Establishment of 
Rural Electrification Fund of the Kingdom of Cambodia 
2004 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire Promoting renewable energy-based grids in rural communities 
for productive uses in Côte d’Ivoire  
2012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kenya Sessional Paper no.4 on Energy 2004 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Kenya Off Grid Solar Access Project for Underserved Counties 2017 2017 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Myanmar National Electrification Plan 2015 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Nigeria Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 2005 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nigeria NERC Regulation for Mini-grids 2016 2016 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Nigeria Nigeria Electrification Project 2018 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nigeria Rural Electrification Strategy and Implementation Plan 
(RESIP)  
2016 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solomon Is. Electricity Access and Renewable Energy Project Phase II 2017 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Solomon Is. Renewable Energy Strategy and Investment Plan  2014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solomon Is. Solomon Island SREP Investment Plan 2014 2014 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Mongolia Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project 2006 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Vanuatu Vanuatu Rural Electrification Project (Phases I and II) 2014 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Vanuatu Vanuatu NAMA 2015 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Gabon Access to Basic Services in Rural Areas and Capacity 
Building Project 
2015 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Nicaragua Offgrid Rural Electrification Project PERZA 2013 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
South Africa Energy Security Master Plan - Electricity 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Africa Non-Grid Electrification Policy Guidelines 2012 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Bangladesh Ordinance No. LI of 1977 1977 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bangladesh Renewable Energy Policy of Bangledesh 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Bangladesh IDCOL SHS Program/Minigrids 2003 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
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Comoros Solar Market Development Project 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
India DDG Scheme - DDUGJY 2015 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
India Notified Rural Regions - Electricity Act 2003 2003 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
India JNNSM - Off Grid Scheme 2010 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Afghanistan Rural Renewable Energy Policy 2013 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lao PDR Decree on Solar Energy Development 2011 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
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APPENDIX 2: SUMMARIZED NARRATIVES OF CHANGE 
ENT ID Starting Business 
Model 
Changes to Business 
Model 
Responsible Policy 
Change 
Overall Themes Reasons for Changes Overall 
Themes 
ENT11 ENT11 began with 
SHS for both grid and 
non-grid connected 
end users, which 
included a government 
subsidy, and the 
expectation of partial 
cost recovery for the 
full capital cost of the 
system. 
1. Shift away from bank 
financing for end users 
1. NABARD subsidy 
cancelled  
1. Revenue Model, 
Customer Interface 
1. The loss of subsidy broke the link 
between the ENT and NABARD banking 
1. Policy 
2. Move from SHS to 
microgrids and rooftop 
2. NABARD subsidy 
cancelled 
2. Product 2. Revenue model for SHS no longer 
worked without subsidy, so moved to 
microgrids and rooftops, which do no 
require end user subsidy 
2. Policy 
3. Move from SHS to 
microgrids also caused a 
shift from total cost 
recovery to partial cost 
recovery 
3. NABARD subsidy 
cancelled 
3. Revenue Model 3. Revenue model for SHS no longer 
worked without subsidy, so moved to 
microgrids, which have a high capex and 
low to moderate likelihood of cost 
recovery, subsidized by rooftop projects 
3. Policy 
4. Shift from both 
electrified and 
unelectrified areas into 
unelectrified hamlets 
4. NABARD subsidy 
cancelled 
4. Customer 
Interace/Customer 
Segments 
4. Revenue model for SHS no longer 
worked without subsidy, so moved to 
microgrids, which are most in demand in 
unelectrified housing clusters 
4. Policy 
5. Shifted from 
manufacturing and 
distribution to just 
distribution 
5. N/A 5. Supply Chain 
Position 
5. Could not compete with other 
manufacturers 
5. Financial 
Aspects 
6. Moved from solar 
lanterns to solar home 
systems 
6. N/A 6. Product 6. Shift of focus to distribution, rather 
than manufacturing 
6. Supply 
Chain 
Position 
ENT12 
 
 
 
 
 
ENT12 began with 
SHS for both grid and 
non-grid connected 
customers, with no 
subsidy, total cost 
recovery for the 
1. Sales dropped for a 
time 
1. GoI introduced a 
scheme with 50% 
subsidy on SHS 
1. Sales 1. When high subsidies are introduced, 
customers stopped buying full price 
products from ENT, alternatively, the 
rumor of subsidies cause prospective 
customers to anticipate subsidies, 
depressing demand 
1. Policy 
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ENT12 systems and the use of 
village level 
entrepreneurs for 
distribution 
2. Moved from selling a 
range of products, now 
primarily sell solar 
products 
2. N/A 2. Product 2.  Only solar products sold 2. Sales 
3. Shifted from VLE for 
distribution to selling via 
NGOs, now selling via 
dealers 
3. N/A 3. Channels 3. Small basket of products did not 
allow for (male) VLEs to make sufficient 
money 
3. Product 
ENT 13 ENT13 began with the 
manufacture of solar 
lanterns. 
1. Stopped sale of solar 
lamps, but still 
provide in grant-based 
projects 
1. N/A 1. Product 1. Found distribution difficult 1. Supply 
Chain 
Position 
2. Began manufacturing 
solar panels 
2. N/A 2. Product 2. Acquired enough capital to 
manufacture panels, felt there was unmet 
demand 
2. 
Infrastructure 
Management 
ENT 14 ENT14 began working 
with solar lanterns 
before moving on to 
SHS, which were for 
both grid and non grid 
connected users. They 
dd not provide a 
subsidy for the 
systems, and expected 
total cost recovery. 
1. Stopped providing 
financing for products 
1. N/A 1. Customer 
Interface/ Channel 
1. Previously enterprise had worked with 
microfinance, but microfinancing fell 
apart 
after 2010 
1. 
Partnerships 
2. Stopped selling SHS  2. N/A 2. Product 2. Manufacturing and Microfinance 
parterships that were used for selling SHS 
ended 
2. 
Partnerships 
3. Trying to move away 
from grant-based 
financing 
3. Microgrid/Minigrid 
CapEx subsidies 
3. Revenue Model 3. Policy uncertainty makes incorporating 
subsidy into revenue model risky 
3. Policy 
ENT 21 ENT21 is a new enterprise with three models for their minigrids. Some minigrids are for grid connected customers only, and expect total cost recovery for the 
system, although some of these minigrids also recieve a government subsidy. The last minigrid model is for non grid connected users, is typically grant-based 
and has the expectation of partial cost recovery. 
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ENT 22 ENT22 has three SHS models, all for both grid and non grid connection end users. The first two are subsidy free, expect the total cost for the system to be paid, 
and are distributed through either microfinance organisations or village level entrepreneurs. The final model is brant-based and therefore has the expectation of 
no or only partial cost recovery. 
ENT 23 ENT23 began by 
manufacturing and 
providing SHS to non 
grid connected users 
with a government 
subsidy through DDG 
tenders, sold the 
systems at price the 
provided only partial 
cost recovery. 
1. Increasing manufacture 
of grid connected 
technology 
1-2. “Government 
incentive schemes” 
are “promoting grid 
tied” projects 
1. Product 1. Incentives from government encourage 
ENT to manufacture products for grid-
connected projects 
1. Policy 
2. Adding more grid-
connected customers 
2. Customer 
Interface/ 
Customer 
Segments 
2. Increasing the manufacture of grid-
connected products increase the amount 
of the ENT's work that focus on grid-
connected customers 
2. Policy 
ENT 24 ENT24 began with 
microgrids for non 
grid connected 
customers, which 
expected only partial 
cost recovery for the 
capex and opex costs. 
1. Shift from microgrids 
to minigrids 
1. Grid expansion 
under 
RGGVY/DDUGJY 
programmes 
1. Product 1. Grid expansion decreased the market 
for small off grid systems 
1. Policy 
2. Shift from unelectrified 
to electrified villages 
2. Grid expansion 
under 
RGGVY/DDUGJY 
programmes 
2. Customer 
Interface/ 
Customer 
Segments 
2. Grid expansion decreased the 
unelectrified market, unreliable grid 
increased demand in electrified villages  
2. Policy 
3. Shifting focus of new 
work to Uttar Pradesh 
3. New UP 
Microgrid/Minigrid 
Policy is “one reason” 
for that change 
3. Customer 
Interface/ 
Customer 
Segments (state) 
3. The new Uttar Pradesh 
Microgrid/Minigrid is favorable to the 
ENT's product, and is a reason why they 
are starting more projects in Uttar Pradesh 
3. Policy 
4. Move from post-pay to 
pre-pay 
model  
4. N/A 4. Revenue Model 4. Poor cost 
recovery from post-pay model 
4. Cost 
Recovery 
5. Inclusion of 
solar/biomass 
hybrid systems 
5. N/A 5. Product 5. Low cost of solar 5. Cost 
Structure 
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ENT 25 ENT25 began with a 
SHS type product that 
focused on providing 
power for non grid 
connected customers, 
expecting total cost 
recovery and 
providing no subsidy. 
1. Shift from unelectrified 
end users to both 
electrified and 
unelectrified 
1. Grid expansion 
under 
RGGVY/DDUGJY 
programmes 
1. Customer 
Interface/ 
Customer 
Segments 
1. Grid expansion brought electricity 
access into areas that they work in 
1. Policy 
2. Focused on 
manufacturing and 
integration, use VLEs 
and MFIs for distribution 
and collection 
2. N/A 2. Customer 
Interface/Channels 
2. Early on, the enterprise realized 
that they could not produce and 
distribute the product 
2. Supply 
Chain 
Position 
ENT 26 ENT26 began with 
SHS that were for both 
grid and non grid 
connected customers. 
The systems recived a 
government subsidy 
and had the 
expectation of partial 
cost recovery. 
1. Shift from government 
subsidy to no subsidy 
1. NABARD subsidy 
was cancelled 
1. Revenue Model 1. JNNSM subsidy cancellation meant 
that it was no longer available for the 
ENT's end users 
1. Policy 
2. Including built-in 
financing for systems 
2. N/A 2. Revenue Model, 
Customer 
Interface/Channels 
2. In period 2007-2009, enterprise finds 
range of new financing through 
partnerships with rural banks, credit 
cooperatives and microfinance agencies 
for end users 
2. 
Partnerships 
ENT 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENT27 began with 
SHS for non grid 
connected users, 
which were distributed 
through self help 
groups and received a 
government subsidy. 
The sale of these 
systems partially 
covered the full cost of 
the SHS. 
1. Enterprise began work 
in conjunction with 
government NABARD 
subsidy, connecting 
NABARD bank with 
SHGs for financing. 
1. NABARD subsidy 1. Partnerships, 
Revenue Model 
1. Needed financing for rural end users, 
NABARD subsidy was available and 
NABARD was happy to partner because 
of ENT's reputation 
1. Policy, 
Customer 
Interface/ 
Customer 
Segments 
2. Shift from subsidy to 
grant-based model 
2. NABARD subsidy 
backlogged, then 
cancelled 
2. Revenue Model 2. The backlogging and then cancellation 
of the subsidy meant that the revenue 
model was no longer viable, so the ENT 
moved to grant-financing 
2. Policy 
3. Increased product range 3. NABARD subsidy 
was cancelled 
3. Product 3.  Previous NABARD subsidy had only 
applied to one product, once cancelled, 
ENT27 added new tech 
3. Policy 
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ENT27 4. Stopped selling solar 
lamps 
4. N/A 4. Product 4. Solar lamps were of poor quality and 
broke 
after approx. one year, didn’t ‘understand 
the technology’ 
4. Quality, 
Knowledge 
5. Enterprise moved from 
loaning to selling systems 
5. N/A 5. Revenue Model 5.  There was a desire to own products 
from end users. 
5. Demand 
6. Enterprise beginning 
own limited company and 
moving towards a 
financially sustainable 
model with no subsidy 
6. N/A 6. Revenue Model 6. Aim for sustainability 6. Revenue 
Model 
ENT 28 ENT28 began with 
SHS and Microgrids. 
SHS were for grid and 
non grid connected 
customers, received a 
grant, had partial cost 
recovery, and were 
distributed through 
SHGs or village level 
entrepreneurs. The 
microgrids are for non 
grid connected users 
only, rely on grant 
funding and expect 
partial recovery of 
opex and capex costs. 
1. Adding larger and 
larger systems to their 
product line 
1. N/A 1. Product 1. It is a “natural progression” as end 
users 
experience a growth in consumer demand 
1. Demand 
ENT 31 ENT31 has a range of products but is currently scaling up their minigrid systems. These are for both grid and non grid connected end users, have a grant subsidy 
for the capital expenditure, but expect hgih levels of cost recovery, either partial or total. 
  
ENT 32 
 
 
ENT32 began their off 
grid electrification 
work with microgrids 
1. Moved from 1 engineer 
with each grid to new 
monitoring technology 
1. JNNSM subsidy 
decreased from 30%-
25%, putting strains 
1. Customer 
Interface, Product 
1. As capital expenditure subsidy 
decreased, ENT had to decrease the 
number of engineers and focus more on 
1. Policy 
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ENT32 for non grid connected 
customers, which were 
enabled by grants for 
capex, and expected 
partial cost recovery. 
and fewer engineers on their finances monitoring to cut costs 
2. Focusing on solar 
products 
2. N/A  2. Product 2. Started with a range of products, but 
had demand for more solar capacity 
2. Demand 
ENT 33 ENT33 is an incubator 
for sustainable energy 
companies, with a 
heavy focus on rural 
electrification, 
including a number of 
off grid solar 
entrepreneurs. 
1. Incubatees do not offer 
subsidy 
to their end users. 
1. NSM-NABARD 
subsidy 
1. Revenue Model 1. Incubatee have too little experience to 
be elifible for NSM-NABARD subsidy & 
financing 
1. Policy 
GOV 21 GOV21 works with 
solar home systems 
and microgrids. SHS 
are specifically for non 
grid connected end 
users, and receive 
either a grant or 
government subsidy, 
meaning that they 
expect only partial cost 
recovery in the sale of 
the system. The 
microgrids they work 
with are also intended 
for non grid connected 
end users, are reliant 
on grants, and expect 
only partial cost 
recovery, primarily for 
the operating costs. 
1. Targeting unelectrified 
areas with SHS 
1. Government 
partnership 
1. Customer 
interface/ 
Customer 
Segments 
1. Partnership with government allowed 
for subsidy, influenced type of end user 
1. Partnership 
2. Enterprise aims to build 
maintenance 
capacity 
2. N/A 2. Value 
Proposition 
2.  In order to “build a stable business 
model” and run future projects as a 
business 
2. Revenue 
Model 
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APPENDIX 3: ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY WORD TABLE 
Tactics Sub-Tactics S2 Codes Examples 
Leveraging 
Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Engaging in 
programmes 
Getting accredited 1. so every bidder has to provide - okay, can they provide this benchmark cost, or below benchmark cost, and also 
they have to get certification from government that their factory and all are properly done. (ENT14) 
2. So though we are an enlisted channel partner of Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (ENT24) 
Applying for 
subsidy 
1. Yeah, there is a central government subsidy which is given by the MNRE for mini grids and that sort of predates 
these state policies. (ENT21) 
2. As of now, for the next upcoming sites, 10 more sites, we are planning to process the application. (ENT24) 
Bidding for 
tenders 
1. We bid like - we said, we'll do 15000, which is 10%. Because that's how much capital I have to do it at that low 
price. (ENT11) 
2. Oh yeah, we do tenders all the time. We don't win all of them. Because tenders, the problem with tenders, the 
basic systemic problem with tenders it's always the lowest quote, right? (ENT11) 
Doing CSR 
projects 
1. I should, now I am. This project is also CSR project, local. (ENT13) 
2. Yeah, social part of our work, I would say is about 20% of our business. 80% is profit. 80% is not profit - 
commercial, commercial. (ENT23) 
Aligning 
with 
government 
priorities 
Following 
government 
priorities 
1. So and then we moved, and the neighboring state, the Jharkhand state - the government said we have a similar 
issue here with these left wing extremists, guerrillas who operate here. So why don't you help us out in those 
neighboring districts, so we moved into three districts which are further into the next state. (ENT32) 
2. But if it's a project tender, and specifications are mentioned then we have to follow MNRE. See, in a project is 
being donated by someone else, they have their own way, their own specifications and we have to follow them. 
(ENT23) 
Moving to areas 
with favorable 
policy 
1. I think that one of the reasons that that [ENT24] has very big plans to scale up in Bihar, but looking at the 
posture of the state government, and a more positive posture from the UP government, plans have shifted towards 
UP, they're neighboring states, so plans have shifted that we'll scale it up in UP, and they are now forming a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the UP government. (ENT24) 
2. Earlier there was a scheme, under which central government were making, they were giving sort of 
encouragement to start on these solar shops. So that time, many people got engaged, but again I think challenge was 
the basket was not sufficient. So most of them now stopped. (ENT12) 
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Leveraging 
Policy 
(cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moving towards 
grid connection 
areas 
1. No, we ugh, it is a combination of both. You see, why we are gravitating to commercial hubs. (ENT24) 
2. I would say, strategy has to factor in the changing reality of time. The changing reality of time is that every 
village is going to be grid connected, so you switch over to commercial hubs who are in need of reliable and good 
quality power, 24 by 7. And this is our focus now. (ENT23) 
Working in 
deregulated space 
1. He wants a playing field where he can legally go and charge a market based tariff and he need concession and 
capital because it's expensive to set up mini grids - each one costs 100,000 dollars for a 30kW type of plant - so he 
needs a subsidy on one hand and he needs a playing ground that has minimal regulations on tariffs, so that he can 
make a viable model out of that (ENT21) 
2. Yes, you can find that in the census, you can get a - So whenever we do sit assessments based on our ESCOs 
requirements, based on our ESCOs product plans, the first thing to check is are these rural notified areas. (ENT21) 
Hedging 
policy risk 
Hedging risk 
through 
partnerships 
1. And finance - we used a very innovative method of financing and we got the apex rural bank - called the 
NABARD - the National Bank for Rural Development in India. They sort of adopted these groups and said that 
there is a financial - something called the Joint Liability Group Financial Instrument. So we would turn them into a 
group and we would give them a loan for the capex of the equipment and they would pay us back in easy 
installments. (ENT32) 
2. Yeah of course! A lot of people, we have a lot of companies that have been built up in association with ENT and 
now they have grown big. (ENT23) 
Hedging risk 
through 
manipulation 
1. I worked with [redacted] - I know how we got subsidy. It's by throwing millions away, right? How we got 
accreditation. We got A1 because we are just like, woah, ... want money, just get the rating. (ENT31) 
2. Now the problem is all these companies also take a government subsidy cumbersome?. They get it after five 
year, three year, four year, so more or less they build it in the price. They think, okay there's only a 20% chance that 
we collect the subsidies. The prices are anywhere high. (ENT14) 
Negotiating Negotiating with 
government 
1. Yeah, that is how it is. We give them the - I mean, we give to the government, this is what we will do this year. 
More or less there is a small discussion, negotiation - 90% it is what we tell them. (ENT23) 
2. Every year ENT creates an agreement with the government on its targets and direction, but using a bottom up 
approach. (ENT23) 
Negotiating with 
implementing 
agents 
1. At that time we did not have finance. That's when we approached the rural banks. Under the Government of 
India, the JNNSM Programme, they said we - they were quite excited. They said, we will be willing to partner with 
ENT considering the reputation the organization has. They agreed to lend to self help groups to procure these lights, 
but they said to us, you have to take care of the repayments. (ENT27) 
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Leveraging 
Policy 
(cont.) 
 
2. And once the person within the Ministry saying, I really don't know what to do about it, you're hopeless. But I 
think what we had to do then as CLEAN and ENT was really bring together a group, bring together the bankers, the 
practitioners and MNRE, because practitioners ended up becoming the go-to between MNRE and bankers, saying, 
okay I promise that they say they're releasing the subsidies very soon, and the bank is saying, I will not finance 
until I get the subsidies. And then you have to go back and tell MNRE, okay, send out the message that it's okay to 
finance, but there won't be a subsidy component to the new finance, right? Yes, MNRE will clear the dues for all 
previous loans given, but starting April 2015 you're still allowed to give financing for energy systems. And 
unfortunately, that was communicated, but banks were still wary, because they said, 'tomorrow if you come back 
and say this was not the right loan to give out...' (ENT33) 
Building 
and 
Leveraging 
Relationshi
ps 
Maintaining 
relationships 
Maintaining 
relationships 
1.And we don't have a civil government option coming there and when I have to take them for inspection, I actually 
escort them to those places because they feel safer with us. (ENT32) 
2. The system works well for ENT because it requires a lot of face time to get through the system and they’re based 
in Jaipur, but it doesn’t work well for out of state companies (ENT13) 
Talking to 
government 
1. I was in touch with a few of the government officers over the summer (ENT25) 
2. We are still talking to government agencies to, so that we get traction somewhere - that's the point. (ENT25) 
Working 
with local 
actors 
Working with 
local actors 
1. it was very well received and we got the entire Sundurbans islands to switch over to this. I mean, I got them to 
design the resolution to what's called the administrative body called the Panchayats, and they gave us permission to 
serve - replace those vehicles with electric vehicles. (ENT32) 
2. We speak to the village, because these are difficult areas where the government grid does not run. So instead of 
permission to take, we speak to the villagers arriving once - even if in a normal areas which is not a conflict area. I 
think that we will still take the okay from the local village Panchayat - the village head man and the village 
committee. (ENT32) 
Partnering 
with 
government 
Partnering with 
government 
1. Yes, we are - we have relationship with the Government of Bihar for training, and like the Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy they have the Surya Programme, that is for solar technicians, we have run one post and we have 
government, (ENT24) 
2. So that is part of the government programme, improving livelihoods of poor women in Bihar, so their focus is 
mainly on the livelihoods side. We actually tried to provide these women a better environment through lighting 
services. So that is how we have connected with the government programme. It's going really good, and we are into 
7th years of our partnership. It's continuing, and we are reaching about 50,000 households there. (ENT28) 
Integrating 
government 
into supply 
Integrating 
government into 
supply chain 
1. So if the government... government wants to come off and help us, so instead of subsidy we will ask, give us 
reach. Give us your distribution channel, give us your public welfare distribution thingy, and we'll work on it. 
(ENT25) 
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chain 2. So as a company we decide that we won't get into distribution, we will have distribution partners, like micro 
finance institution, or government institutions, or NGOs, and there are other companies, like, other... companies 
who have foothold in rural areas. We ultimately use their services. So we'll have distribution partners across. They 
will distribute the kit for us, that is how we'll get the reach. (ENT25) 
Lobbying 
Lobbying 
(cont.) 
Offering 
information 
Offering 
information 
1. So that point, we are trying to raise with the government agencies to make sure - and the government officials - 
to tell them there are five segments, you cannot ignore any of them. (ENT25) 
2. They are responsive, yes, because we make a lot of sense when we talk things. We also have a - not a habit per 
say, but whatever we say, we make sure that we back it up with data. So if the government - anyone can come to us 
and ask us, why do have three lights, three more than lights? We have data for it. Why do have it? Why do we have 
16 ports? We have data for it. (ENT25) 
Giving 
feedback 
Giving feedback 
through formal 
channels 
1. So they, for who to electrify this country they conduct a 1/2, 1 and 1/2 meeting with entrepreneurs they said 
everything, in one year. And that conference, nobody got to speak other than the consultant who had organized this 
conference. Representative of this UP policy for one hour, that was all of it. (ENT31) 
2. Not for any support to the...but I need them, you know, to just give them a feedback of what we feel, and also 
there. So there's a committee they have formed, right? So we have been sometimes in committee meeting when 
they have called some of the manufacturers, us and all. So it was more of a best practices and a feedback sharing, 
right? (ENT14) 
Giving individual 
feedback 
1. And we have given our representation, hopefully they should take care of those areas. (ENT24) 
2. From, we gave a lot of developers' perspective of how it should be, but the reason that that policy and what is 
now, what we would want (ENT31) 
Giving collective 
feedback 
1. the micro grids players should put up a strong case in government that these people do not need grid 
connectivity, because your grid connectivity is bad (ENT31) 
2. And we have made representations and our broader stakeholder group, even ESCOs, do it with us or even 
independently, because it's ultimately going to benefit them, whether we do it or they do it, so they also make 
independent representations. But collectively everyone has sourced still at that level - their perspective is different, 
these new bureaucrats, their perspective is different from what the previous generation of bureaucrats had (ENT21) 
Championin
g policy 
Championing 
policy 
1. So this is a very unique institution, where you will find people working on policy side, working at the grassroots 
level, so we have people working from grassroots to government. (ENT28) 
2. But in Rajasthan, where we've been championing, we say 'open the funnel as much as you can, let more 
entrepreneurs come in, let more consultants come in, let more people with technologies come in (ENT11) 
Being a 
member of 
Being a member of 
an industry 
1. At central level also, there are many organizations also, we are a member of CLEAN - CLEAN - that we are a 
member of, we are not member but there's a cookstove, energy efficient cookstove, smokeless cookstove, some 
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an industry 
organization 
organization organization like that. So there're 4, 5 organizations which keep some annual meetings (ENT12) 
2. But I think what we had to do then as CLEAN and ENT was really bring together a group, bring together the 
bankers, the practitioners and MNRE, because practitioners ended up becoming the go-to between MNRE and 
bankers (ENT33) 
Monitoring Anticipating Anticipating 
government action 
1. And then as we get bigger, maybe also 100 villages, somebody will look up and they will either try to emulate 
our model or they will try to regulate our model. And yeah, surely they will, because right now the tariff is 
something that we never shared with the communities. (ENT32) 
2. See, there are two ways to look at that. One is of course government planning, government says in 3 years every 
village will be electrified. But in reality it may take some more time (ENT23) 
Anticipating 
integration/non-
integration 
1. At some point we, I think, reason dictates that we integrate these two, but it will be some time before we do that. 
(ENT32) 
2. My perspective on this is that not every entrepreneur is looking at it from the perspective of interconnecting with 
a DISCOM. It might be a nightmare for them to do something like that and collect their money from the 
government. That's a certain nightmare. So everyone would want to work over a certain period of number of years 
with as minimum regulations as possible and as minimum competition as possible (ENT21) 
Having 
awareness 
Being aware of 
government vision 
1. the government, when it - the government policy is far more likely keeping a view those areas where there is no 
possibility of grid reach, like you have the faster transmission line becomes so corrupted that it is not economically 
viable to put up the transmission network to put up, say, 20 households. (ENT24) 
2. They had a mandate from Prime Minister Modi to do it, like all the villages needed to be electrified in the next 
three years, right? But they know that it's not going to be able to do it, so now they are thinking, they're going to put 
in infrastructure if not 3 years, 7 years, right?  (ENT14) 
Being aware of 
policy 
1. Well, obviously. Government policy, especially in the UP, in case people have government, because it's basically 
competitive politics which comes into play, at the time of, I would say, elections - in case you have the chance to do 
the same. So you're doomed, okay. So that is the, as of now in Bihar, the only government which is got priority on 
off grid or mini grids is UP. They have brought very good policy, and Bihar is still in draft stage, so that is the 
status as of just now. There are not very many - state governments that have set out a clear cut policy - UP was the 
first one - and Bihar is following suit, but still in the draft stage, they have sought inputs from all the stakeholders, 
and still the policy, it is not out. (ENT24) 
2. We didn't because, you know, the policies operated for a specific period. So when these sites are being put up, 
that policy was, I would say, the time was gone. So for the next set of sites, we're looking for government directive, 
on government circular, the government circular is out with, you put, the application online, and you see the 
government will never honor your post- post processing applications. (ENT24) 
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Waiting Waiting to know 
government 
approach 
1. Everybody says, let' see what government is deciding, government is still learning the ropes, ... years back. 
(ENT31) 
2. Well, it may not create as much chaos as if these people had gotten certified, because now, it's like, okay - people 
can still wait and see if a new certification rule comes in, or if something changes.(ENT33) 
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APPENDIX 4: DISENGAGEMENT STRATEGY WORD TABLE 
Tactics Sub-Tactics S2 Codes Examples 
Avoiding Avoiding 
grid 
Avoiding grid 1. Only one has grid access, and that's a cluster model in which I built one micro grid which was powering - giving 
power to at least two neighboring schools, schools.... So I did not have to interfere with the grid or anything like 
that. They simply look at it, it's for school. One other two, three micro grids happening are totally grid devoid areas. 
(ENT31) 
2. After [the grid arrives], we withdraw the system, if we see that it is not being used, and we shift it to some other 
locations. (ENT28) 
Stepping in 
where the 
government 
in not 
Stepping in where 
the government in 
not 
1. And therefore the government was not able to penetrate those areas. So we started work there in about 25 
villages, and then expanded to 30 villages. (ENT32) 
2. Maintenance is an issue - these pumps are to be shared, they're not good with groups. That's where we step in. 
(ENT32) 
Not 
engaging 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not 
engaging in 
policy 
Not applying 1. There are certain reasons, but the procedure is so winding, that we do not avail of that subsidy (ENT24) 
2. We didn't [apply] because, you know, the policies operated for a specific period. So when these sites are being 
put up, that policy was, I would say, the time was gone. (ENT24) 
Not bidding 1. The off grid space in Jharkhand is really good vis a vis Bihar, because the area, the Naxal affected areas and the 
population is sparse, spread out. So there the off grid solution is much more in demand unlike Bihar so we thought 
that we will fill the bid and win the contract but it got rejected, so now we are disappointed that the ninth, that 
responding to Bihar tender is foolhardy, there's not point in wasting and dropping your money for six months and 
they keep postponing tenders, and for one year you keep looking and you relax, because there's no point (ENT24) 
2. Their experience with tenders is not that great they are “designed to fail” so they don’t really go for them 
(ENT26) 
Disengaging from 
policy 
1. I think the biggest support they could give me is to just stay out of my way at this point. (ENT32) 
2. We were expecting [the subsidy] to happen, you know we even collected the money but in the end it didn't 
happen. Same thing with the solar heater]. If you remember, earlier they were giving out these solar heater also, 
subsidy. Suddenly one particular day they decided we're not giving it. So many of the manufacturers had a lot 
issues. Just the availability of this... It's not trustworthy, it can change. (ENT14) 
Not 
considering 
Not taking grid 
expansion into 
1. No actually, when we do our campaigns, even til now, we do focus - we try to find areas which are completely 
off grid - those are very rare actually. To find areas which has not been connected with grid - like, the connections 
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Not 
engaging 
(cont.) 
policy account are there but there is no power, that is a different thing - few people, few of the households, they just anticipate that 
if the powers have been set, probably the power will comes in a couple of years. So they're still reluctant to get it. 
So finding off grid, completely off grid hamlets. Some of the hamlets we are able to identify, but mostly we work in 
grid areas also. (ENT27) 
2. We have to pay attention, especially if we are installing micro grid. But we do not pay attention when we are 
expanding the solar home systems (ENT28) 
Not waiting for 
policy changes 
1. Whenever policy comes, I will work. Other way I work something else. I have an organization which I intend to 
grow, so we work, have to work [...] So I cannot wait that when government policy will come, what policy will 
come, when it will get implemented, when actually I will get money. I cannot wait for that. (ENT12) 
Not working 
with 
government 
Not interacting 
with government 
1. State level, [feedback is]  not happening. (ENT12) 
2. We have no interactions with the state government. (ENT12) 
Not partnering 
with government 
1. There are no partnerships. Tender participation only. (ENT23) 
2. No we don't. We did try to speak to BREDA people, which is - yeah. But they were interested more in micro 
grids and they want - they said, we had a couple of discussions - they wanted us to identify these hamlets where 
grids could be set up, and they could take forward everything. So they just wanted our help in the identification of 
villages, so I did not find anything useful in that, the discussions. This was long time back, but after that we have 
not discussed. (ENT27) 
Not working with 
government 
1. We haven't, but we - We did not have, we never got the opportunity where the needs were aligned. But we never 
had the - yeah, so we should be trying to do something… (ENT27) 
2. Because government also got thousands of number of pounds, home light systems, whatever. So some people 
work with them. We are not working. ENT is not working. But there're many many people are. (ENT12) 
 
